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Abstract. 
 
 
  ‘In the blink of an eye’ is a figurative expression which, in its most 
basic interpretation describes the experience of a fleeting but momentous 
event. It comes, however, to represent an encounter with the ‘eternal’. That it 
can contain these antithetical elements points to the abidingly paradoxical 
nature of the Augenblick. In this thesis we follow the development of the 
concept from its roots in the theology of Søren Kierkgaard and the myth of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, to its existential eludidation nearly a century later in the 
work of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. In the final two chapters of this 
thesis, the Augenblick is viewed as an inherited conceptual tool for 
metaphysical thought. We apply it to the consideration of an historical epoch 
of great social change and to certain works of art which express its zeitgeist. 
This well-used metaphor is a living idea, it continues to gather meaning to 
itself.  
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Introduction. 
 
  The concept of the Moment (Augenblick) is a theme with variations 
which recur throughout the work of various philosophers. My investigation is 
carried out chronologically, I begin with Søren Kierkegaard followed by 
Friedrich Nietzsche. These two are recognised as being the source for many 
major existential ideas and the Moment as found in this thesis is I assert, a 
core existential idea. Having traced its development through Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger, the concept becomes a 
‘philosopheme’, an inherited conceptual tool of metaphysical thought through 
which we might consider various elements within historical or contemporary 
situations. The final two chapters use the Moment in this way to discuss 
photography and art in particular eras and practitioners. The philosophers I 
refer to in these chapters, though in much less depth, are Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Theodore Adorno, and Ernst Bloch. 
Common to philosophers in this thesis are their own personal 
experiences which underpin the development of their concepts of the 
Moment. Most markedly Kierkegaard, in a moment of decision speaks out 
against the Christian Church in Denmark in a series of pamphlets named The 
Moment. What Kierkegaard refers to as ‘blessed moments’ of his own 
experience give impetus to his more developed concept of Øieblikket (the 
moment). Nietszche experiences a ‘prodigious moment’ in his initial 
conception of the doctrine of Eternal Return and Heidegger speaks of 
experiencing ‘inspired moments’ which ‘oscillate’ in one’s Being. The  
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clarification which comes to one through such Moments must be seized upon 
and exploited for a genuine knowledge of one’s self and one’s time.  
In Chapter One, I look into Søren Kierkegaard’s concept of Moment 
(Øieblik), which Kierkegaard deals with most directly in Philosophical 
Fragments and The Concept of Anxiety. Between two existing translations of 
Fragments there is a difference in how the word Øieblik is transcribed. 
Investigating this difference reveals nuances which become crucial to the 
further unfolding of the concept. Stated briefly they are: the ‘Moment’ of the 
Incarnation, the ‘moment’ of an ‘appropriation of the truth’ (or conversion) 
and a third ‘replete sense’, combining these two in the ‘Moment ‘ expressed 
as ‘the fulness of time’.  
The Moment of the Incarnation stands as a prototype or orginating 
moment, others that follow such as individual moments of subjective 
experience can be thought of as partaking in this original. In considering the 
relationship between Christ and his disciples and a disciple in the present 
who undergoes an experience of conversion, Kierkegaard posits a collapsing 
of the time between the two. Kierkegaard elevates the Moment from ordinary 
time in its description as an ‘atom of time’ to an ‘atom of eternity’. These 
ideas of escaping the temporal domain go on to become central to the more 
developed concept of the Moment. The idea of the fullness of time is related 
to the Greek kairos, the fitting or right time for event to occur. All three of 
these aspects recur time and again through the various thinkers. 
  I follow the socratic form which Kierkegaard gave to the Fragments  
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through which he brings us to an understanding of the difference between 
Socratic knowledge and that which goes beyond it, the ‘truth’ which is an 
object of faith. The attainment of this kind of ‘knowledge’ relies on an 
experience involving variations of Kierkegaard’s concepts of  ‘Anxiety’, the 
‘absolute paradox’ which gives onto a state of wonder, and its culmination in 
the ‘leap of faith’. This ‘knowledge’ or encounter with something transcendent 
or eternal is considered attainable only through an experience of the 
Augenblick. Redeployed by succeeding thinkers it features prominently in 
their notions of the Moment. 
  Although there is no direct progression of the concept from 
Kierkegaard to Nietzsche, (unlike the cases of Jaspers and Heidegger, who 
derive major aspects of their concept directly from Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche), there are some striking similarities between their renditions of the 
Moment. There are also fresh strands which emerge independently in 
Nietzsche. Both philosophers make use of an ‘indirect communication’ 
evidenced by the literary style of their works, which allows seeming 
contradictions in the development of their ideas. 
Chapter Two brings me to Nietzsche’s Gateway named ‘Moment’ in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (TSZ ). Here I consider the place of the Augenblick 
in Nietzsche’s concept of Eternal Return which Zarathustra encounters as 
the weightiest thought, as a vision and an enigma. There are parallels 
between Kierkegaard’s unfolding thought in the Socratic form of the 
Fragments, and the progress of Nietzsche’s revealing the significance of the  
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thought of Eternal Return. Included in Kierkegaard’s various lesser meanings 
of moment is that aspect which designates a stage in a progression or 
process. Nietzsche’s gateway Moment as we shall see marks a significant 
place in a process of death and renewal.  
Through the process of a gradual revealing of knowledge, the one 
who learns is aided by a ‘teacher’ who also learns by that process. The one 
who seeks does not know what he seeks and sees the superficial meaning of 
the idea before properly ‘understanding’ it. Zararthustra, as both teacher and 
learner, shows the gateway to the Geist of Gravity who reacts against it, but 
Zarathustra himself goes on to come to a full understanding of its content. 
For both philosophers the Moment concerns the decision of human being’s 
existence in its deepest sense, the goal or telos is not outside but within 
oneself. It is a Moment of krisis or judgement and concerns a transformation 
of the individual and the freedom won by self-overcoming. 
  When the ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ is discovered Kierkegaard tells us, the 
moment of time vanishes in the eternal. Common to both philosophers is the 
notion of time ‘nullified’ or stopped in a nunc stans. Correspondingly, 
Kierkegaard also speaks of the Moment in terms of kinesis, i.e., change as 
movement, and this chapter questions whether the Moment (gateway) is at 
rest or in motion, whether we pass through a present ‘now’ or carry it along 
with us. Kierkegaard’s pause of wonder at the paradox and the clash of past 
and future in Nietzsche’s gateway both give way: to ‘faith’ for Kierkegaard 
and to admiration of and devotion to Life for Nietzsche. For both, the Moment  
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is one of the communication of love. 
  In this chapter I determine the reason for Nietzsche’s choosing the 
Zoroastrian prophet as his mouthpiece in TSZ and point to various influences 
within it from Zoroastrian texts. What differences there may be between the 
terms Eternal Return (ewige Wiederkehr) and Eternal Recurrence (ewige 
Wiederkunft), are investigated as is the nature of the ‘same’ (Gleich) which 
returns. Learning with Zarathustra the importance of overcoming the 
hindrance of ‘It was’, allows an understanding of this overcoming as a 
redemption. When Zarathustra experiences the full awakening of the thought 
of Eternal Return it is expressed in the estastic song and dance of the 
affirmation of Life. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche share the notions of a collision 
at the limit of reason, its necessary downfall and the emotional upsurge in an 
intense moment of experience, the relief of whose expression allows the 
moment to become the past. 
  Both philosophers are concerned with the communication of a type of 
‘knowledge’ which imparts something ‘eternal’. The connection to the eternal 
must be maintained, for Kierkegaard man must keep reaffirming his relation 
with God. Although the Incarnation is a ‘once and for all’ event for all 
humanity, Christ’s blessings are given individually anew in each moment 
because there is always the possibility of ‘falling back’. For Nietszche, the 
affirmative possibilities are available not ‘once and for all’ but ‘in every 
moment’ and Zarathustra must keep ‘going down’ in order to rise.  
Chapter Three uncovers the Augenblick in the work of Karl Jaspers.  
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Aspects of the moment which we have encountered in our previous 
philosophers in Chapters One and Two reappear in Jaspers. Like 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Jaspers is also something of an outsider, he 
does not develop doctrines but strives to elucidate ideas. In play in this 
chapter is the concept of ‘the source’ (Ursprung) which Jaspers intends in 
various ways. It can refer to one’s ‘context’, both that of one’s own historical 
situation and origins, but also to the ‘context’ of the philosophical tradition 
within which one thinks and appropriates ideas. In this notion can be seen 
again the collapsing of time, past ideas live again. Further, it can be 
understood as more than the particulars of our finite existence, but as 
representing the transcendent ‘Existenz’ or ‘authentic being’ itself an 
awareness of which human being strives toward.  
I examine Jaspers’ early psychological work, Psychologie der 
Weltanschauungen where he first gives his attention to the Augenblick, 
tracing it from its origins in Kierkegaard. This work I find an account of how 
one might be ‘in the moment’ in two inadequate ways, either only for the sake 
of one’s own future aims or for momentary pleasure. I first discover in this 
chapter the adjective augenblicklich which describes an alternative and 
authentic way of being ‘in the moment’, i.e., when it comes to concern one’s 
Existenz. The vanishing temporal moment in Jaspers is described as that 
which occurs ‘athwart of time.’ 
 In Jaspers’ later philosophical work, Philosophy he unfolds the 
concept of  ‘boundary situations’. Such experiences Jaspers informs us,  
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come to us direct and unmediated from the core of our existence and as 
such cannot be clarified by scientific thinking. The failure of human 
understanding in such situations, as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche assert, is a 
necessary condition of approaching the idea of Transcendence. All that one 
can do is ‘surrender’ to the experience of the ‘boundary situation’ and realise 
its potential to reveal something which is usually unavailable. As in our 
previous philosophers, a limit or boundary of possibility is reached and 
transcended though not without a struggle in which one might suffer a 
‘foundering’. 
  I remark in this chapter on Jaspers’ appropriation of Kierkegaard’s 
leap, and his extension of it into a process of three leaps. Again the Moment 
reveals knowledge, or discovers Existenz, not in a temporal instant but in 
stages of discovery. The knowledge must intimately concern the knower, in 
the subjective self, or in Jaspers’ terms ‘soul’. As found in chapters One and 
Two, ultimately man’s existence speaks to him through love. 
  In an example taken from the Psychologie I follow the series of the 
leap in the case of a particular individual’s moment of moral decision and of 
insight, his ‘decision from the source’. As stressed by Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche, one’s attitude to life, how one lives fully ‘in the moment’ rather 
than as though in a partial phase of a process is crucial. One’s situation 
changes ‘from moment to moment’, Jaspers asserts and echoing 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche tells us that therefore its possibilities are 
available ‘in every moment’. As in Nietzsche, the acceptance of this is found  
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in the notion of amor fati. 
For Jaspers, a cipher (Chiffer or Chiffre) is that through which we can 
understand the existential connotations of a subjective and inexpressable 
experience. Finally in this chapter, I look at Jaspers’ elucidation of the notion 
of the cipher and cipher reading. Understanding the cipher as a metaphysical 
device by which we can represent and speak of transcendent things which 
are unavailable as knowledge in a scientific sense, I go on to describe the 
Augenblick itself as one such cipher. 
  Chapter Four concerns Martin Heidegger’s Augenblick or ‘moment of 
vision’. I establish that the concept of temporality is integral to the 
Augenblick, human being having its existence inexorably within time. Yet as 
a ‘moment of vision’, the Augenblick has a necessary relation to some kind of 
‘insight’ (Einblick). I find that Heidegger’s concept of the Augenblick is 
surrounded in apocalyptic imagery which is in keeping with the mood of 
eschatological expectation of his time. As in the Moment of Nietzsche there 
is redemption, Heidegger expects National Socialism to redeem the German 
nation and spirit from the contemporary world which he considers to be 
moving progressively toward political and spiritual destruction.  
  In this chapter I discusss the aspects of apocalypse which impinge on 
Heidegger’s Augenblick, and which echo aspects of the Augenblick 
previously identified, briefly: the eschatological moment which comes at the 
culmination point of a state of crisis must give way to change and the 
instigation of a new order. This crisis is the concern of the immediate present  
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and the change which inevitably emerges from such a situation is considered 
to be imminent. In this lies the idea of the constant presence, the ‘now’ which 
carries the potential Augenblick with it. The present situation must be 
transcended and give way to the awaited future. As with Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche acceptance of the past is necessary to the present and to the 
anticipated future. Being ‘in the Moment’ or in Nietzsche’s gateway allows the 
thinking of the Moment not as the fleeting ‘now’ but as eternity seen as a 
‘standing now’. In this way, we are meet again the idea of the nunc stans. 
The presence of a 'visionary', Messianic figure is necessary to the 
recognition that 'now' is the time. This falls in with the kairotic idea first seen 
in Kierkegaard, that the right ‘man of the moment’ must be present.  
  Heidegger also attempts to make a new beginning in philosophy, to 
redeem the thinking of Being from its perceived oblivion and the theorising 
which inhibits a ‘primary experience’. As with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and 
Jaspers, science is seen as the obstacle to gaining philosophical insight into 
the ‘truth‘ of Being, the ‘there’ of our ‘there-being’ or Dasein. Heidegger 
moves to reinstate questioning as the proper attitude for one to carry out 
such a process of learning. Again there is the idea that one must risk a leap 
into a new way of being, of discovering the world. Heidegger asserts that 
there are certain rare moments of a special intensity which, if we are properly 
‘attuned’ and ‘resolute’, may be seized hold of and exploited for this aim. 
Often just 'for that moment', he says existence can ‘gain the mastery over’ 
the temporal strictures of everyday existence and one can be authentically ‘in 
a moment’ (augenblicklich).   
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  What is disclosed in this Moment are the possibilities which belong to  
one’s ‘ownmost’ self, in particularly the most certain, that of death. Yet this 
moment is ‘unavailable’ to actual experience. By extension the very nature of 
the Being of human being is momentary and finite existence. 
  Paradoxically, and in keeping with the nature of the Augenblick, the 
‘saving power’ which will redeem the contemporary political world will come 
from out of the very situation itself. Correspondingly, the revelation of Being 
comes from out of Being itself. For Heidegger, human being itself  reveals 
the world and is the site of the Moment, there is a relation between this 
notion and Nietzsche’s consideration that human being itself is the bridge.  
Possibilities recur, they are in a sense constantly there or present. 
  Related to the necesssity of the right man being there, the revelation 
depends upon the presence of one ‘who asks the questions’, the learner 
identified in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Jaspers considered that certain 
people of an ‘epochal consciousness’ could have a special insight into their 
time. Nietzsche speaks of the ‘overman’ as the one who in the future will 
comprehend Eternal Return, and Heidegger speaks of ‘the coming future 
ones’ who will know how to be authentically ‘in the Augenblick’. 
Heidegger redeploys Nietzsche’s concept of Return to claim that possibilities 
recur, from out of Being itself. Human being’s existence is momentary but in 
a momentous way. 
  Chapter Five sees a change of approach toward the subject of the 
Augenblick. Having traced the development of the concept from  
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Kierkegaard’s theology into existentialism I now use the concept as a 
conceptual tool. Through it, in this chapter I consider the photographer Henri 
Cartier-Bresson and his work. Cartier-Bresson’s book: The Decisive Moment 
with its original French title Images à la Sauvette (Images on the run) 
provides a departure point and a clue.  The moment is grasped from within a 
process. I consider the stance of the photographer who is out to capture an 
image and the circumstances surrounding its capture, noticing similarities 
with Heidegger’s notions of comportment and attunement. The Moment is a 
hiatus corresponding to Kierkegaard’s pause of wonder which holds 
possibilities which occur at the right time. The concept of kairos, as the right 
time is met with again and reveals further pertinent nuances. I point also to 
the surrealist aspects surrounding Cartier-Bresson’s seizing a ‘moment’. This 
‘moment’ refers to both the seizing and what is seized. 
 Having discussed the practice of Cartier-Bresson I consider the 
equipment, or in Heidegger’s terms ‘gear’ (Zeug) which is necessary to it in 
the shape of the, then new, Leica camera. I contemplate the place of the ‘still’ 
image now, in the age of the moving image, and whether such a still image 
can hold the ‘now’ in presence. The concept of the nunc stans appears again 
as the ‘captured now’ of a photographic image. The photographic still in a 
filmic sequence will be considered in relation to observations made by the 
film editor Walter Murch. A discussion regarding the ability of an image to 
express and represent complex, simultaneously experienced emotions leads 
to the extension of this question in regard to visual and musical 'imagery',  
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one of the focal points of the final chapter. 
  Chapter Six considers a ‘decisive epoch’ which has a focal point in the 
year 1910. A period of great social and political upheaval in Europe, 
impinging on artistic and philosophical aspects of European life, it is full of 
instances of ‘decisive moment’ and proves a fertile ground for consideration 
of the Augenblick. With Heidegger and Gadamer I have defined ‘historicity’ in 
this thesis as the conjunction of historical events with their individual 
experiencing. Gadamer calls this experience of historicity an ‘existential 
moment’. I speak of art in this chapter as a means of expressing an 
‘existential moment’. I consider the documents including works of art which 
describe the prevailing zeitgeist and consider how the ‘will to form’ expresses 
the protagonist’s relation to the world. I notice certain parallels in the 
development of abstract art in painting represented by Wassily Kandinsky 
and of Expressionism in the music of Arnold Schoenberg. 
Schoenberg’s atonal technique and the ‘dissonance’ it produces 
becomes a motif for describing the epoch itself. The present is comparable to 
the Moment held open in expectation of an impending event. I reflect on the 
fleeting moment of the Dada movement and its antics and consider what 
might determine whether ‘breakthroughs’ in art can be considered as 
revolution or evolution. I elucidate the ‘moment of inspiration’ as found in 
Adorno’s concept of Einfall which incorporates the subjective impulse with its 
objective ‘working out’ in a musical composition. I revisit the idea of the 
authentic, striving and questioning individual. This idea has permeated the  
13 
unfolding of the concept of the Augenblick, and appears again in the form of 
those whom Ernst Bloch refers to as ‘figures of venturing beyond’. I ask what 
it is they venture beyond and establish that their impulse is to express the 
inexpressible subjective and momentary experience of which I have spoken 
through the cipher of an objective work of art. I come to see with Bloch that it 
involves a dangerous moment of decision, one which risks one’s very self in 
a ‘Faustian Wager’.    
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Chapter 1.   
Of Time and The Eternal, Søren Kierkegaard’s Moment (Øieblik). 
 
  Søren Kierkegaard, as all ‘philosophers of the moment’1 who follow 
admit, is the first to have elevated the concept of the Augenblick from a mere 
instant in time. For Kierkegaard the moment receives its meaning from 
Christianity, but it is from Kierkegaard that the moment receives its meaning 
for existentialism.  Although in the notes to Kierkegaard’s Journals, Howard 
V. and Edna H. Hong assert  that ‘direct or extended considerations of this 
important concept are not numerous in either the works or the Papirer’2, the 
concept of the moment seems to permeate much of Kierkegaard’s work. He 
deals with the concept most directly in two particular books: Philosophical 
Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy (1844), a hypothetical work written 
under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, and The Concept of Anxiety, A 
Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of 
Hereditary Sin (1844), psychological rather than hypothetical, written under 
the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis and published only four days after 
Fragments. Of these two, I take the Fragments as my main point of 
                                            
1 Safranski, Rüdiger, Martin Heidegger, Between Good and Evil, Harvard University Press, 
1998, p. 180 
 
2 Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, Editors: Hong and Hong, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington and London, 1975, notes  to section on Moment/Momentary, p. 207 
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departure. 
  In order to elucidate Kierkegaard’s ‘moment’ and its surrounding 
concepts I have also made use of the Danish text of Fragments, 
Philosophiske Smuler eller En Smule Philosophi (henceforth Smuler3), for 
reasons to do with translation that will become apparent. I also refer to 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (CUP) (1846) 
which, written under his own name rather than a pseudonym, fulfils 
Kierkegaard’s promise to further develop the ideas in Fragments. 
Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, which as Walter Lowrie tells us, rather 
than being private confessional journals were written for public consumption, 
provide clues for his reading public. They have provided this text with a 
valuable expansion of the ideas found in his works.  Kierkegaard's written 
works resist all categorisation, whether that of theologian, philosopher or 
poet and as Kierkegaard asserts, it is the task of each individual to think, 
reflect and abstract their 'own actuality'4.  ‘Each generation has its own task’5 
                                            
3 I want to thank the staff in Interlibrary Loans and Document Delivery at Murdoch 
University Library for their invaluable help in  acquiring  necessary books and documents 
for this thesis, and particularly in relation to their liaising with the State Library in Victoria, 
whom I also thank, to gain access to the Danish text of Smuler which is technically too old to 
lend.  
 
4 The Moment and Late Writings, Kierkegaard's Writings, XXIII,  by Søren Kierkegaard, Editor 
and Translator: Edward. V. Hong and Edna. H. Hong, Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey, 1998, Historical Introduction, p. xiii. 
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as Haufniensis says, to rework the works of the past according to their 
present and their future as it appears in that present.  When reading 
Kierkegaard’s works one needs to bear in mind the position of each of their 
pseudonymous authors, some of whose opinions are contradictory. This 
pseudonymous authorship enables a distancing ‘indirect communication’, 
which allows Kierkegaard to assume contrary points of view toward the same 
questions and explore ideas in a hypothetical manner. Kierkegaard offers an 
explanation of his use of pseudonyms at the end of CUP,  asserting that 
each work is that of its cited author but that the ‘responsibility’ is his as a 
‘souffler [prompter]’. He maintains a remote position from his authors, he tells 
us, having assumed them not from fear of any ‘penalty under the law’ 
because he is not aware of having committed ‘any offense’, but because they 
are ‘essential’ to the ‘production itself’6. The authors are psychologically 
different individuals and the works are from their own perspective.  
  The questions raised in Fragments are viewed, Johannes Climacus 
tells us, from ‘within a pagan consciousness’, the basis from which Climacus 
                                                                                                                             
5 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on 
the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin,  Editor and Translator: Reidar Thomte, with Albert B. 
Anderson, princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1980, p.9 
 
6 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Editors and 
Translators: Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
1992, p. 625 
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develops the ‘higher’ concepts of Christianity. Climacus’ point of view in 
relation to Christianity is ‘lower’ than Kierkegaard’s, that is, not from a 
position of faith. He even declares that he is not a Christian. ‘Climacus’ 
comes from the Greek: Klimax - ladder, and, according to the Hongs, refers 
to logical or philosophical ladders of thought, or intellectual pursuits. 
Fragments does indeed follow the form of a logical argument.  
The pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis means ‘watchman of 
Copenhagen’ indicating that the ‘author’ is one who is an observer. He is 
sketched in The Concept of Anxiety as something of a spy who imitates the 
psychological state which he sees in those around him. By doing this he can 
present himself to an individual as one who also possess this state and 
thereby offer ‘relief and satisfaction’7 to the individual who will hopefully be 
persuaded that their state is shared and therefore understood. The Concept 
of Anxiety is a work of psychology, Reidar Thomte in his Historical 
Introduction to the book tells us that Kierkegaard’s notion of psychology 
differs from the idea we have of it in the present day, it is 'a phenomenology’ 
which is ‘based on an ontological view of man, the fundamental 
presupposition of which is the transcendent reality of the individual, whose 
intuitively discernible character reveals the existence of an eternal 
                                            
7 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, op cit, pp. 54-6  
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component'8. Unlike Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety reflects 
Kierkegaard’s personal history concerned as it is with existential anxiety, a 
state to which he was no stranger. In fact, the Hongs tell us in their notes to 
the book that the original draft has Kierkegaard‘s name as author. In CUP 
Kierkegaard tells us that this work is more ‘direct’, ’and even somewhat 
didactic’, ‘Perhaps the author thought that a communication of knowledge 
might be necessary before a transition could be made to inward deepening‘9. 
  Kierkegaard’s instructions in CUP are that in referring to the texts one 
should cite the respective pseudonymous author’s name rather than 
Kierkegaard’s own. I have endeavoured to follow this instruction. However, 
taking him at his word that interpretation of the works is the task of each new 
generation, and assuming that by now it is well known that all the 
pseudonyms represent aspects of the same Kierkegaard, I have in places 
used the name ‘Kierkegaard’ to avoid confusion (mine). I am, however, 
careful to establish which text various quotes and ideas come from. 
  I will first discuss ‘Øieblik’ as the expression ‘in the blink of an eye’ 
before endeavouring to tease out a problem concerning two different 
translations of the Fragments where the word ‘moment’ is rendered in 
different and perhaps conflicting ways. The socratic form of Fragments is 
                                            
8 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, op cit, p. xiv 
 
9 Kierkegaard, CUP, I, op cit, p. 271 
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considered next and the way in which Kierkegaard’s argument unfolds within 
the text has some influence on the form of the chapter itself. I will consider 
the ‘reciprocal relation’ between ‘the god’ and human being which, for 
Kierkegaard is necessary to an understanding of the moment. Following the 
development of the concept from ‘an atom of time’ to its elevated sense as 
the moment of Incarnation and the consequent moment of subjective 
appropriation, we find its culmination in a more ‘replete sense’ as ‘an atom of 
eternity’ or the ‘fulness of time’. The concept of Anxiety is next considered in 
its fundamental relation to the moment as are the notions of paradox and 
wonder, transition and the leap of faith. The interpretations of moment, freed 
for the purposes of reflection from temporal constraints (though always 
dependent on the temporal) allow Kierkegaard to posit a collapsing of time 
between that of Christ and his disciples and those who can be called 
disciples in the present. 
 The  Fragments ends in a resolution rather than a finalising conclusion 
and this leads me to discuss resolution of another kind, that of Kierkegaard 
himself and his task of thinking of Christianity in a new way. His task comes 
to a culmination point in the publishing of a series of polemical pamphlets 
called ‘The Moment’ toward the close of his life. Finally, a brief description of 
the ‘blessed moments’ which Kierkegaard himself experiences early on in his 
life and which presage the more developed concept.   
20 
The Beautiful Expression. 
  The word for ‘moment’ in Danish is Øieblik or Øieblikket (which 
includes the article), it is derived from Øiets Blik (‘a blink of an eye’). The 
phrase ‘in the blink of an eye’ illustrates the seemingly instantaneous event 
when suddenly everything is changed. It is used to designate the fleeting 
nature of a moment of experience and perhaps we might also consider that it 
refers to the momentary nature of life itself. It refers also to the suddenness 
of occurrences, and the complete change of direction or view that these can 
bring. Unlike the literal ‘in the blink of an eye’, Øiblikket can also mean simply 
moment or instant in time in a more common and ordinary sense and indeed 
is so used by Kierkegaard throughout his works. The Latin, ‘Momentum’10  
Kierkegaard tells us, expresses the movement of moments vanishing like all 
‘now’ instants in the succession of time. The Latinate Momenter is also found 
in two places in the Danish text of Fragments (Smuler), where it refers to a 
moment in the sense of a phase or stage in a progression of something like 
an unfolding logical argument. Momenter is translated in the English text as 
‘moment’ because in English this word can serve for the meaning of phase or 
stage as well11.  
                                            
10 Kierkegaard,  The Concept of Anxiety, op cit, p.88 
 
11 We might mention here Kierkegaard’s book title: Stages on Life’s Way, which describes the 
transitional process of a developing consciousness through the stages of the aesthetic, the 
ethical, and the religious (in two senses). In other words, these are the individual ‘moments’  
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 In  The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard speaks of the phrase thus: 
The moment 'is a figurative expression and therefore not easy to deal with. 
However, it is a beautiful word to consider. Nothing is as swift as the blink of 
an eye, and yet it is commensurable with the content of the eternal’12. Such a 
figure of speech gives pictorial form to the concept but as a metaphor it can 
go beyond the image, it acquires the power to accumulate meaning in excess 
of a mere moment of time. Kierkegaard comments that, in contrast to this, 
‘Greek art culminates in the plastic, which precisely lacks the glance’, that is, 
the more profound ‘insight’ or ‘vision’ implicated in this metaphor. This is, he 
says, because ’the Greeks did not grasp the concept of spirit in the 
profoundest sense nor therefore comprehend sensuousness and 
temporality... in striking contrast to Christianity, in which God is pictorially 
represented as an eye’'13.  We might think of the glance or insight as a direct 
communication coming to us from the ‘eye’ of God.   
  If we take the term ‘plastic’ art to refer to the rendering of objective 
representations of the external things in the world then we might assume that 
by lack of ‘spirit’, Kierkegaard refers to a lack of a subjective element in 
Greek art.  It is this very subjective element which is key to understanding the 
                                                                                                                             
in the progress. 
 
12 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, op cit, p. 87 
 
13 Ibid, p. 87  
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intention of Kierkegaard.14  Kierkegaard brings us a new understanding of 
‘self-concern’ which is identified with spirit. As Roy Matinez tells us in  
Kierkegaard’s Ideal of Inward Deepening, ‘inwardness corresponds to the 
‘self’ and is predicated as infinite’, while ‘externality corresponds to the ‘world’ 
and is qualified as finite.’15  
Moment, moment, Moment, A Difference in Translations. 
 
  There are two translations of Fragments into English. The first, by 
David F. Swenson in 1936, was slightly revised by Howard V. Hong in 1962, 
who added a Foreword and Commentary. It was later re-translated directly 
from the Danish by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong in 1985. A 
comparison of the two translations reveals typographical differences in their 
rendering of the word ‘moment’. This in turn raises the question as to 
whether there are any differences in the interpretation of  ‘moment’ which 
might reveal a different nuance of meaning, or even that meaning has been 
                                                                                                                             
 
14 Kierkegaard refers to Paul’s ‘poetic’ use of the phrase in Corinthians 15:52 where he tells 
us that 'the world will pass away in a moment (in the twinkling of an eye)’ and that this use 
also ‘expresses that the moment is commensurable with eternity, precisely because the 
moment of destruction expresses eternity at the same moment.' The Concept of Anxiety, p. 88. 
 
15 Martinez, Roy, Kierkegaard’s Ideal of Inward Deepening, Philosophy Today, Summer, 1988; 
32, p. 110 
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lost or distorted. 
   In the Danish language it is the convention to capitalise all nouns. 
Swenson, in his translation holds over the capitalisation of some nouns which 
represent important concepts like Faith etc, including some instances of the 
word ‘moment’ but not all. Swenson’s differentiations designate particular 
meanings of the moment in certain parts of the text of Fragments. The 
differentiations are: the ‘Moment’ with a capital ‘M’ which represents the 
Moment of Incarnation occurring at an actual point in time, ‘moment’ without 
a capital which is one of ‘subjective appropriation of the truth’, that is a 
moment of conversion or revelation, and Moment italicised and capitalised 
which might be thought of as some third thing incorporating the two others in 
a higher concept. The italics are represented in the Danish text by spacing of 
the letters.  
  It is generally accepted that there is more than one type of moment in 
Kierkegaard. There are certainly two: the ‘once and for all’16 moment of the 
Incarnation, and the subjective moment of conversion. Perhaps a case can 
be made for the third which forms a synthesis of these two in a higher 
concept without eliminating either of them and which, as we shall see, the 
process of Kierkegaard’s unfolding thought in the Fragments reveals as an 
aspect of the moment which finds its expression in the phrase ‘the fullness of 
                                            
16 Nielsen, H.A.,Where the Passion Is, A Reading of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments, 
University Presses of Florida, Tallahassee, 1983, p. 113  
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time’. At the base of all of these, the simple moment of time must not be 
ignored; but it may be going too far to count it as a fourth ‘moment’. 
  In the Hongs’ translation we get lower-case ‘moment’ throughout, 
including the italicized the moment, which includes its article where 
Swenson’s does not. In fact, the Hongs’ hold over no capitals at all from the 
Danish convention, not even for concepts such as ‘faith’ or ‘the god’. In not 
doing so, the Hongs in a sense, bring us closer to the original text, in that 
Smuler makes no distinction between ‘Moment’ and ‘moment’ (although it 
does use spacing to differentiate ‘the moment’ ), and we are free to come to 
our own understanding. However, meaning is neither lost nor particularly 
distorted by Swenson’s distinctions, and although there are occasional 
places in the text where it seems debatable as to whether a particular use of 
Moment really refers to the Incarnation itself or to the moment of time in 
which it occurs, there are none that can’t possibly be construed as the 
Incarnation after a little consideration. However, in making his distinctions, 
Swenson may risk misrepresenting Kierkegaard’s intended meaning in not 
leaving some things undecided in the text rather than having meaning fixed. 
In this way its paradoxical and transcendent level is maintained, the either/or 
question is not answered, and the text in question remains open.  It is 
significant that Fragments ends in a ‘resolution’ rather than a ‘conclusion’ of 
the hypothesis. Swenson may also be depriving the reader of the challenge 
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of coming to their own understanding of the text; they might enjoy, like 
Kierkegaard, their concepts being kept ‘young and beautiful and lovely to 
look at’17.   
  The Hong’s translation also seems closer to the original in its retention 
of Kierkegaard’s literary device of the repetition of phrases which Swenson 
has removed in favour of his own wording. Though Swenson’s translation is 
more explanatory, which can be helpful, he imposes his own interpretation, 
which may be misleading. Sometimes I have been grateful for Swenson’s 
form and sometimes for the Hongs’; unpicking Kierkegaard’s meaning is 
made a little easier having the two versions. Yet we must remember that 
Kierkegaard does not set out to make things easy to understand. Whether 
Kierkegaard himself intended any difference of nuance between the 
moments can only be decided by the individual reader. Kierkegaard 
comments in the Journals: ‘Everything essentially Christian has a double 
meaning [Dobbelttydigt], is a redoubling [Fordoblelse]. And this is what is so 
strenuous, also what makes it difficult to have an understanding with 
others’18. So the concept is deepened by the redoubling effect of having more 
than one layer of meaning. We see this in the very title: Philosophical 
Fragments or A Fragment of Philosophy. 
                                            
17 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, quoted in The Moment and Late Writings, op cit, p xxi  
 
18 Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers Volume III, op cit, Section 3664,  
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  Victoria S. Harrison, in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments: A 
Clarification19 (1997), relies heavily on Swenson’s distinctions, carrying over 
his three definitions of ‘moment’ in order to identify three corresponding 
aspects of Kierkegaard’s concept of  the ‘condition’ for faith. She declares 
that in making these clear distinctions Swenson ‘saves the reader a lot of 
work in ascertaining which concept is intended’ and that Swenson’s ‘system 
of reference’ ‘enable(s) Climacus to communicate more easily with his 
readers.’20 However, I think we must wonder whether it is correct to base new 
work on these distinctions, particularly as the Hong’s later translation of the 
work does away with them. Furthermore, in the Hongs’ notes to 
Kierkegaard’s Journals, we are told that Kierkegaard was not always 
consistent with the capitalising of nouns even within the conventions of his 
own language.    
   The Latinate Momenter is also found in two places in the Danish text, 
Smuler. This word means a moment in the sense of a phase or stage in a 
progression of something like an unfolding logical argument. Momenter  is 
translated into the English text as ‘moment’ because in English this word can 
serve for the meaning of phase or stage as well. There are phrases in 
                                            
19 Harrison, Victoria S., Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments: A Clarification, Religious 
Studies, 33, Cambridge University Press, UK. 1997 
 
20 Ibid, p.458 
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Smuler, such as Øieblikket i Tiden or ‘Moment in time’ which appear in the 
English as a Moment which at first glance seem like the use of capitals for a 
moment which is not the Incarnation, but unlike a moment of time or instant, 
it actually can be thought to refer to the moment in time, the incarnation. The 
word ‘moment’ is also used in the Swenson translation in instances where 
the Smuler itself does not use Øieblikket but ‘Nu’, that is, ‘now’ or this present 
moment of time. In these cases it would have seemed judicious for Swenson, 
with so much resting on the proper understanding of the ‘moment’, to make 
this distinction clear by using an alternative word. The Hongs’ translation on 
this occasion uses ‘this very instant’. 
  Only adding to the confusion, there are places where Smuler uses 
Øieblikket which Swenson translates as ‘instant’ not ‘moment’ (pp. 15-16). 
Then again, there are places where the Smuler uses Øieblikket and Swenson 
renders it ‘moment’ yet it obviously means an instant of time (p.22), the 
moment when the Incarnation occurs. There is a place where, in relation to 
the collision of reason with the paradox Swenson renders the sentence: ‘all 
offense is in its essence a misunderstanding of the Moment’21 . This Moment 
in Smuler is Øieblikket spaced out for stress and the Hongs have the 
moment italicised. So, in this instance Swenson has seemingly made a 
simple mistake. Furthermore, in a draft of this section, noted in the Hong 
                                            
21 Kierkegaard, Fragments, Swenson p.64, Hong p.50 
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translation, Kierkegaard has: ‘in the moment of collision of understanding’.  
  These discrepancies come hand in hand with noted problems 
concerning the translation of Kierkegaard’s concepts into English in general. 
Kierkegaard chose very precise words in Danish which often do not find an 
accurate counterpart in English. There is a body of correspondence between 
Walter Lowrie22  and Alexandre Dru (who first translated parts of the journals) 
and Swenson, regarding the ‘torment’ of the translation process. Lowrie tells 
of Swenson once asking him how to deal with certain words. Lowrie merely 
shakes his head, and looks into his eyes ‘with silent despair’23. 
  In a footnote to Lowrie’s article Existence as understood by 
Kierkegaard and Sartre (1950), he criticises Swenson’s translation of 
Kierkegaard’s two separate words for existence (Tilvaerelsens, and existere) 
with one English word, effectively clouding the crucial distinction between the 
two . And in his Preface to The Concept of Dread Lowrie quotes the CUP 
regarding the link between Kierkegaard’s concepts of Fear, Dread and 
Despair but specifically states that he does not follow Swenson’s translation. 
                                            
22 Walter Lowrie, was one of the first people to translate Kierkegaard’s work into English 
[especially The Concept of Dread, later The Concept of Anxiety] and has written two 
authoritative books on his life as well as various prefaces to translations of other of 
Kierkegaard’s works. 
 
23 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread  Translator: Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, 
1946, Preface, p. viii 
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He doesn’t explain why24 but it would seem that Swenson’s translation of 
Kierkegaard was already in question. So, how much should we rely on his 
formulations of the ‘moment’? 
  Swenson himself speaks of his translation of the word ‘moment’ in his  
Something About Kierkegaard, 1945: ‘I am prompted to say a word about 
‘Momentet’. This word is not generally identical with the English ‘Moment’ but 
rather means phase, part, factor, aspect, or the like.’ It can, of course, also 
mean any of these in English. He goes on say: ‘To live ‘i Momentet’ [that is 
‘in the moment’] is to live submerged in some partial phase of a whole, to the 
exclusion of the rest, or of the control of the whole, ie, to live anarchically.25  
This can also be applied to the case of Time and its moment, but this would 
be merely a special application, not a general equivalent’26 .  Regarding the 
word Øieblik  he says that he thinks in some contexts it ‘is exactly equivalent 
to’ ‘instant’, ’but not in all, and particularly not in the context of the rubrics for 
                                            
24 Lowrie also criticises Swenson on other points of phraseology. 
 
25 Either living in the moment in an ‘imperfect sensuality’ or engrossed in concern for the 
future are both ways of missing the significance of the ’moment’. Kierkegaard’s figure of the 
Seducer in Either/Or, is a representative of the person who lives ‘in the moment’ in such a 
way. One of Kierkegaard’s ‘stages on life’s way’ is this aesthetic stage, which may or may 
not give onto an ethical and then to a religious ‘stage’. 
 
26 Swenson, David, F., Something About Kierkegaard, Augsburg Publishing 
House,Minneapolis, 1945, pp. 209-210. 
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the pamphlets of the agitation’.  In this use of Øieblik Swenson says: ‘the 
stress is not upon the instantaneous, but upon the present as filled with 
significance, e.g. Christianity brought to bear upon the contemporary 
situation, and through the medium of the pamphlet or newspaper,…’ He 
says: ‘It is in this way ‘Øieblikket’ is used in the Smuler’. Then he adds, ‘also: 
a ‘moment’, which is also the ‘fulness of time’.27 Its italicization here is a clue 
we shall soon follow to trace the meaning of the moment, posited as a third 
thing. 
The Socratic Form of Fragments. 
  Philosophical Fragments is a thought project, and its form follows the 
progression of an unfolding hypothesis in a logical form. Through it Climacus, 
suffers the progress of his thoughts on the question of whether the historical 
event of the Incarnation can have significance for man’s ‘eternal 
consciousness’. In this dialogue with himself he puts up objections which he 
anticipates from his readers. In order to carry out this project, Climacus 
adopts the Socratic method. Socrates taught others ‘in his own way’, he tells 
us, and that is what Climacus himself claims to be doing by this method. He 
is satisfying ‘claims within himself’ as he satisfies those ‘that others might 
have on him’. He is exercising this project of thought for the sake of imparting 
knowledge but also for the sake of working out knowledge for himself by the 
                                            
27 Ibid, pp. 209-210.  
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process. This is the Socratic shape of the Fragments, Kierkegaard reveres 
Socrates while wanting to go beyond him. In order to preserve the finely 
nuanced development of the argument and the emerging concept of the 
‘moment’ within it, yet at the risk of seeming long-winded and repetitive, the 
following discussion retains something of the movement of Climacus’ 
thought. All progression is a suffering, Climacus says, something to be 
undergone, and one devotes oneself to the progress of an idea because it is 
a passion.  
  The title page of Fragments bears an epigraph which lays out the 
three part question with which the book is taken up and which are resolved in 
the Moral at the end: ‘Can a historical point of departure be given for an 
eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than 
historical interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical 
knowledge?’28. That is to say, is it possible that the god who is ‘wholly other’ 
can come into time and history at an actual point and impart the truth 
required for a human being to share in the future eternal life. Can we think 
about eternal questions from the point of view, not of a Christian or of 
revelation, but from facts in the world. The fact at issue here is that of the 
incarnation, which was a fact of history for Kierkegaard . 
  Can such an incarnation ‘really communicate anything eternal - i.e., in 
                                                                                                                             
 
28 Kierkegaard, Fragments, Hong, op cit, Title page.  
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the two fold sense of communicate, to make known and to impart its life, that 
is, as Ozro Jones Jr. in his dissertation The meaning of the Moment in 
Existential Encounter according to Kierkegaard, points out, to pass on 
knowledge of and to bring one to an understanding of it29 . These two 
meanings are important because, according to Kierkegaard, the truth 
contained in knowledge of something is not the truth imparted by faith to an 
individual human being. Hence the question is about whether it is possible to 
base an eternal happiness upon historical knowledge. We might take 
‘happiness’ here in the sense of the Greek eudaimonia or personal well-
being, even though we are speaking of an historical event. But if we further 
consider that ‘happen’ and ‘happiness’ have the same Old English root in 
‘happen’ meaning ‘a stroke of fortune’, ‘an opportune time’ and hence 
‘happiness’ is the result 30, then we can think of the historical event as a 
stroke of fortune for human being.  This meaning allows us to think of it as 
something like Kairos.  
  Climacus, outlining the ‘Project of Thought’, wants to go beyond 
Socratic thinking, to elucidate the boundary of difference between knowledge 
                                                                                                                             
 
29 Ozro Jones Jr., The meaning of the Moment in Existential Encounter according to Kierkegaard, 
Temple University, STD, (Dissertation presented to Temple University in partial 
requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology), January 15th , 1962, p. 7 
 
30 My thanks to Dr. Paul MacDonald for pointing out this connection. 
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and faith. To begin, he lays out the difference between the passing on of 
knowledge by the Socratic way and of truth of the god grasped by faith. The 
Socratic notion of knowledge was that it was immanent within human being 
and had been from eternity. Climacus tells us that, in that sense, for the 
Greeks eternity was the past.  Such knowledge could to be drawn out by a 
teacher who aids the recollection (anamnesis31 ) of the knowledge. However, 
for Christian thought, he tells us, eternity is the future because the truth 
comes from outside of time in an eternity which only really begins from the 
moment of revelation of that truth by the teacher who is the god. Such 
knowledge cannot be passed on by a human teacher by aiding memory like 
a midwife, but must be brought by an advent of the god into human being’s 
finite world, it must be as it were begotten in a procreative act or event. The 
Socratic moment is an occasion for the bringing of knowledge to the person 
who already possesses it, though they may at first be unaware that they do. 
But as a decisive event, the moment is that of the incarnation, the coming 
into existence of the god from outside of time and existence. Also, the 
moment can be thought of as the god himself, [Christ].32  The incarnation is 
the historical point of departure for an eternal consciousness of the truth. 
                                            
31 The Greek concept of Anamnesis is a re-remembering of something. Knowledge which one 
doesn’t realise one has can be brought back to mind, one can be ‘reminded’ of it. 
 
32 We find this idea again in Karl Jaspers. 
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The ‘Reciprocal Relation’. 
  There is a ‘reciprocal relation’ between the teacher and the learner, 
the teacher is a learner and the learner also a teacher, this constituting the 
Socratic relationship, the highest possible between human beings. They are 
equal to and like an echo of each other, Climacus tells us, and therefore 
there is no moment. But the god does not need this relation, there is no 
occasion that can have an effect on the god, what could possibly ‘move’ him 
whose resolve is from eternity. He can only move himself and by love not by 
need, ’for love does not have the satisfaction of need outside itself but 
within.’ The god’s resolve or love is the motive [the ‘basis of movement’33] 
and the goal. When fulfilled in time ‘in its most replete sense’, he says, ‘it 
expressly becomes the moment [Swenson: Moment, Smuler: Øieblikket]’34 . 
Here we find a direct link between the notion of fulfilment and the moment.  
Only in love is ‘the different’ made equal and man acquires the possibility of 
eternal happiness, an ‘eternal consciousness’ as Climacus says. It is a new 
capacity for understanding an ‘eternal communication’ and a subjective 
inward relation with ‘the god’. 
  Climacus goes on to ask how the teacher and learner are to meet on a 
non-Socratic level. The ‘elevation of the learner’ in an ascent to the god may 
                                            
33 Kierkegaard, Fragment, Hong, p.25 
 
34 Ibid, p. 25  
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be too much for the delicate human being, like the gilding of the lily which 
breaks its tender stem. So it must be brought about by a descent of the god 
appearing as the equal of the learner. He must come in the form of a servant, 
not in disguise with a cloak or other garment but must actually put on the 
form of the servant, as ‘his true form’. This is the kind of love, that Climacus 
speaks of, it wills to be the equal of the beloved, and in his omnipotence the 
god is capable of this love, of which, he says, Socrates was not capable’35 . 
Socrates’ ‘ignorance’ is seen as an expression of his equality with and love 
for the learner. ‘This unity was the truth’ the unity between teacher and 
learner can convey the Socratic truth. ‘But’, Climacus says again,  ‘if the 
Moment is to have decisive significance then things must be otherwise. What 
is relayed in the Socratic manner is not the truth but knowledge, the learner 
owes only the occasion of this truth to the teacher, for he possessed it 
himself already. The relation between the learner and the god as teacher 
however, is one of owing the teacher everything. The love of the god must be 
an aid to the truth in the learner but also a giving birth to the learner as a new 
person. As the teacher gives birth to the learner he also gives birth to 
himself, i.e. he comes into existence36. Between human beings to ‘be of 
                                                                                                                             
 
35 Kierkegaard, Fragments, Hong, op cit, p.32 
 
36 Ibid, Supplement, p.189 
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assistance is supreme, but to beget is reserved for the god’37. A begetting, 
from which something springs forth, is an act of creation, not simply creation 
occurring of itself. 
An Atom of Time. 
 
  In the initial unfolding of the moment an instant of time is implicated, 
the instant when a learner or disciple might discover that the truth has been 
in him since eternity (the past in the Socratic position), yet without the learner 
being aware of it. This moment is just another moment in time 
indistinguishable from all other moments of time. It is lost and cannot be 
located anywhere because, as Climacus says: ‘'The temporal point of 
departure is nothing, for as soon as I discover that I have known the Truth 
from eternity without being aware of it, the same instant this moment of 
occasion is hidden in the eternal, and so incorporated with it that I cannot 
even find it so to speak, even if I sought it; because in my eternal 
consciousness there is neither here nor there, but only an ubique et 
nusquam’38, that is everywhere and nowhere, it is in no place. 
  On the Socratic view, Climacus says: ‘any point of departure in time 
[‘Ungangspunkt i Tiden’] is eo ipso something accidental, a vanishing point’ 
                                            
37 Kierkegaard, Fragments, Hong, op cit, p.31  
 
38 Kierkegaard, Fragments, Swenson, pp. 15-16  
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(the Hongs have ‘vanishing moment’). Such a moment passes in the 
continuum of time and merely provides the ‘occasion’39 for something else, if 
this were all, the role of the teacher would end here.
 However, and here in 
Swenson is where the moment first acquires its capital letter, to be more than 
an occasion, Climacus says, ‘the Moment in time [Øieblikket i Tiden] must 
have a decisive significance, so that I will never be able to forget it either in 
time or in eternity; because the Eternal, which hitherto did not exist, came 
into existence in this moment.’40  [Smuler: blev til i dette Øieblik] If we 
consider the ‘eternal’, not as an infinite stretch of time but some realm which 
is out of time in ‘no place’, then we can think of this ‘coming into existence’ as 
the eternal coming into time, rather than as a coming into ‘being’. The 
moment must be such that the learner would not forget it either as a matter of 
knowledge or of faith.  In the Journals, Kierkegaard tells us: ‘the moment is 
really time's atom, but not until eternity is posited, and this is why one may 
properly say that eternity is always that which has no place’41. 
 In  The Concept of Anxiety, Haufniensis says: Without eternity the 
moment does not exist in the proper sense, because the nature of time is 
                                                                                                                             
 
39 Kierkegaard,  Fragments, Hong, p.11 
 
40 Kierkegaard,  Fragments,  Swenson, p.16 
 
41 Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers],  p. 207 
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‘only that it goes by'42 . But he rejects notions of time as continuous flow 
taking a starting point for the moment from Plato who, in his notion of 
exaiphnes (the Sudden), stresses the originating moment of emergence, the 
coming into presence as though out of nothing. In the Parmenides Plato 
describes ‘this strange entity’'43 thus:  
 
‘For the moment seems to imply a something of which change takes 
place in either of two states; for the change is not from the state of rest 
as such; but there is this curious nature which we call the moment lying 
between rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and out of 
this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest into 
motion.’
44 
  The moment though it cannot be located in time is certainly something 
and not nothing. When we consider Kierkegaard’s definition of temporality it 
would appear that the actual moment of time is crucial to any elevated sense 
of ‘moment’: 'The moment is that ambiguity in which time and eternity touch 
each other, and with this the concept of temporality is posited, whereby time 
constantly intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time'45 . Our 
                                            
42 Ibid, notes, p.821 
 
43 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, p.83 
 
44 Plato, Parmenides 156d, Translator: B. Jowett, William, Benton, The University of Chicago, 
Chicago, 1952, p. 505 
 
45 Kierkegaard,, The Concept of Anxiety, op cit, p. 89  
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existence as temporal beings requires time, but as ‘temporality’ it allows a 
connection with the eternal. In considering the moment as ‘a blink’ it is ‘a 
designation of time … in the fateful conflict when it is touched by eternity'46. 
The touch of the eternal in time is indeed a ‘fateful conflict’, a contradiction 
significant to the destiny of human being. It is decisive for man’s ‘eternal 
being’, because it allows a spiritual existence which an individual can attain in 
deeply subjective experiences of the moment which can follow. Haufniensis 
goes on: ‘Only when the eternal strikes the stream of time and forms a 
synthesis of time and eternity does the particular moment gain significance: 
'for the moment is really time's atom...'47. The atom of time is something 
infinitesimally small, and ‘contentless’, that which by its very name is 
designated as ‘indivisible’; it can open to reveal an unsuspected and awful 
power, the immensity of the eternal.  
  In our experiences we know that the moment passing in the 
continuum of time has significance though we cannot point to its ‘now’. An 
event can come to our attention and stand out as a significant moment of 
emotional upsurge, or we might say, of heightened experience. Climacus 
tells us, such ‘an outburst of emotion, a sigh or a word’ can determine a 
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moment of time as ‘more present as something that is vanishing’.  An 
expression of emotion has the ‘power to relieve the soul of a burdensome 
weight, precisely because the burden, when merely expressed, already 
begins to become something of the past’48.  The actual moment of time, the 
seemingly nothing as a vanishing instant is, at the same time, everything and 
therefore '... the moment is not properly an atom of time but an atom of 
eternity. It is the first reflection of eternity in time, its first attempt, as it were, 
at stopping time...'49  
  Such moments have the effect of nullifying the continuum of time, 
which is arrested and made to stand still in the moment. In The Concept of 
Anxiety Haufniensis calls this a ‘going forth that nevertheless never gets off 
the spot’50. This standing still in the ‘now’ of the moment suggests the 
concept of nunc stans, the mystical notion from medieval scholasticism of a 
‘standing present’ or ‘everlasting now’ of eternity as timelessness. 
Kierkegaard seeks a spiritual truth in the collapsing of the continuum of time. 
This happens when the eternal enters time, but also in another way. He 
speaks of the 1843 years that separate the incarnation of Christ and his own 
present time as if it is no time at all, in terms of Christian faith. If, as 
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Kierkegaard says ‘faith believes what it does not see’ then to consider the 
moment in its abstraction from time is to believe in this something that we 
cannot locate. 
  In reflection the succession of moment after moment can be annulled. 
The experiences of our life are carried with us into the future, E. L. Allen in 
Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought, (1935) says: ’As an existing person, he 
[the individual] stores up the past within himself and moves forward 
constantly into the future’51 . So that how we choose to act in present 
situations determines our future being. The moment, he says: 
‘… is krisis - a judgement on time. It brings the present and us who are 
in it under the constraint and claim of the Absolute, and it opens the 
future before us as a Promised Land or a waste howling wilderness - as 
we choose! It thus gives to the future a new significance; the future is as 
it were the incognito of eternity. … Here I stand, therefore, an individual 
human being with a unique life-history. My feet are on the threshold of 
the future, and God’s voice speaks to me here and now. Here, where I 
stand, I come under his absolute requirement. Am I willing to venture, to 
risk myself on  a new event, something which does not as yet exist but 
which my own free act will bring about? When I have taken that step 
forward, I shall be another man, for something out of eternity itself will 
have become incarnate in me!’
52  
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Incarnation and Appropriation. 
  The instant in time, then, is an essential element to any elevated 
sense of ‘moment’. It is implicated in the Incarnation whose very significance 
is that it occurs, for Kierkegaard, as an historical actuality. The Moment of 
Incarnation is, for Kierkegaard, a primary moment, when the totally other, 
that which cannot be said to exist in time, but in and as eternity, enters time. 
The god even becomes an ordinary human being through his ‘birth’ in human 
form. The eternal as timeless being comes into time and space as ‘a specific 
embodiment of the eternal’53 in the person of Christ. This for Kierkegaard is a 
matter of historical fact. The moment or event of the incarnation is pivotal for 
Kierkegaard, upon this moment all other moments turn. This original Moment 
of the incarnation enables every following subjective moment of conversion. 
Kierkegaard himself in the Journals refers to this initialising moment as a 
‘prototype’. 
  In becoming human the god enables the condition of faith, and 
bestows the possibility of an eternal state of beatitude, in imitation of the 
divine condition. The individual moment of what Kierkegaard calls ‘subjective 
appropriation of the truth’, (or conversion) carries the possibility of a radical 
change. A person undergoing such a moment and becoming a disciple of 
Christ in the present is directly contemporary with the disciples of Christ in 
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their time. Further, Kierkegaard maintains, such a person is absolutely 
contemporary with Christ himself, as eternal. The subjective moment of  
conversion, represents a ‘repetition’ of the Incarnation. It repeats the ‘coming 
into existence’ of the god by believing it despite the time which lies between 
the events. Such a moment marks a complete and radical turn around in the 
individual (Greek: epistrophe, ‘turning about’). 
   When an individual comes into being with the truth, in a moment of 
subjective appropriation, this moment of truth is contemporary with the 
originating moment of incarnation, the individual is at this point one with 
Christ (Kierkegaard goes further to consider Christ himself as the moment). 
In this way, the eternal touches human being directly. The moment 
represents, not so much an instant of time but  a certain experience of  being 
in time.  
The ‘Replete Sense’. 
  Victoria Harrison accepts this rendering of the moment as something 
not eliminating either of the other two but uniting them in some higher 
concept. We begin to see how the moment can indeed be so considered in 
the following passage from Fragments which brings us to a definition of the 
moment as the ‘fullness of time’: ‘And now the moment [Og nu Øieblikket54] 
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…’, there is no capital ‘M’ here in the Swenson translation because it is still 
referring to the moment of time in which the event, or advent took place. ‘… 
A moment such as this is unique. To be sure, it is short and temporal, as the 
moment is; it is passing, as the moment is, past, as the moment is in the next 
moment, and yet it is decisive, and yet it is filled with the eternal. A moment 
such as this must have a special name. Let us call it: the fullness of time 
[Tidens Folde].’55 We notice ‘the fullness of time’ appears with spacing in 
the Danish indicated by italics in the English text. 
 In  Galatians 4:4, we hear that ‘the fulness of the time was come, 
[when] God sent forth his son …' that is, in the Incarnation. To find the other 
aspect of this italicised moment, that of subjective appropriation or 
conversion we must read a little further on in the text. Climacus says, that the 
god’s purpose or ‘resolution’ must be from eternity’, and when ‘fulfilled in time 
it expressly becomes the moment,’ [Øieblikket]’56 . The Hong’s use of 
‘fulfilled’ in this passage further confirms that the moment does comprise a 
higher concept incorporating the first two meanings.  
  The god’s purpose, according to Climacus, is to bring the truth to the 
individual in a subjective moment of appropriation, or conversion.  The god’s 
motive, as we have said, is love which, when fulfilled in time, ‘becomes the 
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moment in its most replete sense’.  The past has built up behind and the 
present is ‘replete’ with the significance of the Christian message of the 
Incarnation which is brought to bear upon the present situation of the 
individual. Here we find a direct link between the notion of fulfilment and the 
moment.  Only in love is the different made equal and man acquires the 
possibility of eternal happiness, an ‘eternal consciousness’ as Climacus says. 
A new capacity for understanding an ‘eternal communication’ and a 
subjective inward relation with the god.  
  One can make this find only in a personal, subjective ‘discovery’ for 
(and by) oneself, one cannot learn it from another, or from doctrine. One of 
Kierkegaard’s criticisms of Christianity was that the simple acceptance of 
church doctrine was not Christianity in the true spiritual sense. The ability to 
question subjectively is the condition for finding an answer and is also the 
answer, because this ability is one and the same with the find.  
  The learner, on discovering that he is in ‘untruth’, now receives that 
truth ‘and with it the condition for understanding it’ which can only be faith, for 
it is not the kind of knowledge that can be understood by reason alone. ‘A 
change takes place within him like the change from non-being to being’, 
Climacus tells us. He comes into ‘existence’[…] in the kind of transition which 
is a new birth or rebirth, in conversion which we can now think of as including 
the prototype moment of coming into existence. It is a change from non-
being to being in the sense that the eternal has come into the realm of  
human being. Climacus says, ‘In consequence of receiving the condition in  
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the moment [Øieblikket] the course of his life has been given an opposite 
direction, so that he is now turned about. Let us call this change Conversion 
[Omvendelse], even though this word be one not hitherto used; but that is 
precisely a reason for choosing it, in order namely to avoid confusion, for it is 
as if expressly coined for the change we have in mind’57. This is also the 
place in the text where the word conversion itself first appears and it too has 
italics, which strengthens its link to ‘fullness of time’. 
  There are questions we might ponder concerning conversion. We 
might wonder whether it is necessarily the case that conversion is 
instantaneous or takes place over a transitional period of time; either way, 
there is a culmination point when the change is irrevocable. We might 
wonder also whether such a complete change happens once and for all, 
whether it must be kept up, the moment revisited and the position renewed. 
In a sense there is a debt owed to the moment which might be neglected and 
allowed to lapse in which case a re-conversion is possible. Even without a 
complete falling away the commitment to a new position is a task in itself, it 
must continually be repeated. William C. Davis, in his Kierkegaard on the 
Transformation of the Individual in Conversion, locates these problems in 
Kierkegaard’s ‘account of the transformation involved in Christian 
conversion‘. The problem is on the one hand whether ‘there is evidence that 
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the transformation … involves an instantaneous alteration in the subject at 
the deepest level: a change in what the individual is’; or on the other hand, 
whether ‘becoming and being a Christian is … an endeavour undertaken ‘in 
fear and trembling’, with the possibility of falling away constantly posing a 
threat’58. 
 Davis says that the moment at which this occurs, is when the 
individual becomes a disciple: ‘when the Moment becomes for him decisive 
for eternity’. Davis uses Swenson’s translation which would indicate - 
according to the definitions we have decided upon - that the moment in 
question is that of the Incarnation, rather than of the individual’s becoming a 
disciple. If we do read this as the Incarnation, then we might interpret it as 
meaning that the fact of Incarnation provides the opportunity for an individual 
which is decisive for eternity. Whether the individual takes it up in such a way 
that it is personally decisive is another matter. However, his argument does 
not depend only on this one quote, but it does point to the extent of the 
problems we encounter when trying to decide which ‘moment’ is intended.  
  If the transformation were a case of ‘once and for all’, then there would 
be no risk or venture in one’s life as a whole. The possibility of ‘falling back’ is 
with the individual until life is over, and there is a danger in feeling too 
complacent. In the Journals, Kierkegaard tells us that God is ‘present’ and 
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gives ‘new blessings’ ‘in every moment’59, but empirically existing beings are 
in existence as spirit and ‘inwardness’ ‘only momentarily’60 and the 
connection with the truth must be constantly renewed. Such a truth can only 
be learned from a relation with God and not from a professor as Kierkegaard 
tells us. One must not be lost in the fleeting and momentary externals of the 
world, but shun the contemporary world as ‘looking like a fool’61 . Daane in his 
thesis, tells us:  
 
‘The persistent striving of life is an expression of the principle that he 
also is in want and desire, who possesses, but desires the continuous 
possession of what he possesses. Illustrated in Christian terms, it is the 
possession of eternal life, however under the qualifications of a 
possession within time - of which qualifications death is a grim 
expression. In the moment of intense passionate striving a man attains 
to the Infinite, but in the next moment he is under the demands of the 
temporal, and can only by constant renewal attain to the Infinite.’
62   
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Anxiety is the Moment. 
  The moment must be such that the learner would not forget it either as 
a matter of knowledge or of faith. The ‘Preceding State’ which the learner 
exists in before learning the truth, is one of  being in error or ‘untruth’ and 
only existing in the ordinary sense of the word, not at all in the eternal sense. 
Becoming aware of being in error or untruth is a recognition of the personal, 
individual obligations, of an inward relation to the god, or in other words, a 
consciousness of sin. The consciousness of being in error or ‘sin’ then 
becomes a presupposition for Climacus from which the problem can be 
further investigated. 
  The learner cannot have possessed the truth before the moment of his 
becoming aware of it (of its coming into existence). He could not even have 
‘known’ it in the sense of being in a state of ignorance of it as it lay immanent 
within him. He must not even be looking for it, for he does not even know that 
there is anything to look for. On the Socratic level, ignorance presupposes 
the knowledge is there but forgotten, available through recollection 
(anamnesis). A seeker can only seek something that already is there to be 
found. He who would find the truth must not in this sense even be a seeker ‘if 
the moment is to have a decisive significance’.63   
 In  The Concept of Anxiety Haufniensis tells us that man’s 
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unawareness of sin is the root of anxiety. Man is described as being 
‘innocent’ rather than ‘ignorant’ of it. Before there is the awareness of sin, it is 
there but hidden. In consequence, man does not know 'Spirit', in other words, 
there is no manifestation of ‘human freedom’64 . Though his Being 
unconsciously cries out for the spirit, in his conscious life he is unaware of his 
great need and therefore suffers a vague but pervasive foreboding: 'This is 
the profound secret of innocence, that it is at the same time anxiety'65. This 
unawareness is not oblivion for he cries out for spirit, but, as Haufniensis 
says, ‘the spirit in man is dreaming’66. Kierkegaard’s psychology has an 
‘eternal component’67: the spirit which lays within him waiting to be awoken, 
and this in itself is the source of anxiety.  
   Kierkegaard is the first to identify ‘anxiety’ existentially, as a fear which 
has no object. Anxiety is a intimation of the 'nothing', of finitude in one's very 
Being which he asserts has been there from the beginning. Anxiety can be 
described as a feeling of 'dizziness' experienced when one looks 'down into 
the yawning abyss' of one's self, and confronts one's own freedom, the 
                                            
64 Kierkegaard,The Concept of Anxiety, note 46, op cit, p.235 
 
65 Ibid, p. 41 
 
66 Ibid, p. 41 
 
67 Ibid, Historical Introduction, p. xiv 
  
51 
freedom of one's own future possibilities. It resides in the abyss and in the 
one who confronts it. 'Man', he says, 'becomes a freedom to himself' and in 
the moment of that realisation everything is changed. Man yearns for some 
undefined thing which he is anxious not to miss before having the chance to 
grasp it.  
  Haufniensis maintains ‘that man is a synthesis of psyche and body 
that is constituted and sustained by spirit’, as a result of the spirit being 
awakened, he says, ‘the difference between oneself and the other is 
posited’68, i.e. the awareness of the self as an individual, as subjectivity, as a 
result of which, he tells us ‘In the individual life, anxiety is the moment’ . This 
phrase, he tells us, is ‘a new expression’ that says the same as this 
synthesis, ‘but that also points toward that which follows'69. 
  The moment of anxiety is the realisation of the nothing and of the 
eternal as being the same, because ‘if there were nothing eternal in a man, 
he could not despair’70 , Haufniensis says, and ‘the opposite of despair is 
believing’71. In his discussion on the difficulties of translating Kierkegaard, 
                                            
68  Ibid, note 46 
 
69 Kierkegaard , Concept of Anxiety, op cit, p. 81 
 
70 Kierkegaard, Søren, The Sickness Unto Death, quoted in A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed: Robert 
Bretall, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1946. p.344 
 
71 Ibid, p.351  
52 
Lowrie tells us: ‘… French translators use angoisse. These words rightly 
indicate the distress of the moment, but do not suggest what is essential to 
the experience Kierkegaard deals with, that it is an apprehension of the 
future, a presentiment of a something which is ‘nothing’, that (as he says in 
the Christian Discourses) it is ‘the next day’, and, in another place, ‘it is 
fighting against the future,’ therefore against oneself - ‘and no man is 
stronger than himself’72 . 
  Man, Climacus goes on to tell us, is also a synthesis of the temporal 
and the eternal73. Haufniensis tells us that this ‘is not another synthesis but 
the expression for the first’74 But ‘reason’. he says, is a 'dunce' to allows a 
synthesis75 of these two unlike elements. The nature of human existence is 
temporal and continually changing and man usually lives in ‘the imperfection 
of the sensuous life’; in contrast, the nature of God is eternal and 
unchanging. But with the positing of spirit ‘the moment is present’76. ‘Only with 
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the moment does history begin’ Haufniensis tells us, we can understand that 
he refers to the Incarnation. Also, he says, ‘it is here that the higher begins, 
for at this point the spirit begins’77.  
  In his own life, Kierkegaard lived intimately with anxiety. In a Journal 
entry for 1837, he speaks of certain presentiments that seem to proceed 
everything that will happen and of an anxious consciousness by which 
'innocent but fragile souls can easily be tempted to believe themselves 
guilty'78. Kierkegaard was drawn towards yet anxious over Christianity. Lowrie 
quotes Kierkegaard from the Journals, where he equates his own inner 
anxiety (or ‘despair’: Lowrie) with ‘the consuming power of original sin’ which 
shows itself as a rising suspicion even while ‘in the midst of the most 
favorable circumstances’. It is a despair which in itself can ‘affect one more 
terribly’ than any actual fact which might confirm ‘the truth of the 
presentiment’79 . This is ‘anxiety over nothing’, it is the very anxiety itself 
which orients human being to its eternal component. 
The Paradox and The Wonder. 
  With the god coming into existence we arrive at the absolute paradox, 
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Climacus says he himself is ‘gripped with a new amazement’, ‘do we not … 
stand here before the wonder [Vidunderet]’80.  Such hypothesis as this, he 
says, could not have a human origin, but is in fact the wonder itself. So the 
hypothesis, as the development of his project of thought is now the wonder 
too in the same way that the god’s teaching is the teaching, the message. 
This thought project not only involves Kierkegaard’s imagination but might 
require ours too. This to and fro of doubling, redoubling, call and response 
permeates the text, brings us to the paradox. The perplexity caused by the 
paradox in turn brings us to a state in which Plato asserts philosophy begins, 
a state of wonder (thaumas).   
  Climacus presents the absolute paradox as a metaphysical crochet or 
caprice, that is as a perverse notion, a sudden and unaccountable change of 
thinking. As a ‘caprice’ the word is linked to ‘sudden start’ and is related to 
the concept of religious awe at the experience of something holy (or 
numinous
81). It leaves the reason without any means of broaching the 
impasse of thought. The understanding might be said to stand agape and 
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agog at the paradox, suggesting a physical state, perhaps an unblinking 
hiatus before the moment.82  In this state one might experience a suspension 
of one’s habitual beliefs, or one may be astonished that the world appears 
just as it does and not otherwise. This attitude of surprise or wonder must be 
maintained and, Climacus says, we should not underestimate its power or 
importance. At its ‘highest pitch’ it wills the collision in thought and in turn 
wills the downfall of the understanding, of itself.  
  The understanding collides with the unknown and the reason is 
offended, it is at a standstill, a limit, which there is no reasoning beyond or 
through. It is only by an act of will that this stasis can be broken. It is not by 
explaining away the paradox for that would be to explain away the wonder, 
though the understanding may try to reconcile its thoughts it cannot lose the 
paradox. This must lead to a wilful ‘act of letting go’, Climacus says, ‘Does it 
not have to be taken into account, this diminutive moment [Swenson: 
moment, Smuler: Øieblik], however brief it is - it does not have to be long, for 
it is a leap [Spring]. However diminutive this moment [Swenson: moment, 
Smuler: Moment], even if it is this very instant, this very instant must be taken 
into account’83 Notice that in the Smuler the word ‘Moment’ is used here and 
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not Øieblik. Yet Swenson, perhaps confusingly, does use ‘moment’. The use 
of ‘Moment’ in the Danish indicates, as we have said, a phase or stage of 
something, here it indicates the brief phase in the process of turning towards 
the truth. For the final sentence, where the Hongs have ‘this very instant …’ 
Swenson  has: ‘even if only an instantaneous now, this ‘now’ [Nu84] must be 
included in the reckoning.’85  However, in referring to the act of ‘letting-go’ as 
a stage in the process of the leap, it must also be referring to a moment of 
subjective appropriation. In this paragraph it is impossible to separate this 
mere ‘Moment’ from the Øieblik itself and this again may indicate the futility 
of attempting to define each occurrence of Kierkegaard’s use of the words. 
   The paradox resonates in consciousness as an offense: ‘all offense is 
a suffering’ [lidende] an unhappy relation, something to be undergone, a 
passion in its fuller sense, passive and acted upon86. But ‘If the paradox and 
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the understanding meet in the mutual understanding of their difference, then 
the encounter is a happy one’87. ‘Through the moment [Swenson: Moment, 
Smuler: Øieblikket], the learner becomes untruth’ and becomes aware of 
himself as so being, ‘the person who knew himself becomes confused about 
himself and instead of self-knowledge he acquires the consciousness of sin 
…, for just as soon as we assume the moment [Swenson: Moment] 
everything goes by itself’88. This awareness does not reinforce one’s self-
knowledge but casts doubt on the grounds of one’s belief. 
  It is not in the confrontation with the paradox and the reason, it is not 
due to the offense caused, that man knows sin or that he has been in 
untruth, ’all offense is in its essence a misunderstanding of the moment 
[Smuler: Øieblikket]’89. Offense at the Moment of Incarnation, it seems, 
leads to the moment of conversion. When Reason yields to the force of 
passion, it becomes filled with wonder and discovers that 'the Paradox is the 
Miracle! [Hong: the wonder]'  It is the Paradox itself that makes the discovery 
(and is this discovery), Kierkegaard asserts: the Moment itself is 'the 
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Paradox'90  
  Climacus himself is confronted by these notions, he admits that he 
‘trembled’ as he wrote these thoughts because he could not recognise 
himself in them. But this confusion is necessary he says, ’in order to be 
united in some third thing’ -  ‘the understanding surrendered itself and the 
paradox gave itself’. He quotes Goethe - ‘she half dragged him, and he half 
sank down’, ‘the understanding lies in that happy passion...’ which is faith91 . 
Described in The Concept of Anxiety as: ‘a sympathetic antipathy and an 
antipathetic sympathy’
92, this double move cannot be overcome by 
‘mediation’, Kierkegaard says. ‘Philosophy mediates, Christianity has the 
paradox’93, philosophy would explain away the paradox, the wonder, and the 
moment and this should be resisted.    
  Wonder is described by Climacus as ‘the passionate sense for coming 
into existence, that is, wonder [Beundring]’94. The Hongs tell us95 that 
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Beundring is an archaic meaning of  ‘wonder’ literally ‘admiration’ 
incorporating the senses of adoration, and devotion through which we can 
connect it to awe. Wonder is integral to the moment, Climacus asserts, even 
if an event seems necessary and inevitable. ‘Even if what has come into 
existence is most certain, even if wonder wants to give its stamp of approval 
in advance by declaring that if this had not occurred it would have to be 
fabricated’96 , still we cannot undermine its importance as a stage in the 
transition to the eternal. The stage of the transition marked by a state of 
wonder is thus described by Climacus: ‘in any progress of this sort there is in 
each moment [Smuler: Øieblik] a pause, (here wonder stands in pausa and 
waits for the coming into existence). This constitutes the pause of coming 
into existence and the pause of possibility precisely because the telos is 
outside. If only one way is possible, then the telos is not outside but in the 
progress itself - indeed, behind it, just as in the progress of immanence’97. For 
Øieblik here Swenson uses the word ‘movement’ stressing that the moment 
referred to here is not the one of decisive significance to Kierkegaard, but 
that which is a stage in a progression. Where the Hongs use ‘progress’ he 
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uses ‘movement’ again. But this discussion properly belongs in the section of 
the Fragments called Interlude. 
Transition and the Leap. 
  The Interlude in Fragments comes as a rest in the progression in 
Climacus’ hypothesis, in the discussion regarding the contemporary disciple 
as witness to the historical event of the Incarnation and the disciple at 
second hand. Climacus says ’Stop a moment’98 [Stau nu et Øieblik] (in a 
common use of Øieblik). The Interlude is compared to the intermission in a 
comedy during which the orchestra plays to suggest a passage of time 
between the events of the action. Yet it is ‘not a mere filler between acts’99. In 
this case it represents ‘precisely eighteen hundred and forty-three years’100 
that passes between Christ’s death and the disciple in the present. Climacus 
has already indicated that this length of time between is nothing. The 
Interlude gives Climacus the opportunity to speak of the concept of ‘coming 
into existence’ outside of his progression of thought. He asks what the past 
and future mean in relation to the moment of coming into existence; what 
kind of change it is by which something comes into existence [blive til], i.e. 
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from non-being to being, and when it can be said to occur. 
  The Interlude represents the type of pause in the reckoning that 
Climacus has spoken of earlier in the anecdote about the sorites paradox.  
The discussion takes place on the Socratic level of thinking, Swenson 
signifies this by not giving capitals to the words ‘faith’ and ‘belief’ [Tro] in this 
section. In Smuler the word ‘Moment[er]’ is used here and not Øieblikket 
because The Interlude is a stage in the developing argument. Climacus has 
left off his subject for a while and resumes a Socratic position,101 in which the 
goal is immanent within the learner and within the progression, whereas for 
Christianity the truth or goal is something outside the logical progression, 
time and human being. 
 In  The Concept of Anxiety, Haufniensis speaks of the the term 
‘transition’ as it is used in 'logical and historical-philosophical inquiries' in 
Hegelian thought. Along with 'negation'  and 'mediation', he tells us they are 
'principles of motion' and he asserts are unexplained by Hegel, their 
meanings are therefore 'presupposed', they remain 'secret agents (agentia 
[main springs]) that bring about all movements'102. Hegelian logic, concerned 
though it is with motion ‘has never accounted for motion’
103 neither can it  
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account for transition as Kierkegaard intends it, which is as ‘pathetic’ rather 
than ‘dialectical’ and belongs to the realm of historical freedom. It would, 
Kierkegaard says in an entry in the Journals, ‘be significant to compare it with 
the Aristotelian teaching about kinesis (change)’104  and this he does in The 
Interlude. 
  Greek philosophy had words for different kinds of change: of place, of 
quantity, of quality, but all these presuppose the existence of that which is 
undergoing change, it concerns their essence rather than their being: ‘This 
change then is not in essence [Vaesen] but in being [Vaeren]…’105  In coming 
into existence, the change is from non-being to being, and this is the change 
involved in the god becoming man and again in the learner becoming a new 
being by rebirth in a moment of conversion and a leap of faith. It is the 
transition from possibility to actuality 106 . 
  When reflecting on the fact of something coming into existence, 
(Climacus uses the example of a star), its being there for our reflection is 
certain but the point of its having come into existence is uncertain. We can’t 
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see its becoming, its ‘how’, that lies in doubt. Therefore, Climacus asserts, a 
new organ of understanding is needed to provide the mechanism of 
understanding such a thing - that is belief or faith: ‘This is precisely the 
nature of belief [Tro]’107  that it ‘believes what it does not see’. The opposite of 
doubt or uncertainty, Climacus says, is not certainty but belief and ‘the 
conclusion of belief is not a conclusion but a resolution’. This resolution  
takes place in freedom by an act of will and through a fundamental choice of 
one's final gaol holding one's deepest values.  
  One must have trust enough to make a 'leap of faith': 'This … is a 
pathos-filled transition, not dialectical... a pathos-filled transition can be 
achieved by every man if he wills it, because the transition to the infinite, 
which consists in pathos, takes only courage’108. This transition takes effect in 
the 'fullness' of time, when the quantity of necessity and the impulse to 
change have built to a 'critical threshold' and must burst into something new. 
In The Concept of Anxiety, Climacus tells us that it is the spirit in man which 
acts to transform him in himself and produces this critical mass and 
precipitates the 'qualitative leap’.   
  Kierkegaard's theory of transition, then, involves movement or change 
over time, an 'actual' change, something which is a result of 'historical 
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freedom'. The change from unbeliever to believer is brought about through 
the leap. The sudden leap is in a strange way both cumulative, yet automatic, 
active and passionate and also passive and acted upon. It is a suspension of 
the acts of reasoning and deduction, a surrender. To effect this transition to 
faith, one must take courage and yield. This is what Kierkegaard calls a 
'letting go'. That the moment contains irreconcilable contradictions which lead 
to the ‘leap of faith’ is crucial to Christianity, whereas if we understand the 
moment in its contradictions by Hegel’s concept of ‘mediation’ there is no 
‘moment’.  
The Collapsing of Time. 
    In considering The Case of the Contemporary Disciple, Climacus 
outlines how it is that the god imparts understanding to human being.  By 
Climacus’ reckoning, had the god not come, we would not have the paradox 
of the Moment nor the subjective moment born out of wonder at the paradox 
either. Climacus describes how the god elicits the love of mankind in an 
analogy of a king who loves a servant girl but is afraid knowledge of his 
station in life will scare her away, or cause her to love him for the wrong 
reason. The god is able to become human (unlike the king who cannot 
become an ordinary human), but is unable to send anyone in his place 
(unlike the king, who can send an emissary). The god’s presence is essential 
to his teaching (it is his teaching, that is the paradox). That the god can be 
present in time is the teaching.  
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  Another person could tell the learner about the teacher and his 
teaching but only the god himself can provide the condition for understanding 
it, and understanding the moment as decisive. This person cannot know what 
the god wants to teach because ‘the god’s presence is not incidental to his 
teaching but is essential’, the presence of the god in the form not only of a 
human being but also of a servant ‘is precisely the teaching’, he can only 
reveal himself in his divinity by his works 109 . So the teaching gives the 
condition, the learner sees that this is the paradox, but because he sees it it 
doesn’t mean that he understands it.  The teacher can draw  ‘a curious crowd 
but neither these nor the city’s ‘professional teachers’ who might want to 
question him are the learner. If he is the ‘news of the day’ in the city, subject 
of idle talk and chatter, he is as learner ‘the eternal,’ it is ‘the beginning of 
eternity’110 .  
  Kierkegaard continues in this vein asking whether there could have 
been ‘more of a contradiction than that the news of the day is the swaddling-
clothes of the eternal, is indeed its actual form, just as in this assumed case, 
so that the moment [Øieblikket] is actually the decision of eternity!’ unless 
‘‘but that the god provides the condition has already been explicated as the 
consequence of the moment [Øieblikket], and we have shown that the 
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moment is the paradox ...’111 
  The impetus for the moment must come from outside. The presence 
of the god in time and as human being gives a historical point of departure 
for this ‘decision of eternity’ and it is as significant for the contemporary 
disciple as it is for ones in later generations. The centuries between are as 
nothing because the later disciple ‘at second hand’ can be in relation to the 
paradox in the same way as the one who is contemporary with the historical 
event. It is not a question of distance or closeness to the teacher in time or 
space, but of understanding. 
  So how does he come to an understanding of it? Climacus says: ’It 
occurs when the understanding and the paradox happily encounter each 
other in the moment (Swenson: Moment), when the understanding steps 
aside and the paradox gives itself, and the third something, the something in 
which this occurs (for it does not occur through the understanding , which is 
discharged, or through the paradox, which gives itself,  - consequently in 
something ) is that happy passion to which we shall now give a name, 
although for us it is not a matter of the name. We shall call it faith’112. As we 
can see, Swenson has the Moment of Incarnation here which we could 
debate because here the but more interestingly now, Climacus names a third 
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thing, neither the paradox of the temporal meeting the eternal in the 
Incarnation nor the moment when the truth is subjectively appropriated in 
conversion but, as he says, in ‘faith’. We might interpret the italicization of 
this third thing as the our third moment, the fullness of time because 
Climacus goes on to say that ‘faith, the object of which is the paradox - but 
the paradox specifically unites the contradictories, is the eternalizing of the 
historical and the historicizing of the eternal. Anyone who understands the 
paradox any other way may retain the honor of having explained it,’113 
Climacus says, but wouldn’t necessarily understand it. 
 Following  The Interlude, Climacus continues his thoughts regarding 
the non-contemporary ‘Follower’ (Hong) or ‘Disciple (Swenson) at Second 
Hand’. Such a person can relate to the reports of the event given by actual 
contemporaries in the same way as the contemporaries themselves relate to 
the event itself. He asserts that it is of dubious advantage to be closer to the 
event because neither being there nor receiving the reports constitutes a true 
understanding gained through faith. For the secondary follower, even an 
eyewitness testimony would be no more than a historical report. It could 
make the person aware of events  but not understand them in faith. Faith, 
Climacus asserts, does not proceed simply as a consequence of awareness, 
there must be a moment of subjective appropriation. The event itself neither 
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saves human being once and for all, nor afresh in each generation. These 
ways of thinking, he says, are quantitative but the change of concern to us is 
qualitative. 
  So, the first generation has the advantage of ‘having the difficulty 
present’, the awe or ‘terror’ of it, and ‘the latest generation has the advantage 
of ease.  But it is this very ease which ‘begets’ its own difficulty, 
corresponding to the difficulty of the terror, and the terror will grip the last 
generation just as primitively as it gripped the first generation of secondary 
followers’114. ‘There is no follower at second hand. The first and the latest 
generations are essentially alike’115. 
Resolution. 
  The progression of Climacus’ thought project resolves itself in the 
Moral116 , which he tells us ‘indisputably makes an advance upon Socrates’. ‘ 
We have here assumed a new organ: faith’. In becoming aware of 
themselves as having been in error, or untruth, in a sense that there is 
something which they lack, a person becomes a ‘new creature’ to the extent 
that they are more than they were. They acquire a new ‘organ’ or mode of 
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understanding. This is not only a new knowledge but constitutes a change in 
the make up of an individual, it is a wholly new ability, a new awareness. 
Together with this ‘new organ’, we have ‘a new presupposition: the 
consciousness of Sin‘, we recognise that we have been in error, Climacus 
tells us. As a presupposition, this implies that the error is in us from the 
beginning, though we are ‘ignorant’ or ‘innocent’ of it we experience an 
anxiety of spirit which has no object in the world.  
  A ‘new decision’ is assumed, Climacus tells us, which is ‘the moment’. 
In Swenson’s translation he designates this as Moment, the Incarnation. 
This, as we have said, can be thought of as decisive for the ‘eternal 
happiness’ of human being because it provides the condition for all individual 
subjective moments which follow and can only follow from it; the god 
commits to human being in that moment. Yet, perhaps this ought to be the 
moment, so that it also includes man’s committing himself in faith to the god. 
However, Climacus continues, we have also ‘a new teacher’, ‘the god in 
time’117 who comes into time from eternity and supplants the Socratic teacher. 
Such is the decision ‘for eternity’, the moment transcends its temporal point 
of departure and becomes decisive. These aspects and the idea that the god 
in time is the teacher and therefore the message is from outside of time, 
constitute the advance that Climacus claims over Socratic thinking. 
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  If it is our task to make Kierkegaard mean for us in our time, 
Kierkegaard’s own task was 'translating Christianity whole and entire into 
terms of reflection … he would not compromise … would not yield'118. In the 
Journals Kierkegaard expresses the need to understand not what he must 
know, but what he must do, which is ‘to find a truth which is true for me… the 
idea for which I can live and die’119. He makes the discovery early in life that 
that 'idea’ is Christianity and 'what it means to be a Christian - in 
Christendom'120, and from this one point of departure, his Archimedian point, 
'to understand a multiplicity of things’121 . 
  Kierkegaard is living in a time and place where everyone would be 
assumed to be a Christian and so the notion of conversion cannot refer to a 
conversion to Christianity from another religious belief or from no religious 
belief but rather a return to, or a renewed commitment to, the faith into which 
one is born. This brought about by an intense experience of a new 
awareness. It is a very different thing to carry out the public expressions of 
being a Christian, to having an intimate experience of realisation regarding 
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that faith. Kierkegaard’s ambiguous position in pursuing an individual style of 
philosophical and religious thought against the grain of the time requires 
effort and risk, ‘a taking up of one’s cross’122 and a resolve he says, quoting 
the German mystic Jakob Boehme, ‘in the moment of temptation … not to 
have many thoughts, but to hold fast to one thought’123 . 
  Kierkegaard emphasises that with venture and risk, courage is 
needed, in thought itself which 'has a certain setting-out-on-an-adventure 
about it'124, and in writing which for Kierkegaard was inseparable from life. A 
venture then is undertaken in the knowledge of risk and the weighing of 
decision. To venture too much, Kierkegaard warns, might attract 
'punishment', to venture too little by 'weakly' 'coddling' oneself, to crave 
security is to be untrue to oneself. To not realise potential until too late to be 
realised, this is to be 'lost forever'. 'At that very moment the eternal in man 
goes out', but if he can rally before it is too late and 'wake up to himself' 
perhaps 'faith and confident boldness will rise up in him and he will be able to 
venture'125. What is required is a willingness to strive passionately toward 
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something newly realised and fundamentally unknowable in a worldly sense. 
‘Worldly sagacity stares and stares at events and circumstances’, but, 
Kierkegaard says, the moment never comes unless there is a ‘breakthrough 
of the eternal'126. One might need to constantly renew one’s efforts in a free 
act of will. The exercise of this freedom promises the possibility of such a 
momentous change that one in a sense can become another person, and 
further, another person with an infinite component. To reiterate what E. L. 
Allen has said: ‘something out of eternity itself will have become incarnate in 
me!’127  
 In  the  Preface to Fragments Kierkegaard offers an ironic apologia for 
the book's being produced from outside the realm of legitimate scholarly 
endeavour. In doing so he identifies himself as an outsider, the implication 
being that it is the very position outside that enables him to speak of what is 
of critical importance to the time. He refers to Fragments as 'merely a 
pamphlet', it being 'impossible' that anyone would 'attribute world-historical 
importance to a pamphlet'128, indeed it being considered so would be a 
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'danger' to his 'undertaking' and assume its author had more importance than 
he actually has. Anyone heralding the opening of an new era or epoch, he 
says, transporting themselves 'into a state of bliss' in their howling and yelling 
of 'era, epoch, era and epoch, epoch and era, the system' is indulging in 
‘irrational exaltation'. Such a one lives as if every day were 'one of those that 
occur only once in a thousand years'.  Yet Kierkegaard claims he does not 
want to abstain from public activity which would be 'an offense' especially in 
'a time of ferment'. Though, he says, 'It is not given to everyone to have 
intellectual pursuits coincide happily with the interests of the public'129, he 
recognises the need to speak publicly on the subject of Christianity. In 
Fragments and The Concept of Anxiety (as well as in works contemporary 
with these), he chooses an indirect method but, as we shall see, there came 
a time for being direct. 
The Moment Pamphlets. 
  The culmination point of Kierkegaard’s own resolve in the matter of 
speaking out directly in the cause of his idea regarding Christianity came late 
in his life. He became involved in a public debate over Christianity and the 
church. Although he avowed ‘no talent to write for the instant’ on 
contemporary social concerns for the consumption of what he considers the 
chattering public and their fleeting interests, he published a series of 
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polemical pamphlets. ‘When is the Moment?’ is the title of a section in 
Volume 10, the last in the series published in 1855. The overall title was The 
Moment - sometimes translated as The Instant. The act of naming a series of 
pamphlets in this way even if in ‘a lower-level analogy’ of ‘moment’ indicates 
not a superficial intent but the importance of both the pamphlets and of the 
concept of ‘moment’ to his greater body of work.  The title, the Hongs tell us, 
‘was intended to mean a judging of Christendom by the earnestness of the 
eternal. This judgement could first be expressed when the right man was on 
hand’130 . Swenson calls them the ‘pamphlets of the agitation’131 and it is 
significant that these pamphlets are written under Kierkegaard's own name 
and not under one of the pseudonyms. They are direct rather than indirect 
communication. In answer to his own question in Volume 10, Kierkegaard 
says, 'The Moment is when the man is there, the right man, the man of the 
moment’132 . Then ‘the circumstances obey’ this man. But ‘there is nothing 
more certain of being excluded from ever seizing the moment than worldly 
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sagacity'133 . 
Kierkegaard’s ‘blessed moments’. 
    In a Journal entry for July 29, 1835 Kierkegaard ‘writes of 
'blessed moments' such as he experienced as he stood by the sea one 
evening, birds 'sang their evening prayer … the few that are dear to me 
came forth from their graves, or rather it seemed to me as though they had 
not died’. He describes a feeling of contentment and an intense experience 
which others have commonly described having in an extraordinary moment: 
 
‘as though I were out of the body, wafted with them into the ether above 
- and the hoarse screech of the gulls reminded me that I stood alone, 
and everything vanished before my eyes, and I turned back with a heavy 
heart to mix in the busy world, yet without forgetting such blessed 
moments. - I have often stood there and looked out upon my past life 
and upon the different surroundings which have exercised their power 
upon me … Seen thus in perspective only the broad and powerful 
outline showed, and I did not, as so frequently happens to me, lose 
myself in the moment, but saw everything as a whole and was 
strengthened to understand things differently, to admit how often I had 
blundered, and to forgive others.’
134  
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  This moment, with its essential inner and, we might say ‘irrational’ 
experience of a loss of self in relation to the spatial and temporal world 
seems to prefigure the fuller and more considered concept of ‘moment’ which 
we have investigated here. That Kierkegaard also has experience of a 
revelatory moment leading to a conversion event is evident from journal 
entries. This revelation, we might more accurately say, re-converts him to 
Christianity with new vision. In the Journals he describes having lived 'for 
several years a disorderly life, in revolt against his father and against God’, 
but making a ‘gradual return in the direction of 'his old home'. A culmination 
point is reached on his 25th birthday, 5 May, 1838, in a reconciliation with his 
father, ‘followed a few days later’ by an event  significant enough that 
Kierkegaard marks the very time of day at which it occurs: 19th May at 10.30 
am ‘by a very striking and effectual experience of conversion135.  His phrasing 
of this as a ‘return’ to his ‘old home’ characteristically has a double meaning. 
i.e. Kierkegaard reconciles with his actual father and also returns to the 
church and to God, whose ‘divine fatherly love’136 constitutes an 
''Archimedean point' ‘outside the individual's actuality and abstracting ideal 
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thought'137 . In the Historical Introduction to Hong and Hong’s The Moment 
and Late Writings, the 'Archimedean point', is described as 'the fulcrum 
outside time and finitude whereby time and finitude can be moved. For 
Kierkegaard that 'Archimedean point' was the changeless love of God for 
every human being'138 . Having failed to ‘find himself’ in the dissolute outside 
world, he suffers a ‘shipwreck’ which turns him ‘towards the highest things, 
the absolute’, and such a moment ‘bursts upon him in all its fullness but also 
in the responsibility which he feels he has.'139 From this time on, as 
Kierkegaard writes, his obligation is to his own task, as we have said, of 
'translating Christianity’ into reflection or perhaps rather self-reflection. Such 
a point ‘outside time’ and the finitude of existence allows a new perspective 
regarding one’s existence understood in a deeper, inner sense. 
  Kierkegaard does not discuss this revelation directly elsewhere, he 
even at times seems to mock such an idea. In The Book on Adler, 
Kierkegaard criticises Adler’s use of his own revelatory experience to make a 
show of piety which backfires on him, for 'To chase after the applause of the 
moment is like chasing one’s own shadow. It eludes the one who chases 
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after it’140.  For Kierkegaard one’s subjective experience is between oneself 
and God initiated only by God and is not something from which one can draw 
general truths about Christianity or church doctrine. Such an experience can 
have no meaning for any other person, it does not happen as the direct 
consequence of human thinking or suggestion and Kierkegaard does not use 
it to attempt to convert others who must find their own ‘moment’. 
  In the following century Kierkegaard’s texts are 'recognised for their 
essential modernity'141. We will see how the idea of the moment and its 
constituent aspects runs through the thinkers who follow even up to that 
period known as ‘high modernity’ almost a century later, especially in the 
case of the ‘moment’. The  moment carries with it other concepts which 
themselves become important to the existential philosophers who follow. We 
will find the emphasis on the individual self, on existential freedom and 
decision, on will and on the notion of existential anxiety. We will see the 
direct adoption of the new and significant meaning which Kierkegaard gives 
to existence, the primacy of individual action over reflection, passion over 
reason as being essential to understanding. We will encounter the  
ambiguities, contradictions and antinomies inherent in all concepts and which 
enable the springing forth of new concepts. Not least, the necessity of the 
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presence of the right ‘man’ of the moment is evident, 'Most men’ Kierkegaard 
asserts, ‘think, talk, and write as they sleep, eat and drink, without ever 
raising the question of their relation to the idea; this only happens among the 
very few and then that decisive moment has in the very highest degree either 
the power to compel (genius), or it paralyses the individual with anxiety 
(irony)’142. 
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Chapter 2. 
The Gateway named ‘Moment’. The place of the Augenblick in Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s concept of Eternal Return. 
  
  There is no evidence that Friedrich Nietzsche was aware of the work 
of Kierkegaard and there is therefore no direct progression of the concept of 
the Moment from that uncovered in the work of Kierkegaard to that which 
appears in Nietzsche. However, there are certain resemblances between 
them. Arising in both cases from the personal subjective experiences of both 
philosophers, the concept concerns the seizing of the insights gained and the 
application of its particular knowledge to one’s life decisions. In both cases 
the Moment is elevated from the ordinary temporal stream to a relation with 
the eternal. The knowledge is imparted by a ‘teacher’ to one who learns. The 
learner at first hears but does not fully understand the revelation. Within this 
process the teacher is also learning. A similarity here is with the notion of the 
Moment as part of a process. 
 Kierkegaard discusses the Moment in terms of kinesis, or change 
through movement, insight comes during the stages of the development of 
the concept. For Nietzsche’s Moment also, Zarathustra’s realisation is a 
gradual process. The image of the Gateway which we shall look into itself 
requires the notion of a movement through. Kierkegaard’s pause of wonder 
at the paradox can be compared to the clash of past and future in the 
gateway. Here arises the notion that we carry the ‘now’ or present along with  
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us. The possibilities of a ‘decisive moment’ are there within every moment, 
they are within human being itself as a nexus of past and future and of the 
site of all its possibilities. 
For Kierkegaard, Christ’s blessings are available in ‘every moment’ for 
the individual who is ready to receive them and learn the ‘truth’. This phrase 
‘in every moment’, as we shall see, is key to Zarathustra’s understanding of 
Eternal Return. This concept in the form given to it by Nietzsche is unique, it 
provides fresh aspects of the Moment taken up in later philosophers
143.  In 
this chapter then, I consider the ‘gateway’ named ‘Augenblick’ (Moment) as it 
appears in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche particularly in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra (1883) (henceforth TSZ), where it is a central aspect in the 
doctrine of Eternal Return (ewige Wiederkehr) or Eternal Recurrence (ewige 
Wiederkunft) of the Same. TSZ is the text in which the doctrine reaches its 
culmination point for Nietzsche. In the figure of Zarathustra himself and his 
discovery and eventual teaching of the meaning of the doctrine of Eternal 
Return we can see the progress of Nietzsche’s own coming to terms with this 
thought which, we are given to understand, arose from a revelatory moment 
of its own. This doctrine brings together other main concepts in his works, the 
concepts of Becoming, Will to Power and the Overman (Übermensch). To 
conclude I come back to Nietzsche himself and his own ‘prodigious 
                                            
143 However, it may be possible to trace elements even of this idea in Kierkegaard in his 
consideration of ‘repetition’ in the book of that name and in Either/Or.   
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Moment’
144. 
  Nietzsche’s poetic, almost intoxicated language in TSZ plays 
constantly with  interconnected imagery, not least where it centres on the 
name inscribed above his gateway: Augenblick. Instances of related words 
abound in the text: Blick (glance) which is equated with ‘visions’ and hints of 
ecstatic visionary states within TSZ. We find Augenblinzeln145 (wink), ein 
Augen-Blick (a twinkling of the eye), and Blitzen (lightning), as the flash of 
insight leading to the affirmation of and desire for the return of every thing 
down to the smallest moment: ‘ein Husch’, literally ‘whoosh’. The imagery in 
TSZ is overwhelmingly of nature, of its cyclical form and the oppositions and 
ambiguities it embodies. Nature is often personified together with Life itself 
and it is they who perform these glances, winks and flashes. In doing so they 
indicate their reciprocal relation to Zarathustra, and by extension describe the 
deeply intimate, indeed immanent way in which Nietzsche sees man as ‘in’ 
the world.  
  Related to the image of the gateway moment, are those of bridges 
and tightropes and rainbows, arcing metaphors which serve the purpose of 
spanning a divide, and of maintaining the tension between one realm and 
                                            
144 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science, Translated by Walter Kaufmann,Vintage Books 
Edition, Random House, New York, 1974, section 341, p.273 
 
145 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Also sprach Zarathustra, Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen, Philipp Reclam 
jun., Stuttgart,1994.  
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another. This extends to images of things which are ‘crooked’146, those which 
curve up and those which curve back on themselves and form the all 
important circle.  These include Zarathustra’s experiences of ‘going down’ 
(Untergang) or ‘going under’(Untergehen), of demise and death, followed by 
ripeness bursting into new life. Images of light and brightness, sun and open 
sky are set against their opposites of darkness, heaviness, and obscuring 
cloud. A central motif of Zoroastrianism is the conflict between good and 
light, darkness and evil.  
  It is possible to find many images and such devices as the 
personification of elements in TSZ that can only have been derived from 
Nietzsche’s familiarity with the newly translated texts of Zoroastrianism in the 
late nineteenth century. Indeed, in parts the very tone of TSZ, resembles the 
declamatory tone of the Gathas of Zoroaster himself, his exhortations and 
prayers of worship to the gods. I shall point to these elements as I go along 
and refer to certain Zoroastrian texts and rites as reconstructed by scholars 
of Zoroastrianism which suggest that much of the imagery in TSZ attributed 
to Christianity bears more evidence of influence from Zoroastrianism. It 
appears that rather in the same way that Zoroaster himself pieced together a 
                                                                                                                             
 
146 The often recurring word  ‘crooked’ is, in the German, krümmen: to bend as in the arch of 
a cat’s back, a curved surface,  also to bend like a river, to wind like a street or path, to 
writhe like a worm, to be like a man doubled -up.  
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religious doctrine from selected older beliefs and his own revelation, so 
Nietzsche utilised aspects of ancient mythology, religion and cosmogony, 
and also the language of physics, science and cosmology to explore and 
develop a doctrine based on his own revelation of Eternal Return. 
  I will consider whether there is any important difference in the two 
terms ‘Eternal Return’ and ‘Eternal Recurrence’ and wonder also what 
‘Same’ it is that comes again. I will describe the thought of Eternal Return as 
the vision and the weightiest encounter, its overcoming in the enigma of the 
Snake, and the full awakening of the thought in Zarathustra. We will find the 
affirmation of the doctrine of Eternal Return leads to the affirmation of Life 
itself and the acceptance of personal fate (‘amor fati’) in which lies its 
redemptive quality. The doctrine is a thought experiment, but, if entertained 
fully, it has the same power to shatter us as it would have if we believed it to 
be true. The moment becomes a site of decision not only in the sense of 
whether one comes to a resounding affirmation of life but also in the sense of 
its marking a point of difference and change. It is a site of judgement and of 
will, not only in the decision to accept the doctrine and will life, its temporal 
character and its possibilities, but as the force of will to power that comprises 
how we exist in the world. We could think of will to power as a life-force. 
Indeed Nietzsche understands life itself as will to power.  
  Nietzsche first mentions the idea of Eternal Return in The Gay 
Science, written in 1881. In this year, Nietzsche tells us the thought first burst 
upon him and made its indelible impression. Although in The Gay Science  
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Nietzsche speaks of a ‘moment’, the image of the gateway which allows the 
possibility of a fuller expounding of its meaning does not appear until TSZ in 
1885-7. Perhaps its meaning had not fully revealed itself to Nietzsche until he 
wrote TSZ two years later. As ‘something’ says to Zarathustra when he is 
sent back into solitude having approached the gateway for the first time as a 
mere observer: ‘O, Zarathustra, your fruits are ripe but you are not yet ripe 
for your fruits!’147 It is in TSZ, then, that the doctrine achieves its full 
description and comes into the realisation of its significance and point of 
entry, the gateway named ‘Augenblick’ (Moment). Zarathustra approaches 
the gateway more than once before the particular moment of the doctrine’s 
revelation. The idea is brought to account by a process which has its own 
comings and goings, or returns; the thought is brought to fruition through the 
unfolding narrative.  
  The idea itself has a deep resonance for Nietzsche and he considers it 
with great seriousness as if it were actually true. To reap its effect we also 
must enter into belief of it if only for a moment. The thought of Eternal Return 
struck Nietzsche profoundly in that moment on the mountain, perhaps not 
quite ‘out of the blue’, however. Rüdiger Safranski in his biography Nietzsche 
tells us that even as a schoolboy Nietzsche learned about the notion of 
circular time in ‘well-established philosophical and religious tradition found in 
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Indic myths, in the philosophy of the pre-Socratics and the Pythagoreans’148. 
Nietzsche’s early essay Fate and History (1862) ‘contained allusions to 
perpetual cycles of time presented in the image of a cosmic clock: ‘Does the 
eternal becoming never reach an end? … Hour by hour, the hand of the 
clock moves along, only to begin its passage all over again after twelve; a 
new cosmic era dawns’’ 149 . 
  Safranski tells us Nietzsche sought to temper his attraction to the 
mythological and ‘his tendency to improvisation’ by imposing ‘regimes’150 upon 
himself. Yet despite describing how Eternal Return might actually work in 
terms of physics, its importance lay in the experience of a profound human 
encounter with the thought, this being the only true way in which it can be 
understood. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche tells us that physics is ‘only 
an interpretation and arrangement of the world’151 intended for the satisfaction 
of our own requirements. Eternal Return is not put forward as a metaphysical 
or cosmological doctrine for this is not Nietzsche’s way. It is Nietzsche’s 
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personal progress and suffering which produces and informs the ideas. For 
him feelings of rapture and moments of inspiration could be reached through 
art, words and music which he considered capable of giving access to and 
conveying the deepest of feelings, the profoundest ideas. It is often in the 
songs within the narrative of TSZ that we find the expression of its meanings.  
  Nietzsche chooses the figure of Zarathustra (Greek: Zoroaster), the 
Iranian prophet and founder of the ancient Persian religion, Zoroastrianism. 
He was in fact, as Mary Boyce tells us in Zoroastrians Their Religious Beliefs 
and Practises, ‘the only founder of a world religion who was both priest and 
prophet’
152. In The Western Response to Zoroaster, J. Duchesne-Guillemin 
explains that ‘Iranian philology’ had a part to play in all the competing schools 
‘in the science of religions’ in the mid-nineteenth century, these included ‘the 
‘naturalistic school’ a ‘combination of Vedic philology and comparative 
linguistics’
153. However, he tells us that the prophet never became a popular 
figure in Europe, and he finds it ‘significant that the only literary work that 
calls him by his real name, Nietzsche’s Also spracht Zarathustra, 1885-7, 
should present a picture of him which is the almost exact opposite of truth’, 
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although Nietzsche was ‘not at all ignorant of the real Zoroaster’
154 .  
  In regard to this accusation we might compare a statement in 
Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations: ‘I do not know what sense classical 
philology could have in our time if it were not untimely - that is to say, working 
against the time and thereby upon the time and, let us hope, in favor of the 
time to come’155. This passage is quoted by Richardson in order to find what 
Nietzsche might have meant when he asserts through Zarathustra that we 
must will the past. Richardson finds that the idea of ‘a noble (distant) past is 
to be used as a model for improving the present’. A. MacIntyre agrees with 
this view, that the ‘contemporary Nietzschean … is condemned to an 
existence which aspires to transcend all relationship to the past’’156, even 
though arguing that Nietzsche has ‘misunderstood the past he favors’157. 
However this may be, Nietzsche’s view seems to be that the works of the 
past should inform the future, and this allows him some license in 
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interpretation of his sources whether from Zoroastrianism or elsewhere. 
Nietzsche does have a precise reason for using Zarathustra in the way he 
did which he lays out in his later work Ecce Homo, in a tone which 
Duchesne-Guillemin describes as one of complaint: 
‘I have not been asked as I should have been asked, what the name 
Zarathustra means in precisely my mouth, in the mouth of the first 
immoralist: for what constitutes the tremendous uniqueness of that 
Persian in history is precisely the opposite of this. Zarathustra was the 
first to see in the struggle between good and evil the actual wheel in the 
working of things: the translation of morality into the realm of 
metaphysics, as force, cause, end-in-itself, in his work…’ 
 
It was Zarathustra, after his revelation, who taught that contrary to an earlier 
belief, it was an ethical judgement at death which decided which souls would 
go on to Paradise and which would go  down to ‘a hell of torment’158, and not 
‘favour bought of the gods’ through the making of sacrifices and offerings to 
the relevant gods. It was Zarathustra who Nietzsche asserts : 
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‘… created this most fateful of errors, morality: consequently he must be 
the first to recognise it. Not only has he had longer and greater 
experience here than any other thinker - the history is indeed the 
experimental refutation  of the proposition of a so-called ‘moral world-
order’- what is more important is that Zarathustra is more truthful than 
any other thinker. His teaching, and his alone, upholds truthfulness as 
the supreme virtue - that is to say, the opposite of the cowardice of the 
‘idealist’, who takes flight in face of reality; Zarathustra has more 
courage in him than all other thinkers put together. … The self-
overcoming of morality through truthfulness, the self-overcoming of the 
moralist into its opposite - into me - that’s what  the name Zarathustra 
means in my mouth’
159. 
    
Nietzsche takes on the heroic stance of ‘the first immoralist’160 (elsewhere ‘a-
moralist’) confronting morality itself and other thoughtlessly accepted ideals 
and values. For him, ‘values do not exist’, this is what is referred to as 
Nietzsche’s ‘perspectivism’161 . Values are invented by valuers not discovered 
in the world and are therefore dependent on ‘the nature of those doing the 
valuing’162. Ultimately values come from within an individual who is ‘powerful 
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enough for the task’
163 of creating them. God is dead, and ‘without God the 
only possibility of greatness is in its creation’164. There is no ‘beyond’ or 
behind of metaphysics. This use of Zoroaster, Duchesne-Guillemin tells us, 
‘became part of an attempt to emancipate modern man from Christianity’165, 
particularly in its monotheism.  He tells us that dualism in religious belief 
‘emerges as an answer to the problem of evil’166, how can one God create 
both good and evil, must there not be a separate source of evil? 
Zoroastrianism is a cosmic dualistic system which admits of a place for both 
good and evil and their on-going conflict. It is distinctive in that these are 
considered equiprimordial in this system, unlike other forms of cosmic 
dualism where evil is derivative and subordinate167. The struggle in ‘the wheel’ 
of things proscribes the possibility of a stable moral ideal ‘world-order’. But it 
takes a certain courage to accept this and to proclaim it as a truth, rather 
than hiding behind idealism. In self overcoming born of the personal struggle 
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within an individual between an inherent good and evil, one ‘creates truth’168.  
  By this way of thinking, Zarathustra, (and hence Nietzsche), is 
supremely moral in his rejection of the idea of a moral ideal toward whose 
attainment we ought to strive. There is no attainment of any ideal, only the 
striving is of worth. There is no end, no ultimate purpose outside of our world, 
‘no God as eternal existing ground of the world, no state of rest, no 
nirvana’
169. For Nietzsche all these ideas lead to the nihilism which he 
considers defines his age, denying the value of this world by giving it to 
another. It is the  ‘weak men’ like the Schopenhaurean pessimists and the 
‘afterworldsmen’
170, the believers in an after life, whom he considers 
perpetuate false values and false hope. Against them, he believed himself to 
be one of the few courageous men with the strength to break ‘old law tables’, 
and to replace them with new thinking about the meaning of ‘values’. The 
‘first immoralist’ is, Nietzsche says, ‘one who first creates truth’, who is ‘a 
world-ruling spirit’ who is himself ‘a destiny’
171.  We can legitimately read 
Nietzsche himself through his character Zarathustra. In Ecce Homo 
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Nietzsche goes on to ask: ‘Have I been understood? - I have not just now 
said a word that I could not have said five years ago through the mouth of 
Zarathustra’
172.  
  In the same way, Nietzsche considered the world itself as not directed 
to any final end, there being no teleological ‘once and for all’173; with no stable 
state, time goes on and things recur. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes the 
‘vehemence of this invasion’ of the thought of Eternal Return, he approaches 
it with serious respect and initially with some sense of ‘helplessness’174 . 
Nietzsche entertains extremes of thought, turning an idea over to look boldly 
and with courage at its other face, realising that the two aspects belong to 
the same idea. He feels that he possesses the particular strength required to 
face this doctrine through which one can, in some way, overcome oneself.   
  John Richardson in Nietzsche’s System, perhaps controversially, 
assigns a metaphysics or ontology to Nietzsche despite Nietzsche’s insistent 
denial of these. Nietzsche’s ontology, he asserts, is based on becoming 
rather than being, for Nietzsche ‘being is becoming’ and ‘the theory of 
becoming is a theory about reality’175 . That reality is temporal, and 
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Richardson argues that temporality is explicit in Nietzsche’s important claims 
and implicit in ’other ideas’
176 such as will to power. Also, despite Nietzsche’s 
attacks on teleology, which Richardson tells us were ‘often and emphatic’
177, 
Nietzsche ‘uses the notion’ of will to power ‘to propose a new telic system as 
essential to all things’
178.  As ‘wills to power’ the essence of all things ‘is a 
striving to grow or develop, but this growth never culminates in any stable 
end’, beings are ‘essentially changing.’ Richardson refers us to Nietzsche’s 
Will to Power 1064: ‘’In a determinate moment of force, the absolute 
conditionedness of a new distribution of all its forces is given: it cannot stand 
still. ‘Alteration’ belongs to the essence, therefore also temporality’
179.  
  The overcoming of oneself then can be seen in this context, 
Richardson says Nietzsche’s ‘distinction among master, slave, and overman 
crucially refer to how this will and these persons are ‘in time’’180. There is not 
necessarily a linear progression from one to the next of these three ‘types’, it 
is rather a dialectical progression, one can shift between types. These terms 
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are not judgements of individuals by Nietzsche, he does not necessarily 
favour the ‘master’ type. Rather, they are necessary fluctuating states of 
being between changing types. But ultimately Nietzsche does posit an ideal 
future person who, as ‘a structuring of drives, … differently resembles each 
of his predecessors’181; he is a ‘synthesis’ of the ‘master’ and ‘slave’ types, 
the Overman182 . Nietzsche considers human being to be in a state ‘between 
animal and Overman’183, human societies are in a constant movement of rise 
and decline. Richardson analyses Nietzsche’s concept of becoming as 
‘process’ of force, as ‘contextual’ within temporality , and as ‘intentionally’ 
directed toward a future goal. This theory underlies Nietzsche’s doctrine of 
Eternal Return as we shall see. However, as my focus is on the Moment, I 
begin at the gateway itself, symbol and written sign of the Augenblick. 
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The Gateway. 
  It is not simply a ‘gate’, but the ‘gateway’ (Torweg or Thorweg) which 
suggests a point of entry into something, it has the connotation of transition, 
of movement through. Several questions might be asked: When does the 
gateway appear and how can it be entered? What or where does it give 
access to and what or where from; is there a toll on the way through? 
Noticing that there is a gateway may not necessarily allow us access to it. 
Hugh J. Silverman points out, in his article The Inscription of the Moment: 
Zarathustra’s Gate that another word for ‘gate’ is ‘bar’184 in the Northern 
English of Yorkshire which refers to a gate into a city. Such a gateway gives 
passage beneath its fortified walls, it might often be closed and disallow any 
entry or passage through. Then of course, there will be a time when it is open 
and the opportunity for entry is there for those allowed admittance, then it is 
for the individual to choose whether to enter. A gateway has a dual aspect, it 
seems to allow for movement in both directions, which side might be the 
starting point and which the destination is not clear. Initially the destination 
itself is not clear either. However, whichever side we are on, it takes us to the 
other side.  
  The gateway in TSZ, Zarathustra says lies on the ‘roads’ between 
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past and future. If we think of ourselves as ‘on’ this road through life, the 
gateway would seem to intercept us, (as death intercepts us). If on our road 
of life we move from past to future, we might assume a one-way journey 
because time is irreversible despite the fact that we can, in a sense, bring the 
past back into the present by remembering or by inheriting its products. This 
is one way in which we can think a continual to-ing and fro-ing across the 
‘divide’ of the present destroying the one-way movement. But continuing our 
linear line of thought, we can think of the future as passing through our 
present on its way to becoming the past.  If, according to the doctrine of 
Eternal Return, the past will return in the future and, in turn, become present 
again, our to-ing and fro-ing becomes cyclical.  
  We, in the present, are the hub of this movement whether linear or 
cyclical. The present would seem to be carried with us as we move from our 
past toward our future, in the present (in us) the past and future meet. We 
describe ontic time, as consisting of past present and future. In our everyday 
experience of time there is no locatable ‘now’ that can be isolated and held 
on to185. There can be no ‘gap’ as such between past and future. It is not 
something self-sufficient but in a continual temporal flux and in the context of 
the rest of time, seemingly moving toward something. Yet there is something 
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identifiable and nameable as a moment when we come to consider our 
existence within time. We have already established that the gateway 
represents the moment by the name above it: Augenblick.  
  Augenblick in its English translation of ‘the blink of an eye’ suggests 
both the present perceived as swiftly passing and also speaks of some 
remarkable and sudden experience. An important event comes to presence, 
it draws our attention to it. In certain intense experiences, our perception of 
everyday temporality can be altered, it is common to note that in sadness or 
boredom or even in trauma, time seems to lengthen; in exciting and sudden 
experiences time might seem to pass swiftly.  And so the ordinary present 
moment is elevated to a rich ontological concept: Augenblick, one which we 
can use for interpreting our existence and the chances and choices offered at 
certain decisive moments.  The literal translation of Augenblick in German is 
‘glance of the eye’186 which opens its meaning further to allow for ‘seeing’, in 
the sense of understanding and directedness toward some object or idea. Its 
connotation of ‘vision’ can also suggest the visionary ‘seeing’ which can 
                                            
186 In a footnote to the TSZ text, Hollingdale tells us that the usual translation of Augenblick is 
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accompany an ecstatic experience. 
  The idea we have of the gateway then, is of a site of passage from 
one place to another. Considering Nietzsche’s decision to use the figure of 
Zarathustra as his voice for expounding the doctrine of Eternal Return in 
TSZ, and we can make an interesting comparison with the Zoroastrian 
Chinvato Peretu, Bridge of the Requiter, also known as Bridge or Crossing of 
the Separator. This bridge separates life and death and is the place of 
individual moral judgement, ‘where each soul must depend, not on power or 
wealth of offerings in the life it has left behind, but on its own ethical 
achievements’187 . The soul’s ‘thoughts, words or deeds’ are weighed in the 
scales of justice, if the good weigh heavier than the evil deeds the soul is met 
by ‘a beautiful maiden’ and led across a broad bridge up to ‘Paradise’ on 
high. This maiden (daena, or double188) ‘represents the personification of the 
soul’s ‘own conscience’. If, in the scales, the evil weighs heavier the soul is 
met by ‘a horrid hag’, ‘the bridge contracts to the width of a blade-edge’ and 
the hag scoops up the soul in her arms and ‘plunges it down to hell’ in the 
abyss below. A kind of limbo exists for those whose deeds just balance 
called the ‘Place of the Mixed Ones’ where those souls  lead a grey 
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existence, lacking both joy and sorrow.’189  This judgement is not final, the 
moment on the Bridge is not an eschatological one, for the dead await a 
further, final judgement190 .  
  The bridge then crosses over the boundary between life and death, it 
is a site of moral judgement between good and evil and an event of decision 
between heaven and hell. Although a bridge crosses a boundary and a 
gateway stands at a boundary, they both mark a point of transition from one 
side to another. The gateway, like the bridge, marks a point of moral decision 
or judgement. They both, in a sense, span an abyss. The bridge spans hell 
and the gateway spans the present moment of Zarathustra’s abysmal 
thought of Eternal Return. Goetz Richter, the translator of Eugene Fink’s 
Nietzsche’s Philosophy, renders ‘at the gateway’ as ‘on the gateway’191 which 
the German allows (Ich sitze am Thorwege), and which might allow us to link 
the image of the gateway and the Bridge of the Requiter. However, there are 
too many differences to be able to say that the image of the gateway in TSZ  
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could derive from the Bridge of Zoroastrian texts.  
  One difference we can point to is that although the gateway is a 
passage between one realm and another, it remains in this world whereas 
the bridge, if we take it as the bridge of judgement at death, takes one from 
this world to another. However, both of these phrases suggest that progress 
through or across is yet to be made, the moment is still pending. Further 
complexities surround these images, Zarathustra says that human being is a 
bridge or rope (Seil: tightrope, highwire), between two states, ‘man is a 
bridge and not a goal’192.  Human being is both the bridge between man and 
Overman and those who pass over the bridge: ‘You are only bridges: may 
higher men than you step across upon you! You are steps: so do not be 
angry with him who climbs over you into his height!’193.  Zarathustra does not 
say that human being itself is the gateway, but he does say that man 
connects the future and past194 and that happens in the gateway. 
  Zarathustra’s gateway is a boundary marked by a ‘boundary-stone’195, 
on which the name Augenblick is inscribed. All these boundary stones will 
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one day lose their weight, Zarathustra tells us. Perhaps this might be taken 
as a suggestion that there will come a time when we will no longer need a 
marker to know the Augenblick. Then, the notion of transcendence between 
an earthly and a spiritual realm will lose its meaning, and we will no longer 
need a scale to determine good and evil because their differences will be 
overcome. We will come back to this notion, but for now, written in stone: 
Augenblick is the name of this boundary.   
  To return to TSZ, we find first mention of the gateway in the section 
called ‘Of Manly Prudence’; here, Zarathustra is found ‘at’ the gateway sitting 
and waiting. Whether we take the translation of ‘on’ or ‘at’ the gateway, 
Zarathustra is neither entering nor crossing, he is, as yet, merely an 
onlooker, an observer: 
  
‘I sit at the gateway and wait for every rogue and ask: who wants to 
deceive me? This is my first manly prudence: I let myself be deceived so 
as not to be on guard against deceivers’
196  
 
  Zarathustra cannot here ‘enter’ the gateway, he must ‘go down’ again 
and return to the gateway repeatedly before realising its significance or being 
able to engage fully with its content.197 He awaits ‘man’ because it is only from 
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his level that a progress can be made, forward into the future of human being 
and upward to the higher notion of what human being can become, the 
Overman.  Willing his own ‘deception’, Zarathustra wants to begin his 
progression from the human level, from the ‘rogue’ of mankind, the ‘weak’ 
creatures against whom he expresses great disgust. Yet he knows this ‘going 
down’ (Greek: katabasis198) is necessary, that being ‘gladly … deceived 
occasionally and settling for a little intoxication and effusive enthusiasm’ by 
‘narcotic consolations’ assures ‘the capacity for constant change’199. One 
should not be on one’s guard against change because it is a far better thing 
than stasis. The deceivers do not only deceive others, but are self-deceivers. 
  Zarathustra must take on the ‘bad’ traits of human being and endure 
them, it is necessary to will to become truly human200 before one can will 
otherwise. He must wait for ‘rogues’ before he can arrive at the 
‘Übermensch’; the time is not yet ‘ripe’. Zarathustra's will is ‘two-fold’, it 
glances up and down at once from the site of his own possibilities. His 
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‘glance plunges into the heights’ because he has a vision of something 
higher to strive toward, but, he says, ‘my hand wants to hold on to the depths 
and lean there - that, that is my abyss and my danger.’201 The ‘abyss’, the 
danger of being drawn down into it and the decision to go further are all his 
alone. But Zarathustra is not yet at the event of the deepest experiencing of 
his vision, nor is he yet the type of person who can experience its ‘highest 
insight’202. 
The Thought as Vision. 
  The next time Zarathustra is at the gateway is in the section called: ‘Of 
the Vision and the Riddle’203. This time he arrives there in the company of the 
Spirit (Geist) of Gravity, a creature ‘half dwarf, half mole’204 . It is at this point 
that the name of the gateway is brought to the attention of the dwarf: ‘The 
name of the gateway is written above it: ‘Moment.’‘ The importance of its 
being ‘written’ or inscribed is investigated by Silverman205. Indeed, writing was 
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of great importance to Nietzsche, Safranski tells us how, in early 
autobiographical sketches, Nietzsche wrote with ‘life force’, and finally ‘he 
wrote to stay alive’206. Something which is inscribed is, in a sense, written so 
as to be conspicuous, to be recognised and taken note of. Words inscribed in 
stone such as ‘law tables’ and commandments, are durable. This gateway it 
seems, must endure through eternity. The word inscription can also refer to 
the point where one geometric figure touches on another without intersecting. 
Perhaps we can think of the gateway as the inscription of past and future, 
two eternal roads abutting but not intersecting. 
  It is ‘written into their stones and into the sides of their summits’ that 
‘The highest must arise to its height from the deepest.’207 Zarathustra has 
climbed a difficult mountain path in solitude, a path forcing upward with effort 
‘despite the spirit that drew it downward, toward the abyss, the Spirit of 
Gravity, my devil and archenemy.’208 Paradoxically, Zarathustra is in solitude 
yet also said to be in the company of the Spirit of Gravity. Perhaps the dwarf 
represents Zarathustra’s own gravity of spirit which has not yet left him, or is 
an instance of a spirit akin to the slinking ‘demon’209 which Nietzsche 
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introduces into our ‘loneliest loneliness’210 when the doctrine is first glimpsed 
in The Gay Science.  
  I make a slight diversion here to talk about gravity and weight. 
‘Gravity’ can of course be interpreted in two ways, Nietzsche is referring to 
the weightiness or seriousness (gravitas) of the thought of Eternal Return 
and the way in which its seriousness in the guise of the dwarf weighs heavily 
on Zarathustra’s shoulders, and how its weight is intended also to burden us. 
As Giles Fraser, in Redeeming Nietzsche suggests, there are questions 
about our individual life that recur to us periodically in reflective moments 
such as whether one might do something differently if given the chance 
again. ‘If we grant for a moment that the eternal recurrence is a cosmological 
possibility’
211, that this moment of my writing and thinking about eternal 
recurrence has already occurred countless times; ‘and this slow spider that 
creeps along in the moonlight’, we realise how weighty this question is. 
Fraser considers whether the individual’s questioning constitutes a ‘test’ 
different from that of Eternal Recurrence because it concerns the repetition of 
a single past, one’s own past, whereas Eternal Recurrence concerns the 
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coming of an infinite number of pasts. Yet does this really make any 
difference? It would seem not to when we hear Zarathustra say: ‘if ever you 
wanted one moment twice, if ever you said: ‘You please me, happiness, 
instant, moment!’ Then you wanted everything to return!’
212 And when we 
consider that the becoming individual is part of the becoming process of the 
world as a whole. 
  Fraser speaks of the loss of weight213 brought about by another of 
Nietzsche’s concepts, the death of God. Fraser tells us that ‘on one level 
Nietzsche celebrates the liberation from oppression brought about by the 
death of God. Nonetheless he fully appreciates that this freedom is, 
potentially, just as hard to bear … nothing seems to matter quite as much as 
it did, ‘without ‘the weight of divine judgement… on each and every human 
choice.’ This gravity must be restored somehow, Nietzsche must find some 
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way ‘of generating gravity, of introducing judgement, without returning to 
divine judgement or divine weight.’ This, Fraser tells us, is ‘the purpose of 
Eternal Return.’214 
  To return to the gateway. The German Geist can be taken to mean 
both ‘spirit’ and ‘intellect’
215. The dwarf represents one interpretation of and 
reaction to the gateway from a heavy and ’ponderous’
216 perspective. He will 
not give up old beliefs too soon and has not the courage to be a creator, to 
think for himself; he has no vision. He pours ‘leaden thoughts’
217 into 
Zarathustra’s mind, telling Zarathustra that as a ‘stone of wisdom’ he has 
thrown himself high ‘but every stone that is thrown - must fall!’. Under the 
force of gravity a stone falls down, ‘it will fall back upon you!’ says the dwarf, 
a warning that man cannot progress, that he is not ‘becoming’. As Fink tells 
us:  
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‘All human projects must finally sink. An infinite ascent is not possible, 
because this is prevented by infinite time … Just like gravity which 
exhausts the finite power of the thrower and destroys it ultimately, the 
infinite power of time exhausts and destroys all the powers of human 
self-overcoming which follow its path.’
218   
 
And Zarathustra’s wisdom will rebound219 on him, and crush him. The dwarf 
becomes silent but for Zarathustra this oppressive silence is worse than 
being alone oppressed by his own dreams and thoughts, ‘wearied by his sore 
torment.’220 Zarathustra carries the thought of Eternal Return in ‘the abyss of 
himself’221 but has not yet confronted it. Courage itself at last bids him stop 
and confront the dwarf, for  the courage ‘that attacks’ is ‘the best destroyer’222. 
Old values and nihilistic thinking can be destroyed. ‘This courage kills death 
and facing life itself expresses a will to repetition’223. Zarathustra rallies 
                                            
218 Fink, op cit, p.74 
 
219 ‘krümmen’:  bent as in ‘doubled up’ 
 
220 A torment reminiscent of the Iranian ordeal by molten metal, incorporated into 
Zoroaster’s notion of the final end of human being and the Last Judgement. See Boyce, 
Zoroastrians Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, p.27 
 
221 Nietzsche, TSZ, op cit, p.178 
 
222 Ibid, p.178 
 
223 Fink, op cit, p.75  
110 
himself to the challenge declaring: ‘You! Or I!’ Zarathustra, telling the dwarf 
that he is the stronger of the two for the dwarf could not, if he knew it, endure 
his ‘abysmal thought’ the point of entry of which they now arrive. The dwarf 
jumps to the ground, relieving Zarathustra of his weight. Zarathustra is 
making a return to the site, and yet it is as though it is for the first time that 
they halt by ‘a’ gateway. It is note worthy that this is ‘a’ gateway, not 
necessarily ‘the’ gateway of Zarathustra’s last arrival. That seems to be now 
forgotten.  Is there a sense in which the gateway is always there at any point 
on the path appearing when it is discovered, that we carry along with us the 
possibility of the gateway in the same way as we do the present of time, until 
they become noticeable as the Moment (Augenblick). The possibilities of the 
Augenblick reside in every moment. 
  The gateway, Zarathustra can now describe as having ‘two aspects. 
Two paths come together here: no one has ever reached their end. This long 
lane behind us: it goes on for an eternity. And that long lane ahead of us - 
that is another eternity. They are in opposition to one another, these paths; 
they abut on one another: and it is here at this gateway that they come 
together’224. ‘Eternity’ here does not mean something other-worldly that comes 
into play when time ends, or refer to a realm that we enter when our temporal 
life is over. Nietzsche is referring to the infinity of time within which finite 
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temporal events occur.  
  Mary Boyce describes how the Zoroastrian theology distinguishes 
between two types of time, ‘unlimited time, that is, eternity, and limited or 
bounded time, within which the events of cosmic history take place’225. Time 
(zurvan), can be used as a noun but in a later period of Zoroastrian belief it 
came to also represent ‘a god personifying what this means’.  Boyce 
explains: ‘The proto-Indo-Iranians … had the capacity to personify what 
would now be termed abstractions, and to apprehend them as strong, ever-
present divinities’. And so ‘time’ could be construed as ‘a divine personality’, 
and in the same way, other ‘lesser ‘abstract’ divinities’, such as ’Courage’ 
which constitute qualities of various persons such as ‘kings, heroes and 
prophets’226 can be hypostasized227.  Having this ‘divinity’ is dependent, 
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however, on their being true to asha, the ‘natural law’ which ensured that 
existence continue in an orderly way’228. We have established two different 
ways in which we consider ‘time’, we might substitute the deity for the 
concept; Time within which human events occur with their own temporal 
character. Fraser points to the difference in this way: ‘The distinction that is 
often used to distinguish between the time of clocks and calendars and the 
theologically charged ‘opportune’ time is that between chronos and kairos, 
(chronos-time refers to the regular flow of measured time, and kairos-time to 
times-of-opportunity or times-of-decision-making)’229. Or, as stated in the 
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament: ‘As regards Kairos and 
Chronos, the one denotes time as the external framework within which all 
human action takes place, the other time in so far as it is ours, … time in 
relation to the content which we give it, the moment which is decisive for 
each action’. This includes the idea of fate and can sometimes have a 
nuance of a ‘propituous hour in the religious sense’230 . 
  Zarathustra wonders further: ‘… if one were to follow them further and 
ever further and further: do you think, dwarf, that these paths would be in 
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eternal opposition?’ Will these roads always be in opposition, or is there 
some concept by which we can unite them, for, if these roads are eternally 
opposed, how can they ever come together to form the circle of return? The 
past and future are absolutely different as ‘ends’. The past is finished and 
closed to further change but the future’s end is always still pending. The 
difference between end as terminus and as telos comes to light again here 
and infers a difference of will, one wills the future but cannot in the same way 
will the past because it can no longer be effected. Forever incompatible, 
paradoxically ‘(t)he incompatibles meet at their borders’231. Only in the 
moment can their contradiction be resolved, this is something we discover in 
a later chapter of TSZ, ‘On Redemption’. For now Zarathustra ‘approaches 
time immanently. Time is conceived as a sequence of moments’232 .  
  Robert Gooding-Williams in Zarathustra’s Dionysian Modernism, 
asserts that the ‘contradiction’ of the paths of past and future implies that ‘if a 
moment has passed away into the past then it is not a future moment (a 
moment yet to occur), and that no future moment has passed away into the 
past’233 . Zarathustra’s perspective of the present moment, Gooding-Williams 
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tells us, is that past and future are seen as ‘spatially continuous extensions’ 
of the ‘place’ of the moment, ‘not as existing ‘before’ and ‘after’ the present 
moment’234 . This perspective is of a ‘perpetual, or eternal ‘now’ relative to 
which neither earlier nor later moments exist. The present is ‘mobile’, a nunc 
stans. 
 Meanwhile,  the  Geist of Gravity representing the abysmal thought, 
cannot deal with the idea, he reacts against Zarathustra’s words: ‘Everything 
straight lies … All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle.’ The ‘dwarf or mole’ 
is a creature of the earth and oppressed by ‘gravity’, his response is in 
keeping with this.  Fink tells us that ’the answer from the dwarf is, from 
Nietzsche’s point of view correct; however, it is also much too simple’235 . This 
is not merely an idea of the circularity of time we can observe in the world 
with its seasonal changes. The dwarf has reached the limit of his 
understanding and cannot go further but Zarathustra will yet go higher in his 
thinking and, paradoxically, deeper in his engagement with the thought.  
  In considering the ‘reaction’ of the dwarf, we might draw here on 
Richardson’s description of Nietzsche's ‘psychological types’. The dwarf is a 
figure which might be seen to represent the ‘slave’ type, an earlier stage in 
the becoming of human being as it progresses toward the higher state of the 
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Overman. The ‘slave aims at passive happiness’236 Richardson tells us, which 
seems to be what the dwarf is aiming at here, his response is ‘reactive’ like 
the ‘slave’ type itself. His reply is too easy, he wants to rest on old ideas. In 
the same way in which things are in flux and constant change according to 
Nietzsche’s theory of becoming, so each human type is in the process of 
change and therefore does not display all the aspects of the type all together. 
That would be to end its life of possibilities, to make it a finished thing or 
being and bring it to an end. The dwarf is a necessary character in 
Zarathustra’s unfolding understanding of Eternal Return, for, ‘must there not 
exist that which is danced upon, danced across? Must there not be moles 
and heavy dwarfs - for the sake of the nimble, the nimblest?’237  
  At the gateway Zarathustra continues, he has shown the dwarf the 
roads and now he brings his attention to the gateway: ‘Behold this Moment!’ 
he goes on, from which an ‘eternal lane runs back’ if, as Zarathustra says, 
‘an eternity lies behind us. … Must not all things that can happen have 
already happened, been done, run past?’, all possible finite temporal events 
must have already come into being if the past stretches back eternally. To 
bring this notion closer, he asks the dwarf to consider that ‘if all things have 
been here before:… Must not this gateway, too, have been here - before?’. 
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Not only the past but this present moment itself, and even the future which 
comes toward it must already have been here and been forgotten.238   
  ‘And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this 
moment draws after it all future things? Therefore - draws itself too?’, 
Zarathustra asks. It seems to pull itself from out of the future, it comes 
constantly, continually offering its possibilities239, ‘in every moment’.  
 
  ‘For all things that can run must also run once again forward along this 
lane. And this slow spider that creeps along in the moonlight, and this 
moonlight itself, and I and you at this gateway whispering together, 
whispering of eternal things - must we not all have been here before? - 
and must we not return and run down that other lane out before us, 
down that long, terrible lane - must we not return eternally?’240  
 
  At the mention of returning eternally, the substance of the gateway 
moment is revealed, there is a howl of a dog241 , the vision is broken, the 
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dwarf and the gateway and the glimpse of recurrent things, for now, 
disappear. Even though Zarathustra has put forward the thought, it is still like 
a dream to him. It is still not the right time of its culmination in him. The 
German Gesicht, apart from meaning vision, can also mean ‘aspect’ or ‘face’, 
the eternity of time has shown its two ‘aspects’ of past and future, its ‘face’ is 
return or recurrence, the vision in which it is shown to Zarathustra holds the 
insight that everything recurs, even recurrence itself. The gateway holds all 
of eternal recurrence, all of eternity in the Moment. 
  ‘And are not all things bound fast together?’ Zarathustra asks. As we 
have said in our introduction, this doctrine draws together Nietzsche’s other 
main concepts, those of Becoming, Will to Power and the Overman. 
Underlying all of these is the language of science, mythology and religion. 
Richardson tells us Nietzsche adopts terms from physics in order ‘to build on 
the sense they have there’
242. These are ‘the drive [Trieb] or force [Kraft] as 
the typical unit of his will’, from Nachlass material, Richardson quotes 
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Nietzsche as saying: ‘Everything is force’
243.  Nietzsche’s notion of ‘becoming’ 
encompasses not only the unfolding of the world, the progression of the 
human race, its societies and the individuals within it, but also the way in 
which individuals live life; it is their moral will. Ethical conduct is judged on the 
Bridge of the Requiter, and in the gateway Moment. 
 Commentators244 differ as to whether Nietzsche believed there to be 
scientific evidence for Eternal Return as a cosmological possibility, Joan 
Stambaugh tells us that Nietzsche approached the thought as a ‘fact 
belonging to physics’245, before succumbing to the event of his profound inner 
experience of it. Yet later, in a fragment from 1885 in Will to Power246 
Nietzsche suggests that scientific explanation is a deception, despite the 
laws of physics such Eternal Return is an impossibility. As well as by ‘rogues’ 
we can also be deceived by ‘the lawfulness which we see’ in ‘force’ as ‘a 
primal law’247. Scientific explanation can rob the inner experience of its 
impact, of its ‘power’. Though cognisant of the ‘physics’ that might allow for 
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Eternal Return, it is still the experience of entry into the gateway or moment 
that he, Nietzsche/Zarathustra awaits. 
  However, the underlying theory is that there is a limited quantum of 
force, energy or matter in the universe and unlimited time in which all 
possible ‘constellations’ of matter and therefore ‘all possible events 
pertaining to both the animate and inanimate realms, have already taken 
place, and they will recur ad infinitum’248. Safranski quotes from Nietzsche’s 
notebooks, the only substantial passage containing statements on Eternal 
Return found in later writings and which, he asserts, show that Nietzsche 
believed there to be physical evidence of the concept of Eternal Return: 
 
‘The world of forces is not subject to any standstill; because otherwise it 
would have been reached, and the clock of existence would stand still. 
The world of forces therefore never reaches a state of equilibrium. It 
never has a moment of respite; its force and its movement are equally 
great at any given moment. Whatever condition this world may reach, it 
must have reached it already; not once but innumerable times. … 
Humanity! Your whole life becomes like an hourglass, always being 
inverted and always running out again - one vast minute of time in-
between until all conditions under which you arose converge once more 
in the revolution of the world’
249   
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The terms ‘clock’, and ‘hourglass’ show us again that Nietzsche speaks 
about our existence within time, positing the ‘possibility’ of Eternal Return 
within ontic time. Yet, the same notion of ‘force’ is used to describe how 
human being itself moves toward the goal of becoming Overman, and within 
human being, how the becoming individual person can become ‘what they 
are’. Life itself is the unfolding ‘force’. 
  Zarathustra tells us, echoing Heraclitus,  ‘ … he is not believed who 
says ‘Everything is in flux’ (Im flux - in German ‘river’ and ‘flowing’), he is 
contradicted by ‘simpletons’ who say ‘the planks over the stream are values 
in place and bridges, concepts, all ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’: all firmly fixed!’250 . But for 
Nietzsche, as it will be for Zarathustra, ‘ … Have not all railings and 
gangways fallen into the water and come to nothing …’251 . Even the notion of 
‘value’ shifts, the ‘immoralist’ denies any divide between notions of what 
constitutes good and evil, and evil must be incorporated into life, for ‘to 
renounce false judgements, would be to renounce life’252.  
The Vision as Enigma. 
  The Geist of Gravity, unable to accommodate Zarathustra’s thought, 
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disappears and the symbol for the Moment, the gateway disappears with 
him. Zarathustra finds himself alone. He asks himself ‘Had I been 
dreaming?’, the vision is changed, he now sees a ‘shepherd writhing, 
choking, convulsed’, with a black snake ‘hanging out of his mouth. 
Zarathustra tries to pull it out, but his efforts only make the snake bite harder. 
‘Then’, he relates, ‘a voice cried from me: ‘Bite! Bite! Its head off! Bite! … my 
horror, my hate, my disgust, my pity, all my good and evil cried out of me with 
a single cry‘253 . This is the voice of Zarathustra’s horror, and of his ‘disgust at 
man’ which ‘choked’ him. It is his disgust at the pessimism of the ‘prophet’254 
who said ‘nothing is worthwhile’, knowledge chokes’’255, and at the idea that 
even the small men recur. In Twilight of the Idols, a footnote tells us that 
Gewissenshisse is an ‘ordinary term’ in German meaning ‘conscience 
bites’256. The voice of Zarathustra’s conscience, of decision and of will tells 
him to bite the head off the snake of knowledge, the heaviest, ‘suffocating’257 
thought literally sticking in his throat. Robert John Ackermann tells us in 
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Nietzsche, A Frenzied Look, that the knowledge which the snake represents 
is ‘conventional wisdom’, and the snake, ‘a symbol of the hierarchical 
rationality of learning and conventional morality’258 . The snake which 
Zarathustra first encounters, in the Prologue, in the company of his eagle is 
coiled and therefore, Ackermann asserts, represents ‘a form of knowledge 
without a privileged point’259.  
  Zarathustra listens to the voice of his horror and acts260. In Beyond 
Good and Evil, he says: ‘Somebody who wills gives orders to something in 
him that obeys’261. It is his will that enables the head of the black snake of 
horrific thought to be bitten off. But the shepherd must do this for himself, 
Zarathustra cannot help by pulling at the snake which only bites harder. The 
image also gives us the symbol of the horror of time biting into or eating itself 
in a perpetual self-consumation, an ‘endless self-annihilating repetition of the 
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same content’. This is a truly nihilistic thought, with time indifferent to any 
event return is a vicious circle; our own footsteps wipe out the past, replacing 
them with the same. Time devours itself over and over in a ‘meaningless, 
atomistically discontinuous becoming, a concept Nietzsche himself discussed 
and rejected in his earlier works as the self-consuming of time, Chronos who 
devours his own children?’262 .  
  Zarathustra calls upon those around him to:  
 
‘Solve for me the riddle (enigma) that I saw, interpret to me the vision of 
the most solitary man!  For it was a vision and a premonition: what did I 
see in allegory? And who is it that must come one day? Who is the 
shepherd into whose mouth the snake thus crawled? Who is the man 
into whose throat all that is heaviest, blackest will thus crawl?’ 
 
  The one who is bitten and bites back, overcoming the ‘snake’, is the 
shepherd, and a shepherd is one who is ‘over’ (Über) men like a carer. He is 
the one who must grapple with the thought of Eternal Return and overcome it 
by his own actions. Zarathustra aids him in this. Yet it is Zarathustra himself 
who struggles with the thought, as only a prophet can grapple with his own 
message. Can it be that Zarathustra is helping himself in the person of the 
shepherd? He who can learn to overcome the thought is the future 
Übermensch, at play here we have the two senses of Über as ‘over’ and 
‘above’. The Overman may become the ‘one of great health’ which suggests’ 
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Fraser tells us ‘internal transcendence’263 . Ackermann asserts that the 
shepherd is ‘surely a vision of Nietzsche himself as a young professor, being 
choked by the knowledge represented in the snake symbol ….  Biting off the 
head of the snake eliminates the symbol of rational structure, leaving a snake 
like Nietzsche’s positive coiled snake that flies with his eagle’. Ackermann 
says this scene is ‘the remembrance by Nietzsche of his own past. The 
transformed, laughing shepherd is the author of Zarathustra and the image of 
the new affirmation’264.  
  Whoever the shepherd represents, he bites the snake and undergoes 
‘an existential transformation’265, he is ‘surrounded with light, laughing!’ as no 
man had yet laughed, Zarathustra describes it as ‘no human laughter, it is 
the ‘superhuman lightness of laughing’266. Gravity is overcome by a mood of 
levity, by the laughter of man transformed.  ‘And now’ Zarathustra says ‘a 
thirst consumes me, a longing that is never stilled’ it is his longing for this 
laughter and he exclaims ‘how do I endure to live! And how do I endure to die 
now!’ between life and death: ‘Thus in symbols everything called to me: ‘It is 
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time!’ But I - I did not hear: until at last my abyss stirred and my thought bit 
me’267. Zarathustra has never yet dared to ‘summon’ this thought to mind, ‘it 
has been enough that I carried you with me!’. His thought was within him but 
not yet awoken. Now he has thrown off the heaviness of the thought in the 
shape of the dwarf and overcome himself so far but must yet go further; he 
says, ‘overcome myself in that which is greater; and a victory shall be the 
seal of perfection!’. He must  overcome himself in accepting the thought and 
therefore overcome himself as a man, on the way to becoming the 
Übermensch.  
  We have said that time and the thought of Eternal Return are 
represented by the snake, but further, what has choked Zarathustra, is his 
‘great disgust at man’, it ‘crept into my throat: and what the prophet 
prophesied: ‘It is all one, nothing is worth while, knowledge chokes me’268. 
The thinking of the doctrine as pessimism chokes, considering recurrence as 
the undifferentiated return of all things, great and small, even small men with 
weak thoughts that seem to mean that ‘nothing is worthwhile. This too must 
be overcome, ‘he succeeds in affirming eternal return when he bites off the 
head of the snake’ spitting out nausea ‘over the sickness of others’ and ‘also 
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Zarathustra’s own sickness’ and yet he expects ‘to repeat again and again 
this becoming sick for the sake of creating a still higher health’269. Human 
being’s struggle between sickness and health belong to the flux of becoming, 
dissolution must also be accepted if man is to achieve a ‘still-higher 
synthesis’270  
  I want to pause here to discuss what the difference is, if any, between 
‘return’ and ‘recurrence’ and what exactly might be meant by the ‘Same’. 
Eternal Return (ewige Wiederkehr) or Eternal Recurrence (ewige 
Wiederkunft) of what ‘Same’ (Gleich)? 
  In German the words for both return and recurrence begin with the 
prefix wieder, (again or back). Return is Wiederkehr, Wiederkunft 
recurrence271. Nietzsche himself used both these terms interchangeably, 
Stambaugh says, though ‘he uses return in most of the crucial passages’. 
That may be because he wanted the hardest sense of the doctrine to be 
engaged with, and as I hope to show, the word ‘recurrence’ gives us a way of 
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considering a more benign model of the thought. Stambaugh herself uses the 
word ‘recurrence ‘more frequently in dealing with cycles as such because the 
word ‘return’, she says, seems too general to express Nietzsche’s basic idea 
of constant coming again and again. We might bear this in mind as a hint, 
return is a general idea, recurrence more particular.  
  Another related word is ‘repetition’ (Wiederholung), which Stambaugh 
tells us Nietzsche ‘almost never used’ though it ‘would have been less 
ambiguous’ to do so ‘if he had meant the exact repetition of all things … in a 
determined series’. Nietzsche does in fact stress this aspect in some places, 
the same events in the same sequence. He does this when he wants the 
hardest sense, that which is most confronting and conducive to reflection to 
be considered. She says ‘recurrence is closer in meaning to repetition than is 
return’272, and recurrence suggests  a continual series rather better than 
return which could mean to come back just once. However, the distinctions 
between ‘return’ and ‘recurrence’, Stambaugh says, are ‘more sharply drawn 
in English’ than in German and so do not figure too importantly in 
considerations of what Nietzsche himself meant273. As Nietzsche made no 
distinction between ‘return’ and recurrence’ Stambaugh asserts it will not 
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help us to do so either. But it seems there are distinctions which can be 
made. 
  One rather too easy definition might be to say that return is spacial, 
things return, recurrence is temporal, events recur. Anything including a 
person can return, turn about and go back to an original place or state; it is 
the same thing, the identical thing, that goes out as comes back in a 
completion of a movement. Stambaugh tells us a ‘person cannot ‘recur’ 
home; an event cannot ‘return’, in the sense of going back to its original 
state’274. However, an event such as a festival or birthday can be said to 
return each year, we wish people ‘many happy returns!’. Or perhaps it is 
rather the time for the event which returns though its content and detail 
differs. Events recur, they have ‘run through their course’ and occur or 
happen again, anew and perhaps many times but are not necessarily the 
same. We might say the festival returns in order to have another occurrence. 
A further complication arises when we remember that Zarathustra describes 
the eternal ‘roads’, which is a spatial metaphor, but he is referring to the past 
and future which are temporal. Richardson tells us that Nietzsche has an 
‘inclination to treat time as real: ‘Space is like matter a subjective form. Not 
time’. The temporal then, is objective. Recurrence, (Wiederkunft) has the 
added dimension of the future (künftig). In phrases such as ‘das künftige 
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leben’, which means ‘the next life’, the next or future life is usually assumed 
to be some kind of life but different from this life. ‘Meine künftige Frau’, 
means ‘my future wife’, this woman will always be a future wife until 
marriage, it is her not-yet-realised condition. 
  Stambaugh says both words convey ‘the quality of being unfinished 
and the quality of being interrupted. What has finished, … reached its end, 
does not come again’ and yet it would seem that Eternal Recurrence is 
exactly that, whole and once completed events are not ‘once and for all’ but 
come ‘again and again’, because there is no ‘end’. ‘Return’ can indeed 
suggest a finished action. Then again she says ‘What persists without 
interruption cannot come again, because … it… never gets away from 
itself’275, it always is the same as itself. This seems to be pointing back to our 
considerations of Nietzsche’s ‘power ontology’276. Nietzsche’s objection to 
Being277  was that it referred to a stable state, but thinking of Being as 
becoming, as continual overcoming enables us to attribute an ‘end’ which is 
telic to Recurrence while finding that Return is as fixed as Being, i.e., Being 
whose ‘end’ is terminal. Perhaps we can think of Return as the circularity of 
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Time itself, within which a sequence of events recur in continual renewal.   
  But what began it all? Was there an initial run of events and things 
following one another and then the whole sequence in the same order 
beginning again when all available permutations had been exhausted? But in 
that case how can anything new ever occur? This seems to imply that 
everything is already determined and leads to fatalism and nihilism, 
Nietzsche denies this deterministic view in order to have the doctrine yield an 
affirmation.278 To help us with this seeming impasse where nothing new can 
occur, Fink asserts that ‘one could equally say this: all is still to be done, 
whatever we decide now, we will need to decide over and over again. Every 
moment has an importance which extends beyond any individual life… The 
importance of eternity rests in the moment.’279  
  Whatever, the distinctions between ‘return’ and ‘recurrence’, 
Stambaugh says, what is important is that amongst myths concerning 
circularity, Nietzsche is unique in his insistence on the fact that what comes 
again is the ‘Same’. Nietzsche did demand that the doctrine of Eternal Return 
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of the Same be taken literally in order to have its full effect. Nietzsche says 
the ‘same’ (Gleich) returns, and this word in German also means ‘identical’ 
so that the strict interpretation of this doctrine is that the selfsame identical 
things, events and ‘we’ return. It is this, most extreme element of the 
hypothesis which must be entertained, otherwise it loses all its strength. The 
model of recurrence which we have described is a more easily acceptable 
doctrine, allowing as it does for something coming again with variations 
because the future still holds possibilities not yet realised280. Time continues 
the same as ever, events are constant in their recurrence, what is constant 
can also be said to be the same. Stambaugh asserts, as does Fink, that what 
returns, what is the ‘Same’ is time itself rather than any content of time. The 
moment returns with its possibilities, indeed it is there as possibility in every 
moment. Human being is, in a sense, itself the moment or bridge because it 
is only through human being that time comes into question. In the gateway 
Moment, time is elevated to the importance of the eternal. 
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The Hindrance and Redemption of ‘It was’. 
  The element of time which is a ‘hindrance’ to eternity is the past, the ‘It 
was’. There is a revulsion toward it, perhaps a bitter resentment (Nietzsche 
uses the French word ‘ressentiment’), until it is accepted. But further it must 
also be willed, willed to happen just as it did, again and again. This also 
forms part of the chapter ‘Redemption’ (Erlösung), which more properly 
means ‘release’. One is freed from the hindrance of the past: ‘To redeem the 
past and to transform every ‘It was’ into an ‘I wanted it thus!’ - that alone do I 
call redemption!’281. It overcomes the hindrance of the past self in order to be 
the creator or ‘poet’ of one’s own fate. The uncertainty of chance is replaced 
with the certainty of joy, and the anticipation of the future: ‘I walk among men 
as among fragments of the future: that future which I scan’. It is Zarathustra’s 
aim to ‘bring together what is fragment and riddle and dreadful chance’. 
  What will come is a return, it is already one’s own ‘it returns to itself’282; 
and one’s own self comes home after it has ‘long been abroad and 
scattered’283, we can think of this as a ‘coming into one’s own’. On 
Zarathustra’s ‘way’ it his own feet which extinguish the path behind: ‘no one 
                                            
281 Fink, op cit, p.161 
 
282 Silverman, Zarathustra’s Gate, op cit, p.54 
 
283 Nietzsche, TSZ, op cit, p.173 
  
133 
shall steal after you here!’. It is his own path, only his. ‘Your foot itself has 
extinguished the path behind you, and above that path stands written: 
Impossibility.’284 This second inscription, Silverman takes to refer to the same 
gateway, Moment, and to Nietzsche's recognition of the impossibility of the 
doctrine of Eternal Return. Yet it stands above the path ‘behind’ Zarathustra, 
it tells us primarily that it is impossible to go back in time. One cannot change 
the past but one can overcome it by willing its return and it is only the 
Moment which enables this. ‘The determined, immovably fixed past is not 
subject to any effort of the will’ but, ‘(o)ne can change one’s will to sublate 
that which cannot be changed’285. This inability of the will to will backwards is 
its suffering and its punishment, Zarathustra says: ‘Alas the stone ‘It was’ 
cannot be rolled away: all punishments too must be eternal!’286  This seems to 
support the claim that the inscription  ‘impossibility’, written in the stone which 
cannot be moved refers rather to the impossibility of changing the past than 
the impossibility of Eternal Return. The impossibility of willing backwards 
leads to ressentiment and a ‘perspective of revenge’287 in human being. 
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Gooding-Williams claims this as the second of three kinds of redemption in 
TSZ, which Zarathustra aims to ‘reconcile’.  
  The first redemption according to Gooding-Williams is from the past 
which man is ‘bequeathed’ as the ‘fragments’ which make him what he is, 
i.e., a result of ‘the play of accidents’288.  What is inherited is already created; 
Zarathustra teaches that ‘individuals will re-create themselves’289 in the future. 
The second redemption is as we have said, the ‘redemption of human will in 
perspective of revenge’290, the will’s lack of creative power regarding the past 
means that this is not a ‘creative redemption’. The will in this situation aims to 
free or redeem itself: ‘out of wrath and ill-temper, the will rolls stones about 
and takes revenge upon him who does not, like it, feel wrath and ill-temper’291 
. This is, Gooding-Williams tells us, a ‘prereflective will’ which, in order to 
redeem itself, ‘constructs a reflective, theoretical view of human existence’ 
which brings a new understanding of redemption. 
  Existence, Zarathustra tells us in ‘On Redemption’, is punishment and 
misery. According to Gooding-Williams this is a result of existence being tied 
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to temporality, the unchangeable suffering caused by the past is what is 
eternal about it. Zarathustra’s view becomes that ‘revenge is rooted in the 
human experience of time’292, and along with change and loss these things 
are essential to life. The passing of time itself is to blame. The 
Schopenhauerian notion, however, that release from this suffering ‘demands 
renunciation’, or, as Zarathustra says, that  ‘willing become not-willing’293 does 
not lead to the third redemption. That can only be achieved by the will 
becoming its own liberator, by redeeming the past ‘creatively’ and as 
Gooding-Williams says, to ‘bring itself joy’294. The third redemption then is ‘the 
redemption of the will through the act of willing backwards’295.  
Convalescence and Awakening. 
  Perishing and coming again makes creators of those who will it, and 
this existence as willing is ‘the will to power, the unexhausted, procreating 
life-will’
296,  Zarathustra says this is the secret which Life itself told him: 
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’Behold,’ it said, ‘I am that which must overcome itself again and again’
297. It is 
Life itself which is the same, comes continually, and continually changes and 
grows. Stambaugh tells us Will to Power is ’according to Nietzsche the 
essence of Life’, he says ‘This world is the Will to Power - and nothing else! 
And even you yourselves are this Will to Power - and nothing else!’
298 It is not 
a goal toward which the will strives but something essential and empowering, 
‘it has to do with a continual, ever-increasing affirmation.’
299 The concepts of  
Will to Power and Eternal Return are ‘inseparable’. Will to Power is the 
driving thought of Eternal Return (although as Stambaugh points out some 
commentators think them mutually exclusive) it is the ‘virtue‘ in which the 
force is continually active. Will to Power works through every moment. 
Through Zarathustra, Nietzsche says ‘Power’ is a ‘new virtue‘ around which 
is ‘a wise soul’ and around that in turn ‘the serpent of knowledge’
300. 
  When Zarathustra was a convalescent he spoke of his disgust301 at the 
idea of ’eternal recurrence even for the smallest! that was my disgust at all 
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existence!’302, that man himself was too small and weak a thing to desire its 
return, is part of the thought which is overcome: 
 
  ‘Precisely the least thing, the gentlest, lightest, the rustling of a lizard, a 
breath (ein Hauch), a moment (ein Husch), a twinkling of the eye (ein 
Augen-Blick) - little makes up the quality of the best happiness.’
303
   
 
  Ein Husch, translated by Hollingdale as ‘moment’, more accurately 
means ‘shoo’, or ‘whoosh’. Swiftly passing, fleeting and momentary things, 
things ‘little’ in every way are to return. In Will to Power, in a piece from the 
Spring - Fall period of 1887, the thought of Eternal Return has changed, 
Nietzsche gives precedence to that which is eternally returning not eternally 
remaining the same: ‘Against the value of that which eternally remains the 
same … the value of the shortest and the most transitory, the seductive flash 
of gold on the belly of the serpent vita.’  
  The convalescent Zarathustra begins to grow  stronger, to overcome 
his weak and nauseous sickness, he possesses the courage for this. In this 
section of TSZ, the theory of Eternal Return is stated again. Zarathustra rises 
from his bed after seven days laying as if dead. He awakes but sees his 
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‘abysmal thought‘ still lying there. He bids it: ‘Up, abysmal thought, up from 
my depths! … And once you are awake you shall stay awake for ever’304. 
Zarathustra with new power has become ‘the advocate of life, the advocate 
of suffering, the advocate of the circle - I call you, my most abysmal 
thought!’305 and the thought answers him and speaks306. Zarathustra speaks to 
and listens to his thought at the same time. Do we not engage with our 
thoughts in this way? This ‘abysmal thought’ which he has not yet fully 
engaged with has lain asleep in him, but now he awakes and wants to 
awaken the thought fully too. (We can hear in this an echo of Kierkegaard’s 
existentially awakened spirit which makes man ‘a freedom to himself’.) With 
words Zarathustra makes thought into idea, he rouses it with ‘Listen!’ 
because the thought must gather itself together in him before he can speak 
it. It is time for the thought to take shape, to come to consciousness. 
Dear Dead Glances. 
  In ‘The Funeral Song’, Zarathustra sings to his past moments of 
vision: 
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‘O, you sights and visions of my youth! O, all you glances of love (ihr 
Blicke der Liebe alle), you divine momentary glances (ihr göttlichen 
Augenblicke) ! How soon you perished! Today I think of you as my dead 
ones.’
307
   
 
  These ‘glances’ of youthful insight, by which we might take 
Zarathustra to refer to heightened moments of erotic or ‘religious’ experience, 
are swiftly over and moved into the past. These now ‘dead ones’ that he 
addresses have had to pass. ‘Dear’ to him and close though they remain 
they must perish and he must learn to will it, that everything is impermanent, 
continually perishing and coming again. Referring to these youthful moments 
Zarathustra considers himself a ‘most-to-be-envied man’, because, he says: 
‘I had you and you still have me’. These passing experiences perish but 
leave their impression. They return here in recollection, he inherits them as 
memory and they still have a grip on him in this present. Zarathustra refers to 
himself as ‘heir and heritage of your love, blooming to your memory’, he is 
both the one who inherits the moments and he is that which is inherited, the 
moments themselves which have shaped him. And Nietzsche’s revelatory 
experience at Sils Maria, has, in the unfolding of the doctrine of Eternal 
Return through Zarathustra come into bloom. Zarathustra is himself a bridge 
between past and present, and it is he who allows the flow back and forth. 
Zarathustra accuses these dear dead glances and moments of unfaithfulness 
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because they pass as all things do. He has not as yet ‘learned another name’ 
for them, he has still not yet discovered the meaning of his vision. He has 
determined that they return and that they are promised to one another ’for 
tender eternities’, and that they will always recur together, yet there are 
further heights to achieve. 
  He realises that for now they are killed by his enemies, the weak and 
pessimistic men who would say that nothing is worthwhile in life as all things 
pass away. A glimpse of eternity came to him ‘hardly as the twinkling of 
divine eyes - as a moment!’. The ‘joyful wisdom’, he says, has fled in the face 
of his enemies, he ‘stood prepared for the finest dance: then you murdered 
my ecstasy with your tones!’.  Yet this youthful intimation of a ‘joyful wisdom’ 
when his ‘purity’ spoke to him has made its mark. Zarathustra approaches 
the culmination of the affect of his vision, saying ‘All creatures shall be divine 
to me … All days shall be holy to me’.  
  Fink asserts that Nietzsche fails to elucidate his doctrine of Eternal 
Return through TSZ, that it is a mood (Stimmung) in the sense of a 
‘fundamental attunement’308. This attunement is perhaps ‘a precondition of 
understanding the Eternal Return more primordially.309 In order to convey 
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such an attunement, Nietzsche via Zarathustra, resorts to the imagery of 
ecstatic experience: ‘I know how to speak the parable of the highest things 
only in the dance’ Zarathustra says, ‘and now my greatest parable has 
remained in my limbs unspoken!’ Yet, ‘How did my soul arise again from 
these graves?’ he asks, ‘something invulnerable, unburiable is within me, 
something that rends rocks: it is my Will.’310 He has had a fleeting glimpse of 
the meaning of his own eternity, and the section in TSZ which follows is 
called: ‘Of Self-Overcoming’. The sense is not merely a moral one, since the 
will to power as life force runs through everything, life ends and rises again, it 
never really leaves. And since we have, through Fink, utilised some 
terminology of Martin Heidegger in this ‘primordial’ and ‘fundamental 
attunement’, we might also use Heidegger’s phrase which describes this as 
the ‘life force in all life’311. Even individual human beings are part of this 
continual coming, overcoming and coming back again. 
Ecstasy, Affirmation, and The Honey Offering. 
  From this point on TSZ has more and more elements and imagery 
which are suggestive of ecstatic states. Earlier in the text we have had 
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instances of flying, (Zarathustra’s ‘shadow’, has been seen coming ‘through 
the air’312), there have been periods when Zarathustra has lain ‘like a dead 
man’313 which describe out of body experiences and trance-like swoons 
common to hallucinogenic drug use (or the sickness that Nietzsche himself  
suffers). There is a loss of self signified by Zarathustra’s trance-like ‘swoons’, 
followed by a further ‘loss’, in a total absorption in the world, an ecstatic 
‘disindividuation’314. On the subject of ecstasy, David B. Allison in Musical 
Psychodramatics, Ecstasis in Nietzsche, tells us that it plays ‘a principal role 
in Nietzsche’s accounts of politics, art, myth and religion’ and resonates, ‘in 
his accounts of a joyful wisdom, the Eternal Return, the will to power, and the 
overman.’315 Allison explains:  
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‘because our ecstatic response is of such a nature that we feel positively 
transfigured by the experience, an experience characterized by loss of 
ego and by a suspension of ordinary object relations, the very distinction 
between subject and object becomes blurred and attenuated, if not 
entirely suspended. The distinction that supports ordinary intentional 
experience, between the objective and subjective genitive, simply does 
not obtain in the ecstatic state’
316.
  
 
  With this in mind we go on to find Zarathustra has become the lightest 
of dancers, the sky has become ‘a dance floor for divine chances’ and 
Zarathustra is the dancer upon this dance floor of chance317 . In ‘The Second 
Dance Song’318 Zarathustra directly addresses Life: ‘Lately I gazed into your 
eyes, O Life … At my feet … you threw a glance, a laughing, questioning, 
melting tossing glance (Blick)’. This glance of life’s eye is a look and a 
communication. Life has thrown him a challenge together with the question of 
whether he can accept it and with a humorous but warm, even loving 
attitude. Zarathustra calls the ‘small men’ ‘accusers of life’, but Life itself 
‘overcomes them with a glance of its eye (Augenblinzeln)’. Although in the 
English translation of TSZ the word Augenblinzeln is rendered ‘glance of the 
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eye’, that is usually the literal translation of Augenblick. What is being 
conveyed is still a ‘look’ and a communication, but it is a lighter hearted 
knowledge now rather than a heaviness of thought.  
  Life ‘impudently’ asks Zarathustra ‘Do you love me?’ and it asks this 
with a wink (Augenblinzeln). A wink is a cheeky kind of communication which 
suggests a hint (Wink) at something yet to be said, or understood between 
them. Life bids him wait, first it has its own accusing to do and it accuses 
Zarathustra of not loving it enough because he is planning to leave it soon. 
But Zarathustra is not one of the ‘small men’, he speaks into the ear of Life, 
telling her that he also knows something. And Life is amazed and says: ‘You 
know that, O Zarathustra? No one knows that’ and, the text says, they gazed 
at one another, this suggests a look of love. Zarathustra says ‘Life was 
dearer to me than all my Wisdom had ever been’319.  
  It would seem that Zarathustra has revealed to Life his knowledge of 
Eternal Return together with its ‘same’ which returns, life itself. This shared 
knowledge melds them together as ‘both proper ne’er do wells and ne’er do 
ills. Beyond good and evil … Therefore we must love one another!’320. 
Nietzsche the ‘great immoralist’ speaks through Zarathustra saying that when 
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man as the creator, ‘breaks the law-tables and the old values’321 they are 
hated by the ‘spiritually limited’322, the so-called ‘good’ who ‘cannot create: 
they are always the beginning of the end … But he who discovered the 
country of ‘Man’, also discovered the country of ‘Human-future’’323.  
  If we think, as Richardson does, that despite Nietzsche’s rejection of 
the idea of teleology, we can interpret his concept of Will to Power as an 
intentional ‘directedness toward some end’324, and that all things ‘are 
connected not by mutually affecting one another in the manner of mechanical 
causes but by giving meaning to one another, as voices in a conversational 
web’325, then we can think of life itself as Will to Power.  ‘Only where life is, 
there is also will: not will to life, but -so I teach you - will to power!’326 . Power 
‘is a movement of growth or enhancement’327, it ‘does not belong to the world 
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of being but to that of becoming328, of growth, ‘the unexhausted, procreating 
life-will’329. Richardson points out that what is important for Nietzsche is the 
idea of ‘growth from cycle to cycle’ not merely habitual repetition, but periodic 
cycles like the natural seasonal world which continues to grow while in a 
process of waxing and waning. Finitude must be ‘overcome’, not by an after-
life but within this world’s life. Fink points out that it would be ‘a denial of 
finitude’ to look to metaphysics for transcendence. For Nietzsche infinity is 
not a metaphysical beyond, ‘the world is the infinite’ and ‘it does not 
transcend things. It is immanent within them and embraces them’330. 
  We find here a communing with life, the intimate reciprocal relation is 
such that life itself speaks to Zarathustra and also listens because now 
Zarathustra has something to say back to life, they echo one another, life 
discovers and lives man and visa versa. Such should be the bond between 
man and world, Nietzsche elsewhere criticises the word ‘and’ standing 
between these two. Safranski speaks of the young Nietzsche’s ‘awful 
dreams’ which ‘refer to the notion that we do not so much live life as get lived 
by it…’
331 Here we find the idea that life has some end (telos) of its own to 
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which it moves. The boundaries between different types of being are melted 
away, we are as alike other human beings as we are the unconscious 
elements of the world, the ‘dead stones’, all things share in return: 
 
‘All things are chained and entwined together, all things are in love; if 
ever you wanted one moment twice, if ever you said: ‘You please me, 
happiness, instant, moment!’ then you wanted everything to return!’  
 
  At the gateway we enter the moment, the communicatory ‘glances’ of 
knowledge and we might say also that in the moment of ‘affirmation’ of the 
doctrine we have entered into the gateway like an agreement, into a contract 
with the idea or thought. In doing so one has accepted life itself even in the 
shape of return. If it is an ‘ethical imperative’ to live as if each day recurs, one 
must ask oneself whether one would want this particular moment countless 
times again and could live it such a way that one accepts it ‘without horror’. In 
this way our present moment, our temporal existence which is crucial to 
becoming and will to power, is elevated to the ‘dignity of the eternal’, by us 
and from us, not by or from a God. One should not strive to be released from 
eternal recurrence, it is precisely that which must be affirmed and willed.  
  A result of this affirmation of life is an overcoming of, even a longing 
for, death as part of eternity: ‘when, well of eternity! … when will you drink my 
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soul back into yourself?’332, because, paradoxically it is destruction which 
allows creation, perishing which brings life again and suffering which is 
necessary to becoming. Contradiction and opposition are necessary, ‘Evil is 
man’s best strength’, Zarathustra says, as essential to good as woe is to joy. 
And men ‘must perish’ as life necessarily becomes harder  - ‘only thus does 
man grow to the height where the lightning can strike and shatter him: high 
enough for the lightning!’333   
 Lightning  (Blitz) can be taken to mean also to look or glance334, Blitzen 
‘to flash’ in the flashing glance lays the communication of an insight 
(Einblick). The imagery of nature here brings clouds which obscure the clear 
sky and the sun of noon, but, like the full ripe globes on the vine they burst 
and ‘give birth to lightnings’335, revelations and Yes -saying. 
  In the section of TSZ called ‘The Seven Seals’ or ‘The Song of ‘Yes 
and Amen’, Zarathustra refers to himself as ‘a prophet … that wanders 
between past and future like a heavy cloud’, he is himself the cloud which will 
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give forth its insight, and it is he who lies between past and future, in this, his 
present, his gateway and Moment. Here he is ‘ready for lightning (Blitze)’, for 
its flashes which reside in the cloud’s ‘dark bosom’, he and the cloud are 
heavy with seed, they are ‘pregnant with lightnings (Blitzen) which affirm 
Yes!’. Zarathustra is ‘ready for the prophetic lightning-flashes (zu 
wahrsagerischen Blitzstrahlen)’ which will make him the prophet or teacher of 
Eternal Return, ‘Oh’, he says ‘how should I not lust for eternity and for the 
wedding ring of rings - the Ring of Recurrence!’ 
  Strength lies in being hardened toward the truth of the perishing of 
everything, of man and world alike. Nietzsche differentiates between what he 
calls ‘Turkish fatalism’ in which man might ‘give up weakly and stand before 
the future with folded hands because he cannot change anything…’ and 
‘amor fati’ or ‘love of fate’, we in fact become our fate (change is the reality 
we inhabit). In the opening of The Gay Science, from New Year’s day 1882 
Nietzsche writes:  
 
‘Amor fati: may that be my love from now on! I want to wage no war 
against the ugly. I do not want to accuse, I do not want even to accuse 
the accusers. May looking away be my only form of negation! And, all in 
all: I want to be at all times hereafter only an affirmer (ein Ja-
sagender)!’
336 .   
 
                                            
336 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, op cit, p. 276 
  
150 
Zarathustra seems to rise and fall, to be near death and then live again, 
sleep and wake, go amongst men and back into solitude, these are also 
returns. But Zarathustra has reached the ripeness of his thought: ‘he 
comprehended in a glance all that had happened between yesterday and 
today’. Between the past of yesterday and the future of tomorrow lies the 
present time and it is in this present moment that Zarathustra has ‘become 
ripe’, he says ‘my hour has come! This is my morning, my day begins: rise up 
now, rise up, great noontide!’337. At the sun’s zenith, the brightest time of day 
he clearly understands the revelation, and that it belongs along with life to his 
own fate. Through his courage he attains the ‘victory’ of ‘the seal of 
perfection’. Zarathustra’s experience has replaced the importance of time 
with eternity, all this happens in the Moment, on ‘entry’ into the gateway, it is 
the shape of eternity which is circular and the shape of perfection: 
  ‘What? Has the world not just become perfect? Round and ripe? Oh, 
golden ripe ring (Reif)’338, the German Reif can be taken to mean both ripe 
and ring. Closing the narrative at its point of ripeness in a ring, Zarathustra 
says that both the joy felt in affirmation and assimilation339 of Eternal Return 
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itself and also the woes of life must be willed to return: ‘you everlasting men, 
loved it eternally and for all time: and you say even to woe: ‘Go, but return!’ 
For all joy wants - eternity!’. Joy itself is circular: ‘it wants itself: it bites into 
itself, the will of the ring wrestles within it’. Now it is joy in the thought of 
Eternal Return which bites into itself as the snake bit earlier. This profusion of 
imagery surrounding the completion and fulfilment of the return culminates in 
another song - a ‘roundelay’. These are short, simple songs with a refrain, 
Zarathustra’s dance is now a ring dance whose meaning is: ‘To all eternity!’ - 
sing you Higher Men, Zarathustra’s roundelay!’ which ends: ’For all joy wants 
- eternity!, Wants deep, deep, deep eternity!’340  
  To love one’s own fate, is to be a soul which ‘plunges into becoming’ 
with its ‘current and counter-current and ebb and flow’, its own heights and 
abysses, one which embraces everything that belongs to its existing and 
‘which out of joy hurls itself into chance’341. By owning all that has and may 
happen, Zarathustra has overcome the possibility of accident, for, he says, 
‘what could still come to me that was not already my own?’. In an earlier 
chapter of TSZ, entitled ‘Redemption’ Zarathustra says ‘when my eye flees 
from the present to the past, it always discovers the same thing: fragments 
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and limbs and dreadful chances - but no men!‘. His view of the past has 
changed since then, having overcome fatalism through ‘amor fati’, chance is 
no longer ‘dreadful’, it is ‘redeemed’ and it is man who is the redeemer. 
  In the chapter ‘The Honey Offering’342 Zarathustra, in reply to his 
animals’ enquiries regarding his happiness says that it ’is heavy and not like 
a liquid wave:  it oppresses me and will not leave me and behaves like a 
molten pitch’343. Like the molten pitch of Zoroastrian trials and torments. His 
animals describe him as growing ‘sallow’ from ‘sitting in your own pitch!’ But 
he replies - ‘Truly, I spoke slander when I spoke of pitch. What is happening 
to me happens to all fruits who grow ripe. It is the honey in my veins that 
makes my blood thicker, and my soul quieter’. Zarathustra’s animals advise 
him to climb a mountain, which he agrees to do but saying ‘take care I have 
honey ready to hand there, yellow, fine, ice-cool golden honey in the comb. 
For I intend to offer the honey offering.’344   
  There seem to be intimations here of the Zoroastrian Haoma rite. The 
Haoma plant was pounded to produce an ‘elixir’ which could be taken neat, 
but usually it seems, it was ‘mixed with honey’ or with ‘milk’ which word may 
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actually refer to ‘ox-flesh’. Haoma is a narcotic plant used ritually in 
Zoroastrian ceremonies and in fact the sacrificial rite of the Haoma plant was 
probably a central sacrament of the Zoroastrian liturgy.345 The plant ritual 
seems to have been ‘associated with’ orgiastic ‘intoxication’346.  Zaehner tells 
us that ‘With regard to the haoma rite as practised by the Zoroastrians 
themselves we read: ‘All other intoxicants are accompanied by Fury 
(aeshma) of the bloody spear, but the intoxication produced by the Haoma is 
accompanied by Truth and joy: the intoxication of Haoma makes one 
nimble.’’347 Nimble enough no doubt to enable ‘moles and heavy dwarfs’ to be 
’danced upon, danced across’348. Joy is a key factor in the experience of 
eternity in TSZ.  
  Boyce describes the ‘peak of Hara’ in Zoroastrian belief as being of 
‘inestimable benefit to the world, bestowing on it the life-giving sun and 
waters’. The deity Haoma ‘is said to worship Mithra ‘on the highest Peak on 
high Hara’, called the ‘chief of summits’ this came to represent the place from 
where good souls began their ‘upward journey’ to heaven. On this peak, then 
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‘is said to rest one end of the Cinvato Peretu, the Chinvat Bridge; and when 
… the crossing of this bridge came to be regarded as depending solely on an 
ethical judgement, the Peak itself received yet another name, … the ‘lawful 
summit’ and ‘souls are judged at that place.’’349 What seems to be happening 
in TSZ is a preparation by Zarathustra for a ritual on the mountain summit 
where he reaches the final peak of ecstasy, at the place from where one 
crosses the bridge of judgement. Perhaps we might think of Zarathustra 
arriving again at the gateway, this time, at last, properly prepared to enter. 
Back to Nietzsche, The ‘Prodigious Moment’. 
  Human being is inescapably in the world, that is why he seeks to ‘get 
out of it’, to transcend it in the mind. With all this discussion of ecstatic states 
surrounding the work of Nietzsche, might we suspect incidents of such 
experience in himself. Nietzsche’s revelatory experience of Eternal Return 
finds its significance in hindsight, as Safranski tells us, Nietzsche found that it 
was not in ‘the grip of the event’ but later in ‘the moment of composition’ that 
‘significance might emerge.’350 Not fully trusting the actual moment of 
inspiration ‘he knew that he was slipping away from himself in the 
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experienced moment and could discover himself only in retrospect’351. Yet for 
Nietzsche the experience was all, the fount: 
 
‘- Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century a distinct conception 
of what poets of strong ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it. - 
If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one would 
hardly be able to set aside the idea that one is merely incarnation, 
merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming forces. The 
concept of revelation, in the sense that something suddenly, with 
unspeakable certainty and subtlety, becomes visible, audible, something 
that shakes and overturns one to the depths, simply describes the fact… 
a thought flashes up like lightning… An ecstasy whose tremendous 
tension sometimes discharges itself in a flood of tears …  a complete 
being outside of oneself … in which the most painful and gloomy things 
appear, not as an antithesis, but as conditioned, demanded, as a 
necessary colour within such a superfluity of light … all existence here 
wants to become words …’
352  
 
  Nietzsche experienced his intellectual crises as realities and with 
emotion and commitment, as passions. In posthumously published notes353, 
he writes:  ‘I speak only of things I have experienced and do not offer only 
events in the head’. Nietzsche experienced the events he describes, they 
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were not an after effect of experience but the experience itself for him and ‘in 
the final analysis’ he says, ‘one experiences only oneself’354. Nietzsche’s 
initial mention of his experience as ‘the heaviest weight’ appears in The Gay 
Science: 
 
‘What if one day or one night a demon slinked after you into your 
loneliest loneliness and said to you; ‘This life, as you live it now and as 
you have lived it, you will have to live once more and countless times 
more. And there will be nothing new about it, but every pain and every 
pleasure, and every thought and sigh, and everything unspeakably small 
and great in your life must come back to you, and all  in the same series 
and sequence - … Wouldn’t you throw yourself down and gnash your 
teeth and damn the demon who spoke this way? Or have you ever 
experienced a prodigious moment in which you would answer him: ‘You 
are a god and I have never heard anything more godlike!…’
355  
 
  TSZ can be seen to represent the resolution of the intellectual crisis 
Nietzsche was suffering in 1881. He writes to Peter Gast of new ideas which 
must keep him going for a few years more, they are new also in their level of 
intensity and he speaks of making ‘direct attempts to go beyond the nihilist 
conclusions of the past five years without being obliged to retract any of 
them’. As with the rigidifying effect of ressentiment of the past, which one 
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must go beyond, not only affirm but will again, he surpasses the past without 
retraction.356  
  Such is Nietzsche’s intensity of feeling over the doctrine that he felt it 
filled him ‘with a glimpse of things which put me in advance of all other men.’ 
Yet his thought always comes back to man. Man strives toward the Overman 
but must keep plunging down again because it is by his self-overcoming that 
the figure of the Overman can emerge. Man must overcome himself and that 
takes courage, Nietzsche says one must philosophise with ‘a hammer’, and 
Zarathustra extolls us to ‘be hard’. The development of Nietzsche’s thought is 
brought to fruition through the narrative of TSZ, and Zarathustra speaks for 
Nietzsche himself, both come to teach the doctrine. If recurrence is of all 
things, then not only every moment but this revelatory gateway Moment and 
the teacher of the doctrine also will return. Man comes to himself as 
recurrence, ‘Where could future and past be closer together than with you?’357 
Zarathustra asks; man himself is the bridge between past and future, is ‘the 
moment’. 
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Chapter 3. 
Karl Jaspers’ ‘‘pure eye’ of the fleeting moment’. 
 
  In uncovering the Augenblick in the work of Karl Jaspers, aspects 
discovered in our previous philosophers reappear. Jaspers is directly 
influenced by both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. He attributes his own ideas to 
the culmination of those of these previous philosophers and immediately we 
recognise in this idea Kierkegaard’s collapsing of time between significant 
events. With both his predecessors he shares the notion of striving toward a 
goal which resides within oneself as one’s ‘source’, for Kierkegaard it is 
existence in its relation to the eternal, for Nietzsche Life in its eternal 
perishing and becoming. Jaspers takes Kierkegaard’s idea of existence to 
form his own term for this transcendent source: Existenz. 
  Jaspers follows Kierkegaard in considering how one can live properly 
‘for’ or ‘in the moment’. The idea of being ‘in the moment’ for Nietzsche we 
have seen demonstrated as the necessity of being in the gateway. In Jaspers 
we discover this idea as an adjective ‘augenblicklich’ which describes the 
authentic way of being in the moment when it concerns one’s Existenz. 
Again, in such a Moment the temporal instant vanishes and understanding is 
reached across time. As for both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche the 
understanding reaches a limit which causes its downfall and requires 
surrender and a leap of faith. Kierkegaard leaps to faith, Nietzsche to an 
acceptance and affirmation of Life, Jaspers to a philosophical faith.  
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Again this happens in a process; in Jaspers, Kierkegaard’s leap becomes 
composed of stages in the progression of overcoming the limit and finding 
that every moment holds the possibilities which concern one’s existential 
being. The notion seen in Nietzsche of amor fati, as acceptance of, even love 
of the fate which a Moment might hold for one, is met with again in Jaspers’ 
work. 
Jaspers discusses the Augenblick most thoroughly in chapter one of 
Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (1919), where he traces its origin in the 
thinking of Kierkegaard, and considers how the Augenblick can be thought in 
two contrasting ways, that is, as everything or as nothing. How one thinks of 
the Augenblick, or rather how one acts ‘in the Augenblick’ is an indication of 
one’s attitude to life itself. This section in Psychologie is prior to the 
development of the concept of boundary situations which follows in chapter 
three. The Psychologie Jaspers referred to as a work of his youth, yet it 
contains the seed of his later thinking, and as Edwin Latzel shows in his 
detailed analysis in: The Concept of ‘Ultimate Situations’ in Jaspers’ 
Philosophy358. Between these two works, the concept of boundary situations 
changes only in its categorical organisation, i.e. which of the boundary 
situations are instances of the general or specific type. This early work of 
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Jaspers is primarily one of psychology while the later works are of 
philosophy, and yet the two disciplines are hardly separable in a philosophy 
which concerns, the ‘existential elucidation’ (Existenzerhellung) of Being. 
From Jaspers’ psychology emerged his philosophy, what he calls in 
Existenzphilosophie, ‘Existenz Clarification’. 
  The concept of ‘boundary situations’ (Grenzsituationen) comes to its 
fullest explication in volume two of the three volume Philosophie (1932), 
entitled Existential Elucidation (Existenzerhellung). These ‘situations’ are 
variously referred to in translation and commentaries as: ‘borderline’, 
‘ultimate’, ‘limit’, ‘frontier’359 or, as we find them in E. B. Ashton’s translation of 
Jaspers’ Philosophie ‘boundary situations’, my preferred reading. Boundary 
situations can be either general ones concerning one’s ‘historically definite 
Existenz’, i.e. one’s beginning and chance events, or specific situations of 
death, suffering, struggle, and guilt. Of these I will be concentrating mainly on 
the general boundary situations, although ‘particular boundary situations … 
affect each individual as general ones within his specific historicity of the 
moment’360, it would take us too far from our main topic of the Augenblick to 
discuss certain specific or ‘particular’ boundary situations in this chapter.  
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  In relation to the boundary situation and the Augenblick I discuss 
Jaspers’ appropriation of Kierkegaard’s leap, and his assimilation and 
extension of the concept. In the light of this I go on to discuss an example 
from the Psychologie of an individual’s moment of moral decision and 
moment of insight. Our being as ‘accidental’ produces the phenomenon of 
chance which offers human being ‘choice’, which in turn offers the 
opportunity to make those choices one’s own. In one’s ‘historical freedom’, 
choice is an act of will and a leap of faith. 
  According to Jaspers, what human being wants and strives toward is 
an awareness of Being. Such a move in the thinking of Jaspers is allowed by 
boundary situations. What the Augenblick ultimately represents, that which is 
at the base of the individual experience of such a moment is the movement 
from ordinary empirical existence to the transcendent Existenz. In the final 
sections of his Philosophy, Jaspers asserts, ‘all great metaphysics … has 
been an articulated reading of the cipher script, an explicit statement of what 
being says in existence’361.  Jaspers elucidates the notion of the cipher 
(Chiffer or Chiffre) and cipher reading in Metaphysik, the third volume of the 
Philosophy,  which speaks of the attitudes and ideas ‘which converge upon 
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God or, as he would say, upon Transcendence’362. The cipher is a 
metaphysical device by which we can represent and speak of those things 
which, as transcendent, have no actuality and are not available as 
knowledge in a scientific sense. In the final section of this chapter I will 
attempt to describe the Augenblick as one such cipher. 
The Source (Ursprung). 
  Jaspers’ concept of the ‘source’ (or ‘origin’) is one of his several 
ideas which cannot be definitively described. In play in this discussion is the 
‘source’ thought in various ways. In one way it means context, both that of 
one’s own historical situation and origins, and of the philosophical tradition 
within which one thinks and appropriates ideas. When Jaspers elucidates the 
boundary situation of our own beginning in Philosophy, he is speaking of an 
unidentifiable ‘first beginning’ beyond our birth in that ‘unlimited process of‘ 
evolution. He says, ‘my beginning’ is one in which ‘I know that I have already 
been’. We owe to our background what we are while knowing that it ‘moves 
beyond’ our ‘visible horizon’
363. The source, even as context is more than the 
particulars of our finite existence, it is Existenz itself as an ‘indefeasible dark 
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source of authentic being’’
364. As such it is that which ‘comes from beyond 
that makes its appearance within the world’’
365.  
  This source is not reached by methodical enquiry, it can only be 
approached indirectly, it is that to which human being proceeds in 
philosophising. But at the same time Jaspers stresses that it is ‘not a goal but 
a source ’, it is a source ‘to which I transcend when I come to myself 
philosophically’
366 . The source, then, is also the self to which one can come 
in philosophical contemplation. The possibility of reaching one’s own ‘self-
being’ is, Jaspers says, a potential ‘which I never made’, it was always 
already there. It is this background, not simply that of our birth that is 
‘something in which I either keep faith with myself or deny and lose 
myself’
367. 
  In existential decisions regarding what one does and what one is, 
which arise from certain boundary situations, one comes to one’s own 
source. In the chances and choices of the process of becoming, it is the 
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source which one aims for, as an authentic awareness of Being, or Existenz 
itself. ‘Choice’ is not simply that which emerges from a conflict of interests 
between which we must decide, it is ‘an expression of my own innermost self 
- at once assertive and revelatory’. The freedom in which choice is made, 
Jaspers refers to as ‘a free source [freier Ursprung]’
368; in making choices I 
change my situation in the world ‘but also create my own being continuously 
in my historical situation’, in its changing from moment to moment. In this 
way one creates oneself, one is one’s own source. ‘It is not that I must act in 
a certain way because I am here and of such and such a nature. Rather I 
know that in my acts and my decisions I am the source at once of what I do 
and of what I most basically am’
369.  What one must or ought to do is 
communicated through the voice of conscience (Gewissen), which acts as a 
‘communication of myself to myself; an appeal to my empirical existence 
from the source of my self-being. No one is calling me; I am calling to 
myself’
370. The source, then, is that from which we emerge and that toward 
which we aim. Transcendence (Transzendenz), is one of the two modes of 
Being that surrounds us (the other is World); it is ‘The source and the goal 
out of whose depths alone we really become authentically human’
371. 
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Philosophical Sources. 
 In  Existenzphilosophie of 1941, Jaspers tells us that the perennial 
philosophical questions as ‘formulated by Kant are 1. What can I know? 2. 
What shall I do? 3. What may I hope for? 4. What is man?’ These questions 
are transformed, ‘reborn for us in changed form and thus become 
comprehensible to us anew in their origin’. They are transformed ‘due to our 
finding ourselves in the kind of life that our age produces’
372, and they are 
from a ‘source within the historical tradition’. We exist within this context and 
‘within the conditions of the time’
373; and we must ‘appropriate’ this ‘historical 
foundation’ if what is handed down to us can have its ‘rebirth’ in the thinking 
we generate and be relevant to our own contemporary existence. But 
philosophising must also come from our own source, in that way ‘all 
appropriation of tradition’, Jaspers tells us, ‘proceeds from the intentness of 
our own lives’
374. One makes the tradition one’s own, it is in ‘practice’, 
Jaspers says, that philosophy can ‘become real’ in ‘the living appropriation’ of 
the contents of philosophical texts. It never becomes ‘real’ or ‘living’ in mere 
‘theoretical contemplation’ and indifferent apprehension.  Knowledge must 
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‘concern the knower’, only in this way can its contents have what Jaspers 
calls a ‘resurrection’, a rising again in contemporary minds concerned with 
contemporary issues. Each age must come to its own understanding of how 
the history of philosophy bears on its own ‘fundamental problem of our 
philosophizing’; it ‘appropriates its history’
375. In this way can it be properly 
assimilated in what we might think of as a return with variations appropriate 
to its time and to the individual philosophising. Each individual in their own 
time must make their own response. ‘My own being can be judged by the 
depths I reach in making these historical origins my own’
376 .  
   ‘It might seem to us’, Jaspers says, ‘that the truth of present-day 
philosophy manifests itself less in the formation of new fundamental 
concepts… than in the new sound it makes audible for us in old thoughts’
377 . 
The thoughts that constitute the unique product of Jaspers’ thinking are his 
‘special contribution to existentialism’
378: the boundary situation and the idea 
of the Encompassing. These join with the inherited ideas of the ancient 
philosophers, those whom Jaspers refers to as the ‘few great minds’, among 
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whom are, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.  In Existenzphilosophie, Jaspers 
speaks of ’The philosopher’s invisible realm of the spirit’, ‘a hidden, non-
objective community to which every philosophizing person secretly longs to 
be admitted’
379. Institutions and doctrines, he asserts, cannot provide the 
‘freedom’ necessary for philosophical discovery, ‘only as an individual can 
man become a philosopher’. Jaspers himself does not develop doctrines, the 
struggle for truth to him was not in order to find an absolute truth, rather the 
very struggle is itself the truth. He did not wish to tell others how to live but 
how to become oneself: ‘The essence of philosophy is not the possession of 
truth but the search for truth’
380. 
  In philosophy’s ‘realm of the spirit’, Jaspers says, ‘we become 
companions-in-thought through the millennia, become occasions for each 
other to find the way to truth from their own source’, although we ‘cannot 
present each other with ready-made truth’
381 . Of the great philosophers, 
Jaspers says, their philosophies ‘permeated their lives and comes to life 
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again in those who hear what they have to say’
382 . The great philosophers, 
he says are an encouragement to us but also, they ‘make us humble’. They 
did not seek disciples, ‘but men who are themselves’383. ‘It is in their 
company’ Jaspers tells us, ‘that we can attain to what we ourselves are 
capable of being’
384. Through these philosophers, ‘we can enter into the core 
of philosophy’. The moment of philosophical insight brings together the 
philosophers of the past and those who follow them, transcending their actual 
concrete temporality, they become ‘eternal contemporaries’
385 . We will 
recognise in this phrase another instance of the ‘collapsing of time’ which  we 
considered in relation to Kierkegaard’s unfolding of the ‘moment’, of the way 
in which for Kierkegaard the disciple at second hand is a ‘contemporary’ of 
the first disciples of Christ, despite  the millennia that intervene. Here, 
however, in contrast to being a relation to ‘the god’, it is a rebirth and a 
resurrection of ideas joining with new ideas. 
  But this is not always straight forward. There is the difficulty of the 
communication of ideas which cannot be found by scientific methodical 
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process. For a philosophy of existence this is its boundary situation. For this 
reason, indirect communication, as Jaspers tells us, ‘… is deliberately 
employed by philosophers like Socrates, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche who 
prefer the struggle for truth to possession of the truth, and dare not presume 
to tell their companions what to believe. Having no absolute truths to offer, 
they say nothing in a straightforward fashion, but ‘merely stimulate people 
and make them attentive, unsettle them by rendering everything problematic, 
and refuse to provide any precepts, regulations or doctrines about how they 
ought to live’
386. Kierkegaard time and again said he had no ‘authority’, in the 
sense that he could only speak from his own experience. Nietzsche tells us 
how badly a pupil would repay a teacher if he did not go beyond him and that 
he who calls himself his disciple never understood him.  
  Jaspers considers Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to be ‘the two ‘great 
exceptions’, even ‘destinies’. From them he takes over the stress upon the 
contingent existence of the individual and the deep conviction that philosophy 
must always remain an expression of the individual personality’
387. Evident in 
Jaspers’ concept of Existenz is the new meaning which Kierkegaard gave to 
the notion of existence, and is attested to by Jaspers in his Reason and 
Existenz of 1935: ‘Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche questioned reason from 
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the depths of Existenz’
388. 
  It was the years of the First World War, Jaspers tells us in his 
Philosophical Memoir, that ‘brought me an illumination by Kierkegaard. To 
him I owe the concept of ‘Existenz’
389, which ever since 1916 has governed 
my understanding of what until then I had been restlessly striving for’
390 . 
Walter Kaufmann in Life at the Limits, locates the place in Nietzsche where 
Jaspers sources his ‘limit situations’, in section 15 of  The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche’s boundary points (Grenzpunkte) are expanded into 
Grenzsituationen: 
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‘Science, spurred by its powerful illusion, speeds irresistibly toward its 
limits where its optimism, concealed in the essence of logic, suffers 
shipwreck. For the periphery of the circle of science has an infinite 
number of points; and while there is no telling how this circle could ever 
be surveyed completely, noble and gifted men nevertheless reach, e’er 
half their time and inevitably, such boundary points (Grenzpunkte) on 
the periphery from which one gazes into what defies illumination. When 
they see to their horror how logic coils up at these boundaries and finally 
bites its own tail - suddenly the new form of insight breaks through, 
tragic insight which, merely to be endured, needs art as a protection and 
remedy.’391  
 
The term shipwreck (Scheiturn), also ‘becomes one of Jaspers’ key terms’
392, 
and incidentally, we meet the snake again here, this time as ‘logic’ or, as 
Jaspers might say, ‘reason’, biting its own tail. 
  As indicated earlier in regards to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the 
moment is something which can be considered in terms of their own life 
experiences which lay behind their ideas, and so it is with Jaspers. In 
Existenzphilosophie, outlining the course of his development in philosophy, 
he tells us that from his schooldays, he ‘was guided by philosophical 
questions’. He sought guidance for ‘self-improvement’ in philosophy through 
‘the fundamental experiences of Being’. In 1913 he qualified as a lecturer in 
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psychology. Up until this time his life was, as he describes it, ‘a spiritual 
striving’, intent on his own life: ‘on the high moments of intimate communion 
with those closest to me. Contemplation of the works of the spirit, research, 
continual intercourse with things timeless, were the purpose and meaning of 
life’s activities’
393. He was not concerned with the political happenings in the 
world, though in common with Kierkegaard, subject to certain presentiments: 
‘momentary forebodings of possible distant dangers’. These presentiments 
were borne out in 1914 with the outbreak of the First World War ending a 
‘naive’ and ‘paradisiacal’ period of life. Philosophy, he tells us ‘with its 
seriousness, became more important than ever’
394, and through the rise and 
destruction of the Nazis when Jaspers was considered an enemy of the state 
he never stopped his philosophical enquiries. In his Self-Portrait of 1966/7
395 
Jaspers relates how he comes to see that a philosopher cannot but concern 
himself with everything’, including the actualities of concrete political 
existence.  
   Jaspers’ thoughts on philosophy, its origins in early thinkers and the 
boundaries that it approaches inform us as to how boundary situations and 
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moments of insight lie at the very heart of philosophising. In his Way to 
Wisdom (Einführung in die Philosophie) (1950), Jaspers tells us that 
philosophising issues from an ‘inner drive’
396 of individual human being 
toward the Transcendent. He does not speak of transcendence in a religious 
sense. In fact he does not agree with many tenets of the Christian church. He 
does not believe in revelation and therefore we cannot consider the 
Augenblick in Jaspers’ work as gaining significance from an experience of 
revelation or conversion as we can with Kierkegaard. But what Jaspers does 
speak of is ‘philosophical faith’ and this as ‘the source that has lived as long 
as men have been thinking’
397 . 
 
‘Philosophy is thinking by which I become aware of Being itself through 
inner action; or rather it is the thinking which prepares the ascent to 
Transcendence, remembers it, and in an exalted moment accomplishes 
the ascent itself as a thinking act of the whole human being.’
398  
  
  The insights into Being to which these can lead are not definable or 
explicable through scientific knowledge, but are rather an awareness in which 
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authentic being is awakened to itself. Such awareness is an idea which ‘turns 
us about’
399, and as we have seen, this phrase indicates a ‘conversion’
400. As 
well as these philosophical insights regarding Being, one can come to 
insights and decisions regarding the conduct of one’s own life; these two 
aspects are irrevocably linked and can only come from one’s own ‘source’. 
  It is important to remember however, that this does not deny any place 
to the importance of contemporary life in the present. This ‘realm of the spirit’ 
and the ‘life of truth’ that philosophers can have within it does not remove 
them from the world, but makes them ‘effective for serving’ the ‘historical 
present'. Our present experience is made up of the experiences of those that 
came before, and new events which occur  - ‘those which become a living 
experience for the first time this very day.’
401 ‘Kierkegaard located 
consciousness both of the Source which is so indispensable to us today,’ 
Jaspers tells us, ‘and of our own historical situation.’
402 
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Augenblick in Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. 
  I turn now to the concept of Augenblick and the section in Psychologie 
der Weltanschauungen, where Jaspers looks into ‘self-reflective attitudes’ 
(Selbstreflektierte Einstellungen), and the ‘reflective and immediate attitude’, 
of ‘the moment (Augenblick)’
403 . Jaspers elucidates the puzzling, ‘riddled 
nature’
404 of the Augenblick, which can be both everything and nothing. The 
more ‘rational’ and knowledgeable in a scientific sense that human being 
becomes, Jaspers asserts, the more the idea of Augenblick grows in 
importance. Human being becomes more ‘inclined to make every momentary 
experience, every temporally determined reality a means for something else, 
for something in the future or for something whole.’
405 Against the defining 
and limiting knowledge of scientific thought, human being strives for another 
kind of knowledge. The more human being feels a lack of such knowledge, 
the more dissatisfied we become. In its confinement to historical context 
human being strains against its limits seeking something more meaningful 
from the present moment. We look beyond ourselves to the future, we seek 
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absolutes and ideals which go beyond our concrete reality. The spirit 
(Geist
406) in man, Jaspers tells us, looks for totalities, consciousness tends 
toward completion, toward making things ‘whole’.  
  The soul, Jaspers tells us, is temporal, ‘it is forever merely 
fragmentary and finite’ yet it ‘needs the reality of the temporal present’. 
Wallraff tells us that when Jaspers speaks of the soul it is as ‘a basic core in 
man which lies beyond all that the social sciences can discover, viz., what is 
called the soul, mind, ego, psyche, or innermost self’
407. ‘Soul’ is another of 
Jaspers’ concepts which does not lend itself to a final definition.  In 
Philosophy, Jaspers describes the soul as something which can be 
‘educated’, and because of this a person can ‘prepare the ground for a future 
freedom which is viewed as possible’
408. The soul seems to be that which 
                                            
406 One could enter into lengthy discussion here regarding the meaning of Geist.  Olson  
notes the ‘essential ambiguity’ of the German word and its derivatives, and how it ‘has been 
particularly troublesome to English translators’ due to its ‘evasive but altogether essential 
metaphysical nuances’, but not simply relating to ‘ghosts’ or ‘apparitions’! Nor simply 
‘mind or ‘intellect’ either, Geist can take in a variety of  meanings pertaining to humanity, 
seen in such phrases as ‘kindred spirits’, ‘a spirited attempt’, ‘the spirit of the times’ 
(Zeitgeist). But summed up by Olson as, for Jaspers,  ‘the ‘nameless unconditioned’ which is 
the source and goal of transcendence and value as experienced in a particular existential 
‘situation’’. (Alan M. Olson in Jaspers Critique of Modernity, in Karl Jaspers Today, op cit, 1988) 
 
407 Wallraff, op cit, p. 34 
 
408 Jaspers, Philosophy II, op cit, p. 186 
  
177 
can mediate between human being in its finite existence and the 
transcendence of Existenz, as such it represents the inner self which in 
authentic being constitutes one’s individuality. It is the problematic 
discrepancy between the limiting temporal realm we inhabit with its ‘passage 
of time’ in which, Jaspers says, the soul ‘is clamped (eingeklemmt
409)’, which 
gives rise to ‘the consciousness of a whole’
410. The problem of the passage 
of time inhibits the way we can think of the moment. But when we become 
aware of and experience the moment in its ‘infinity’, the soul ‘can grow 
beyond time’ towards ‘eternity and timelessness’
411. 
  Jaspers reiterates Kierkegaard's thinking as it emerges from the 
Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of time and of the moment in its 
‘paradoxical nature’ and as an ‘unimaginable’ transition ‘from the singular to 
the manifold, from movement to motionlessness and vice versa‘. He points 
out the three worldviews (Weltanschauungen
412) of time from which 
Kierkegaard draws out his moment
413, that is, the Platonic, the Jewish and 
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the Christian. As we have said it is primarily from the Christian thinking that 
the moment becomes thought of as a synthesis of the temporal and the 
eternal
414 and eventually gains its existential significance when we find that 
its psychological importance is in the experience of the temporal moment as 
‘an event’
415. The moment thought in this way, ‘as filled with content’ Jaspers 
tells us, ‘is the experienced source of what is unique, of the leap, of 
resolution’
416. It becomes an ‘irrevocable’ event and ‘the medium of 
historicity’
417.  
 
‘The metaphysics of time moves in pictures and thoughts which repeals 
time in favour of eternity, which is not timeless like transcendental forms, 
not the endless succession of the temporal, the empty eternity, but the 
fulfilled eternity, an absolutely paradoxical, unimaginable concept, 
towards which our intentionality is directed along various pathways.
418   
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  The actual experience of the Augenblick, Jaspers says, ‘cannot be 
grasped because in it lies eternity’. But to look toward it can teach human 
being something  important about ‘attitude’ to life. In order to see what a 
person’s attitude to life is, one must ‘see how he lives it in the Augenblick’, 
Jaspers asserts. The lived and really experienced Augenblick is a reality of 
our psychic life, it is ‘the last‘ in the sense of being the limit or the utmost. It 
is, Jaspers says, ‘blood-warm, immediate, living, corporeal’ that is, it is 
present in the flesh, bodily present, it is alone ‘concrete’, the totality of the 
real. (‘Der gelebte Augenblick ist das Letzte, Blutwarme, Umittelbar, 
Lebendige, das leibhaftig Gegenwärtige, die Totalität des Realen, das allein 
Konkrete.’
419)  
  In the instant or ‘temporal moment’ (Zeitmomente) one can lose 
oneself in past and future, but human existence and the absolute is in the 
end only found in the Augenblick. Past and future are ‘dark uncertain 
abysses (Abgründe)’, Jaspers says, they are ‘time without end while the 
Augenblick can be suspension of time, the presence of eternity’. The 
temporal moment is autonomous, it ‘wants for nothing’, and it always 
vanishes. It represents a mere means ‘to be sacrificed for something in the 
future’. With the term Augenblick ‘we tend to indicate’ or express ‘something 
heterogeneous’, that which is at the same time both fulfilled and empty.  In 
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the self-reflective attitude the conflicting demands on one are, on one hand to 
register the Augenblick as an indifferent moment and on the other to see 
everything in it. ‘The temporal atom is nothing, the Augenblick is everything’ 
(das Zeitatom ist zwar nichts, der Augenblick aber alles’
420.) 
  Usually, human beings experience only moments of time 
(Zeitmomente), Jaspers tells us, they don’t always experience the 
Augenblick. In this ‘contrast’ of warring attitudes lies ‘a double meaning 
(doppeldeutiger)’. (We might remember here Kierkegaard’s statement that 
‘everything essentially Christian has a double meaning [Dobbelttydigt], is a 
redoubling [Fordoblelse]). In one view the focus is toward the future, the 
present is merely the means to it and is ‘given up in respect of what has to be 
achieved’ either in terms of goals in this life or ‘in favour of some future life’. 
The command is: - ‘Live!’. The present seen in this way does not have any 
significance in itself. In the contrasting view, the focus is on an ‘Epicurean 
aesthetic celebration’ of the Augenblick as a ‘singular and separate moment’, 
in this attitude the Augenblick is directed toward a totality. The command is: 
‘Carpe Diem!’ and demands a view of the Augenblick as a self-sufficient 
experience, ‘entirely concluded in the temporal present’. The  Epicurean 
attitude, however, is to seize the day because there is ‘no certainty of 
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tomorrow’, enjoyment must be experienced now
421. Jaspers refers to 
Kierkegaard’s quoting of the Epicureans, saying that if one has participated 
in the Augenblick in the sense of ‘moments of intensive living’, then one has 
really lived and ‘other hapless people’, those only concerned with ’running 
forward in life’ will ‘envy you’. But this interpretation of the Augenblick 
Jaspers says, makes it into an ‘abstraction’
422 because it lacks a connection 
with eternity and even marks ‘a fear of eternity’. These two contrasting ways 
of interpreting the moment are means to goals that concern finite temporal 
existence. Neither of them reach a depth of existential significance which 
demands an authentic engagement with the moment and a committed 
response to it. However, there is a sense that one can ‘seize the day’ proper, 
by recognising and courageously grasping the possibilities that occur and 
being authentically concerned to make them one’s own.  
  One who is a mere observer, Jaspers tells us, will not have ‘realised 
the contrast of the temporal moment and the Augenblick’ , of immediate 
experience and reflection, unlike one who has experience of being ‘in the 
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Augenblick (augenblicklich)’
423 . What is meant by living ‘in the Augenblick’ 
might be understood as being either authentic or inauthentic in attitude. The 
corresponding phrase ‘living for the moment’ usually indicates a life lived with 
no concern for the effects of one’s actions on tomorrow. Sometimes this can 
be good advice directing one away from the hazards of too much reflection, 
which Jaspers points to as a danger in the first leap. However, as Jaspers 
points out, the word ‘augenblicklich’ conveys the meaning of ‘to be like the 
Augenblick’, or to be the same as (gleichgültigen) the Augenblick, that is, 
being valid by the very same name as Augenblick. Considered in this way it 
allows an understanding of the absolute and authentic way in which one can 
be involved in such fundamental experience
424. 
  Jaspers tells us that the Augenblick is ‘a medium for all liveliness and 
therefore infinitely manifold in its formulations (Gestalten)’, ‘from the poorest 
to the richest, from the simplest to the most intricate’, ‘everything that is truly 
alive in us is subsumed in the Augenblick’, or somehow ‘stems from 
Augenblicken’. The meaning of the Augenblick ‘dissolves’ for the one who is 
‘indifferent’ to it in its immediacy, for them it is ‘not yet real’
425 . In reflection, 
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‘initially the tendency is toward this indifference’, one is ‘inclined to declare 
the Augenblick to be nothing’ and ‘to subordinate it to the indifferent’ moment 
‘within the temporal process’
426. As we have seen, Jaspers asserts that the 
stress of contemporary thinking is on ‘rational’ knowledge which creates 
situations ‘in which man yearns for the fulness of the Augenblick’. Now ‘the 
Augenblick appears as something possible’ and ‘on account of the reflex 
attitude it affirms, we have a realisation of it as Unergründlichkeit, of it being 
such that it is impossible to find its ground, there is no ‘discovering its 
ground, in its infinity, its creative power’
427 . So often in life, ‘one works, 
reflectively achieves, dares things in the consciousness of the preparation of 
those Augenblick, the quality and significance of which are unknown’. Yet 
living in the consciousness that they are possible, Jaspers says, ‘fulfils the 
hoping soul’ and ‘thus psychic life’, that is, the life of the soul. So the life of 
psyche is ‘a pulsating in which the highest peaks are rare Augenblicke and 
the depths mere moments in time.’  In both cases the Augenblick is a means 
to something. By means of reflection, the Augenblick can come to be 
experienced as above time, ‘as fulfilled (erfüllt) and fulfilling (erfüllend)
428. 
  All that is living and vital, all that can be said to be is subjectively 
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experienced in the Augenblick, while ‘as a metaphysical idea’ it is only ‘a 
meagre and abstract objective expression’, it is in reflection that the 
Augenblick can be filled ‘with new powers’, but this ‘only makes sense for the 
living human if the reflection really achieves the power (Kräften)’. To grasp 
(Erfassung) an understanding ‘of the psychological nature of the Augenblick 
which however one can only describe and not determine’, one must be able 
to see the ‘certain abnormalities of the experiencing of the Augenblick’ of 
which we have spoken,  which ‘through a deficit show us drastically what is 
there but is not noticed in its taken-for-granted-ness, (Selbsverstandlichkeit)’. 
  There is tension between the desire for the sensual present moment 
and the demand to bring to actuality ‘the most expanded version’ of the 
moment, to move from ‘the narrowest to the broadest’ understanding of the 
Augenblick. But the Augenblick in its broadest understanding ‘fails (versagt) 
again and again through the power of the sensual present’ which overtakes 
it. This ‘power’, as indicated by the use of the German word ‘geistige’, has 
both a spiritual and a ‘mental’ principle. How much of this power is actual in 
the psychology of human beings, Jaspers tells us, ‘shows itself only in 
certitude and reliability’ in the immediately present Augenblick. 
The Boundary in Philosophy. 
  Volume II of Philosophy is named Existential Elucidation 
(Existenzerhellung), and it ‘elucidates the potentialities of man, and appeals  
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to him to exercise his freedom in actualizing them’
429. We begin with what 
Jaspers describes as ‘situations’. For Jaspers, we in our concrete existence 
(Dasein), are already in the situation of being ‘always in situations’. Situations 
are a ‘sense-related reality’, not simply a ‘reality governed by natural laws’ 
but both psychological and physical ‘in one’
430. Situations change, that is how 
they exist and how we recognise that they concern us as the reality of the 
existence which we have ‘a stake in’
431. One situation arises from another, 
they are linked but we cannot be completely aware of how their connections 
work. Once we begin to consider them the very act of consideration comes 
into play to effect them also, especially when they come to our attention as 
boundary situations. The ‘concrete reality of existence’ is that we are not 
alone in situations, ‘other subjects, their interests, their sociological power 
relations, and their combinations’ have their bearing on one’s situation. 
Whether as ‘advantage’ or ‘obstacle’, opportunities arise from accidents and 
from the ‘chances of the moment’. Most of the time we must accept these as 
‘given’, yet there can be a chance of ‘transforming them’, in some cases we 
can create situations for ourselves in order to pursue a goal.  
  This being ‘in situations’ is what it is for a person to exist. Situations, 
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Jaspers tells us are either ‘general and typical or historically definite and 
unique’. Typical situations come from particularities of our existence, from the 
common everyday context that we share with our fellow human beings. But 
‘absolute singularity shows up only in retrospect - at the crucial point of our 
concern with a unique world situation, for example, with a chance that will 
never recur’
432. In reflecting upon it,  we can recognise a situation as being 
decisive for us, one that concerns us personally in our individual human 
being and also, inevitably for Jaspers, as part of a community, in 
communication with other human beings. In either case, whether general and 
everyday or singular, we cannot ‘know’ the situation we find ourselves in ‘as 
a whole’, there is always something outstanding. 
  Unlike the continually changing situations of ordinary everyday 
existence, those which arrest our attention as exceptional and bearing most 
intimately upon our existence are the boundary situations. These ‘never 
change, except in appearance’. Fundamentally they remain the same, 
belonging as they do to existence itself while an individual’s experience of 
them will vary, immersed as they are in the reality of their own time and 
place. These fundamental, unchanging situations fall into categories both 
general and specific. The first one Jaspers speaks of is the general boundary 
situation of confinement within our historical definition and beginnings, 
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including that ‘first beginning’
433 of which we have spoken in the first section 
of this chapter. 
  Every individual exists within their own psychological, physiological, 
sociological, cultural and, ‘historical’ dimensions.  Even though some may 
yearn for another era in the past or imagine their own future utopia, these are 
still seen from the perspective of present possibilities. Being so concretely 
within one’s ‘specific place and time’ constricts the ‘individual’s opportunities 
for action, but also the possible ways in which he can view his world’. When 
considering limitation in this way ‘we approach what Jaspers calls ‘historicity’ 
(Geschichtlichkeit)
434. Of course, as we have said, this does not preclude our 
appropriation of past philosophies into our present thinking. 
  We cannot avoid boundary situations, unless we ignore them 
altogether, closing our eyes and minds to them and never therefore reaching 
the depth of experience they can offer. ‘Situations like the following: that I am 
always in situations, I cannot live without struggling and suffering; that I 
cannot avoid guilt; that I must die’ are, if we experience them meaningfully, 
‘like a wall we run into, a wall on which we founder’
435. Jaspers’ term 
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foundering’ (Scheitern), as Johannes Thyssen tells us in ‘The Concept of 
‘Foundering’ in Jaspers’ Philosophy’, ‘signifies the fruitlessness of all 
endeavors to reach, from a finite basis such as consciousness-as-such or 
even from self-sufficient Existenz, a satisfactory access to Being, i.e., to 
arrive at the absolute’
436. This foundering represents a failure of human 
understanding and is a necessary condition of approaching the idea of 
Transcendence. Our understanding, as Jaspers says in Way to Wisdom, is 
‘attuned to the practical’, it resists certain ideas and is thrown into doubt by 
them, it ‘even shipwrecks itself’
437 against them. 
 What  we  can do is make these situations ‘lucid’, Jaspers tells us, ‘but 
without explaining or deducing them from something else’
438. Science would 
seek to clarify them, he says, they cannot be clarified though they can be 
illuminated. They come to us direct and unmediated from the core of our 
existence. All that we can do is ‘surrender’ to them, not in a negative way but 
by taking them for what they are; the situations which suggest something, 
that something outstanding which we can know, though it lays beyond ‘an 
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existing consciousness’
439 and as such is usually unavailable. The word 
‘boundary’ he says, ‘implies that there is something else’
440. What is this 
something else of our existence? It is that which Kierkegaard pointed to, 
Existenz itself as the origin or source. 
   We can relate this idea of unavailability to the Augenblick itself, as 
something that we cannot make concrete either by defining it or locating it in 
time or place. We do not always think of each moment of existence, only 
when a moment takes on particular significance and extraordinary meaning. 
Even then, like all boundaries that remain boundaries and all horizons that 
remain horizons, it draws away from us as we advance upon it. ‘The 
meaningful way to react to boundary situations is … not by planning … to 
overcome them but by the very different activity of becoming the Existenz we 
potentially are; we become ourselves by entering with open eyes into the 
boundary situation’
441. What is necessary, Jaspers tells us, is a state of 
‘unconditionality’, we must enter the situation without reservation, making 
and owning to our decisions, indeed our life itself must be ‘guided by 
something unconditional which can only spring from the decision’
442. We 
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become ‘in time’, in the concrete present of our actions and decisions, the 
person that we are ‘in eternity’
443. 
  When we are involved in our ordinary everyday existence, we do not 
consider the boundary situations, we know them ‘only externally’, and 
objectively. But ‘when we are ourselves’, when we are authentic, ‘they can 
make us aware of being’, as Existenz we can feel ‘their reality’. ‘To 
experience boundary situations’ Jaspers says, ‘is the same as Existenz’. This 
movement from existence to Existenz ‘happens in a leap; a mind which 
merely knows about boundary situations may, in historic, singular, 
noninterchangeable fashion, come to be fulfilled. The boundary thus plays its 
proper role of something immanent which already points to 
transcendence’
444. Jaspers says, that in this ‘sphere’ which is that of 
‘historical freedom’, the transition which we spoke of earlier in relation to 
Kierkegaard is no longer merely a quantitative but a qualitative change. In 
seeing this Kierkegaard posited the only means of making this change, which 
Jaspers now takes up, is through a leap: ’the new enters with a leap (einem 
Sprung)‘
445. 
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The Leap. 
  ‘Everything depends on the leap to this other way of thinking’
446 
Jaspers says, because each time we approach questions at the limits of 
empirical knowledge or of logical thinking we find no definitive answers. That 
is, ‘until the final question meets with … the silence of fulfilment, in which 
man’s own essence can speak directly to him through his inmost self, 
through his own demands, through reason, through love’
447. Jaspers utilises 
Kierkegaard’s concept of the ‘leap of faith’ which spans the boundary of 
understanding that confronts us in the ‘absolute paradox’ of the ‘moment’. 
Kierkegaard's leap is, as we have seen in chapter one, one of faith in relation 
to religious belief and concerns an afterlife, while Jaspers’ leap relates to 
faith in philosophical thinking and to a finite temporal life. The leap of faith 
represents a qualitative transition from non-being to being, or, from 
unbeliever to believer and as such represents a ‘rebirth’ from one form of 
existence to a higher form of existence. This leap is both active and passive, 
depending on both an act of will and an act of ‘letting go’, it is a combination 
of a conscious act of volition and choice and of the risky move of ‘closing 
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one’s eyes and leaping’
448.  This is how it can be a leap of faith, or a leap to a 
position of faith. It can only be an act of an isolated individual self and 
represents a decisive move for one’s eternal being. Jaspers appropriates 
Kierkegaard’s leap and develops it into three progressive leaps which, as will 
be seen, lead from mundane existence in the world to existential 
philosophising and contemplation as possible Existenz, and ultimately ‘to real 
Existenz in boundary situations’
449 . These three leaps ‘are tied to each other’ 
not in a linear, one-directional ‘ascending’ series; ‘They alternately engender 
each other.’ However we may consider Jaspers’ leap, whether as three leaps 
or as three stages in one leap, it does not change the significance of the 
concept.  
  To begin the process, Jaspers speaks of the ‘Desultory Genesis of 
Existenz’
450, in everyday life we skip from one thing to another in a seemingly 
irregular or even erratic course with little fixed plan or purpose, 
unmethodically. There is an indecisiveness to actions, an indifference to their 
outcome. ‘Desultory’ can also refer to events which are occasional and 
disconnected, and describe a way of being as if ‘a feather for each wind that 
                                            
448 Ferreira, Jamie, M., Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap, The Cambridge Companion to 
Kierkegaard, pp.  214-5 
 
449 Jaspers, Philosophy II, op cit, p. 181 
 
450 Ibid, p. 179 
  
193 
blows’
451. Importantly, it can refer to things occurring randomly in isolation, 
and it is in solitude that Jaspers asserts there originates a crucial shift in 
being. Jaspers calls this ‘absolute solitude’ of contemplation ‘the eye of an 
existence (Sie ist Auge eines Daseins)’, it is ‘the first leap in which this 
existence transcends itself’
452. 
  The ‘genesis’ of the first leap is from within our ordinary existence. We 
are immersed in the world but in contemplative thought, we can be in the 
world and ‘at the same time’ somehow ‘outside’ of the world’, the world and 
‘my own existence’ can fade away. We reach an ‘Archimedian point’ where 
we ‘see’, where we ‘know what is’. We can objectify our own existence and  
‘even face my own existence as if it were a strangers’, we seek to ‘know the 
whole’.  Being looks for ‘a way to get there’ to the place ‘outside’ which it 
does not occupy. This overcoming of my being ‘occurs in absolute solitude.’ 
The affect of it is that the happenings of the world and my existence in it 
becomes ‘doubtful’ and ‘fades away’. Though seemingly standing outside the 
world, paradoxically I stand: ‘so closely before myself as if I were an isle of 
safety in mid-ocean, a place from which I aimlessly gaze upon the world as 
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on a billowing atmosphere without limits.’ The contemplating self feels free of 
concern and secure in a ‘supporting’ objective knowledge of things in the 
world.  
  This solitude of the self, when it is ‘detached from any situation, is like 
the pure eye that meets no other eye and looks upon all things, but not into 
itself’, Jaspers tells us. This calm and unconcerned place concentrates the 
reflecting self to ‘a mere point’, it is undisturbed by any thoughts, ‘other than 
the calm of its vision’
453. Here we find the metaphors of the eye and of vision 
representing the contemplation or reflection
454 of a self-satisfied ‘knowing’ 
regard. But having taken this first leap one is still in the everyday situations of 
existence although differently involved now since one is ‘a possible Existenz’ 
(my italics). This gaze at ‘reality’ prepares the way for a different knowledge, 
one ‘which in existence opens my mind to boundary situations; for fleeting 
moments only can it be a pure eye’
455 (es kann bloßes Auge nur in 
vorübergehenden Augenblicken sein
456). This knowledge cannot be grasped 
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except briefly, seen only in glimpses, it cannot be held in time but belongs to 
eternity ‘outside the limited temporality of the historical moment’
457 or ‘athwart 
of time’(in Querstellung zur Zeit)
458. In this glimpse which transverses
459  time 
as it takes its usual direction, the way in which we notice time goes awry.   
  Solitariness can be a comfortable and homely feeling, yet at the same 
time it can verge on loneliness and harbour a desire to escape it, a yearning 
toward some undefined thing. This tension in the first leap means that we 
cannot remain in this moment, it cannot be sustained. It cannot be 
considered objectively by consciousness-as-such, and the intimation it 
contains of a different knowledge can not be communicated between one 
person and another. It is a swift but vital experience, a penetrating and clear 
glimpse so to speak, from which we can turn back or look further. This 
glimpse is a moment of insight, from this point (Punkt), existence looks ‘for a 
way to get there’, to Existenz.  In this boundary situation we have moved 
from the leaping with no fixed plan to the leaping toward Existenz. It may 
seem that the movement is not yet complete and so this ‘pure eye’ cannot be 
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the Augenblick we seek, but we can get over this difficulty if we consider that 
this first leap is the crucial ‘genesis’, if taken and not retreated from, it takes 
in the second and third leaps.  
 In  Way to Wisdom, Jaspers describes the threefold meaning of the 
‘unconditional imperative’ which ‘has reality in the man who follows it in faith 
and awareness … it cannot be proved [or] shown to exist’
460. We can think 
that from now on due to what amounts to an act of faith, the remaining leaps 
are incorporated in this fleeting moment, there is no going back if Existenz is 
to be reached. The danger is, that if this leap is not connected to following 
leaps, Jaspers says, it will ‘go astray’, this leap may become ‘‘the hard-self-
centeredness of unconcern’, it may become knowledge without being’
461. The 
first leap begins in questioning contemplation and, Jaspers tells us in 
summing up the leaps, ’in view of the dubiousness of all things, takes me 
from mundane existence to the substantial solitude of universal 
knowledge’
462, it ‘leads me to philosophize in world images’
463. One wants to 
make sense of the world but when confronted with the ‘dubiousness’ of 
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existence, one is anxious over what really matters, ‘what counts in 
existence’. What ‘counts’ and what the boundary situation threatens, is 
‘universal knowledge’ which we trust.  
  From this ‘lonely punctuality of having stepped outside, I take my 
second leap to elucidation’. Punctuality is another telling choice of word. It 
underlines how this state of contemplation brings to a pause or punctuates 
the usual course of life being simply lived. ‘Thought pauses enquiringly. It 
comes to a halt before Being’
464, Jaspers tells us echoing Kierkegaard in his 
‘wonder’. From the Latin punctum, it allows us to think it as a point of focus. 
Further there is the element of being on time or ‘timely’ in ‘punctuality’, 
suggestive of the sense of kairos as the right time. If one retreats from this 
first leap, one loses the moment. If one does not retreat, the second leap 
takes us to philosophising and the realisation that a boundary situation 
represents a possibility which concerns my own self, such a realisation would 
‘hit the essence of my being’.  The world has become more than just an 
object of knowledge, it also contains ‘one’s ’own shaken self’.  
   One’s foothold is no longer sure, it is as if the ground, so to speak, is 
pulled out from under one’s feet. The situation becomes one’s ‘object again’ 
yet not as a ‘transparent’ situation that knowledge can get one through and 
leave behind. This has become a situation of another order, one which ‘I 
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cannot get out of’, a situation which ‘I cannot see through as a whole’. The 
boundary situation is one which I ‘cannot knowingly control I can only grasp 
existentially’. It is no longer a question of being in a situation and in existence 
but of being Existenz - ‘something to be or not to be‘. There is no ‘valid 
knowledge’ which is the goal of this contemplation in ‘the solitude of cognitive 
self-being’, the leap to ‘the consciousness of its possible Existenz’ aims at 
elucidating ‘the nontransparent boundary situations’
465. Having come up 
against the fact of one’s ‘necessary involvement in the world’ through 
philosophical contemplation, and failed in the face of it, we have arrived with 
the second leap at transparency, at the ‘elucidation of possible Existenz’. The 
concept of becoming transparent (transparent werden), expresses Jaspers’ 
view ‘that empirical being is capable of letting Transcendence ‘shine 
through’
466. The danger in this second leap, if it loses its relation to the 
others, is that the solitariness from which it emerges may become a 
seclusion in which one revels ‘in the possibility of all realities; merely 
conceiving existentialities without being prepared for Existenz’; Jaspers says 
one may ‘become shameless’
467. 
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  We discuss boundary situations as ‘possible Existenz’, contemplating 
and reflecting, but not as Existenz itself. We have laid the ground for, but not 
yet reached an ‘existential realisation’; though we are ‘ready for the leap’, 
Jaspers says, we are ‘not yet leaping’. The ‘real and finite’ situation is 
lacking. Boundary situations can be grasped objectively like any existing 
situations, but ‘to become boundary situations proper they need a unique 
translation, a realisation in personal existence that will make an Existenz sure 
of itself and will mark its appearance’. It ‘involves Existenz as a whole’ and 
there can be ‘no substitution’ for this. ‘I am no longer an individual finitely 
concerned with particular situations; I grasp the boundary situations of 
existence as infinitely concerned Existenz. This is the third and crucial leap: 
the leap in which possible Existenz becomes real’
468. One can now live 
‘philosophically as Existenz’
469, but the danger here is that ‘a direct reality of 
Existenz without a clear transcendence may radically shatter and submerge 
me in bewildering passions’
470. 
  Each form of the leap precipitates a change in how one sees one’s 
life, Jaspers says, ‘I say ‘I myself’ in a new sense, the leap marks a 
conscious, inner move from a ‘heretofore’ to a ‘hereafter’. There is a 
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boundary marked in time between the being which one is before and the 
being which one is after the leap is complete. The leap brings one to a new 
awareness of oneself ‘as my own creature’
471. It originates with oneself, as 
‘my beginning’ but one in which ‘I know that I have already been.’ The 
potential, Jaspers says is one ‘which I never made’, it has laid immanent 
within, as though there as possibility in every moment, but awaiting the 
moment of its fulfilment. 
  ‘After the leap’, Jaspers tells us, there ‘prevails’ an ‘insoluble duality’ of 
being in between two states, in the world, yet also as Existenz. I could 
choose to ‘favor one side or the other’ of the duality and ‘lose the boundary 
situation; either I step out of the world altogether in an incommunicable, 
wordless mysticism, or I plunge altogether into the world, in factual 
positivism’
472. Jaspers tells us that in existence we ‘pass through both 
mystical and positivistic moments’
473, following our remarks on Jaspers’ 
mediating role of the soul we might imagine it at work on this duality. One is 
constantly thrown, or ‘recoils’ ‘back into the duality where ‘Everything in the 
world is a matter of complete indifference, and everything in the world may 
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acquire decisive importance’
474. We noted in Psychologie how Jaspers 
maintains that the way in which one is augenblicklich, whether with an 
attitude of indifferent superficially or of authentic responsiveness, gives an 
indication of one’s attitude to life. This life necessarily concerns both our 
temporal finite existence with its concrete situations and also the 
transcendent Existenz which we might glimpse in the Augenblick.  
‘Existentially I am supratemporal by staying squarely temporal as a 
phenomenon’, Jaspers says. But in the moment when time becomes ‘not of 
the essence’, then Existenz takes on ‘the absolute weight of decision’. Is the 
Augenblick, and is life itself ‘everything or nothing’? ‘Impassioned action 
unites with a feeling of ‘Nothing means anything; - but so that I become 
more, not less, serious in action’
475 .  
Decision from the Source. 
  We will now return to Jaspers’ Psychologie to consider an example he 
gives there of a man in a certain decisive situation and consider it in the light 
of the elucidation of boundary situations and the leap. In the first boundary 
situation we are always ‘in a particular situation’
476 and within that situation 
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we are always historically defined. As these change in ways we can have no 
control over, one particular situation can come to the fore as decisive. Having 
reflected on one’s new position and hopefully reached some elucidation, a 
decisive resolution might come seemingly from ‘out of the blue’. The 
‘historicity’ of our existence constrains us, yet we do not acquiesce. Human 
being does not submit to or rest within its limitations, it cannot but strive 
against them. One reason for our state of ‘unrest’ is that our future is 
‘uncertain’ directed as it is, Jaspers tells us, by ‘opportunities and chances’, 
and by ‘resistances’. Resistances are the ‘given data’ of one’s life and the will 
of other individuals which limit one’s freedom and possibilities but which can 
be challenged and conquered. They include the ’material’ we put to our 
purpose, or cultivate and also the ‘conditions for the life’ one wants which we 
also cultivate, though one’s life might take a direction one didn’t expect.  
  Faced with possibilities which arise by chance or by accident one has 
to make choices. We cannot actualise all of the possibilities which might 
belong to us, some of them will never ‘get the chance’ to become available 
for choosing, they will never occur. Aware, however, that ‘what is up to me 
still lies ahead’
477, one has freedom to actively create opportunities and to 
make future events turn out according to one’s will. Jaspers’ example quoted 
in Wallraff (in relation to the notion of ‘source’), concerns the nineteenth 
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century German physicist, Franz Neumann, who ‘had to decide whether he 
ought to adopt the life of a farmer in order to remain with and care for his 
mother, or to leave his mother to pursue a demanding career in science’
478. A 
real possibility has arisen for him, that of changing the situation into which he 
is born and by which he is ‘constrained’. In this state of uncertainty, one’s 
own historical existence might be brought into question; the world itself might 
seem uncertain and one’s foothold unsure. Our existence itself becomes a 
boundary which ‘reveals the dubious character of the world’s being, and of 
my being in the world’
479.  In reflecting on such a dilemma, on one’s place in 
the world and at this boundary, consciousness might deepen and one could 
become aware of ‘being at large as historically phenomenal’. This, Jaspers 
refers to as the ‘the universal boundary situation of all existence’ in which can 
be felt ‘absolute historicity’
480. 
  When we come up against a boundary situation it throws not only our 
empirical and everyday existence into question but gives us ‘a perspective in 
which we ask about existence as a whole and conceive it as possible or 
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impossible’481 . It is not regarding everyday decisions that human beings 
reach this impasse, but in relation to decisions which concern the ‘world in 
which they commit sins, fall in love, say prayers or join the communist 
party’
482. They are decisions which involve a personal judgement regarding 
how one ought to conduct oneself, what one ought to do and how one ought 
to live. As Wallraff puts it, individuals ‘must decide here and now how to live 
and what to live for ’
483. In this boundary situation, the historically defined 
individual in the world turns to reflect on his situation as an individual within ‘a 
world at large’
484. He ‘orients’ himself to this wider world from which an 
opportunity has arisen, presenting him with a choice. We can identify here 
the point of solitary contemplation which constitutes the first leap.  
  It is a difficult choice over which, we are told, Neumann ‘spent many 
difficult hours trying to reach a decision’
485. We can imagine Neumann 
‘shaken’ in the face of his dilemma and ‘failing’ against it. Here, we have the 
second leap in which Neumann’s ‘necessary involvement in the world’ moves 
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him from contemplation of the situation to a realisation of his existence as 
‘possible Professor ‘, that this moment is decisive to his very being. Using 
Jaspers’ metaphor, we might see him in the ‘shipwreck’ of ‘foundering’ 
(Scheitern). For Jaspers, this failure as ‘factual foundering’ (faktisches 
Scheitern), needs interpretation. What it refers to, Thyssen tells us, must be 
‘understood existentially as a cipher’
486. That is to say, the notion of 
‘foundering’ is a cipher through which we can understand and communicate 
this otherwise indescribable experience in which one feels as if one has been 
‘hit’
487 in the essence of one’s being, or lost one’s entire strength in the face 
of such an experience. This ‘failure’ in the boundary situation allows not only 
a decision regarding one’s own life. If one does not remain secluded, 
revelling in all one’s possibilities, it provides the opportunity for authenticity. If 
one makes that decision, one also makes the third leap to living 
‘philosophically as Existenz’
488.  If not overtaken by the ‘bewildering passions’ 
that we have previously mentioned, but seeing clearly toward transcendence, 
one can now reach Being itself, as the source. 
  Although we emerge from a background that we have, by chance, 
inherited, there are also unexpected events which occur; accidents can befall 
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us which might bring good or bad results. Regarding the accident of meeting 
for instance, Jaspers says, ‘My love for the companion of my life depends 
upon the accident of our meeting in existence’
489 . ‘What I become, what 
tasks I set myself, depends upon opportunities’. What ensues can mark a 
change in the way a person sees themselves. When faced with a decision, 
we are guided by ‘laws and customs’ of our social situation to a certain extent 
but ultimately ‘each individual is thrown back upon his own resources and 
forced to make his own decisions’
490 . The course taken is mine but not ‘up to 
me alone’, we might consider ourselves as unavoidably prey to accident and 
chance and allow them to overtake us.  But it would seem an ‘unbearable 
boundary situation’ to think of oneself as such a ‘plaything’ of ‘blind 
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chance’
491 .  
  One can miss chances, some will pass unnoticed and some will be 
noticed but not recognised as significant. Some, whose potential we can see 
will still not be taken up, in a variety of ways one can fail to seize the 
moment. Jaspers asserts that in our reflections regarding chance, we make 
use of ‘mythicizing’ concepts such as luck and fate which are not subject to 
reason but are necessary ‘functions of the metaphysical elucidation of 
Existenz in boundary situations’
492. We think of chance as ‘lucky or unlucky’, 
either as a circumstance of Fortune itself or an ‘quality’ of an individual who 
might be favoured by fortune (Latin: fortunatus). Or luck ‘may have to be 
seized’ in action rather than waiting passively for it. One use of the term 
Kairos implies ‘he who grasps the helm firmly in a moment of fate, forces 
fortune’
493. Jaspers tells us this constitutes a ‘split’ or ‘dichotomy’ between 
the outward circumstances under the guidance of Fortune and one’s self, 
between these two one takes ‘a standpoint’
494.  
  These views of chance and luck are directed at goals within finite 
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existence and limited by the dichotomy between circumstances and the self. 
The split can be ‘voided’ by an inward adoption of the ‘fortuities’. This brings 
us, in Jaspers’ explication, to amor fati.  In realising that the individual and 
the circumstances belong together and that this fate is not an ‘external one’, 
results in the more ‘profound idea of my fate’
495. The ‘historical definition’ in 
which, as we have said, one is ‘immersed’ can only belong to the individual 
existing within it. This historic definition is ‘not definitive, and neither, in it, am 
I’ but ‘I am in the form of becoming in time the man that I am in eternity’
496. 
My fate belongs to me and ‘I love it as I love myself for only in my fate can I 
be existentially sure of myself’
497. Realising this, one is no longer at the whim 
of Fortune or chance or accident. As Nietzsche’s Zarathustra said, ‘The time 
has passed when accidents could befall me; and what could still come to me 
that was not already my own?’
498. This sense of fate in historicity comes, 
Jaspers says, when we take ‘concrete existence seriously’
499. 
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  But we must not forget the danger we spoke of in relation to the first 
leap. Reflections might come between ‘me and my sense of fate’, thinking of 
fate in ‘universal’ terms may make our particular situation something ‘merely 
individual and private’, and unimportant in itself. Or we may become self-
important if we think that fate favours us in the particularities of existence. It 
is not the particularities as such that have ‘existential relevance’. We must 
realise the absolute particularity of our existence in union with Existenz, in 
order for the idea of our fate to become ‘real as Existenz’.  It is the 
‘indissoluble union of particularity and Existenz which we elucidate in the 
historic consciousness of amor fati’
500. 
   We might try to free ourselves ‘from random chance by the idea of 
necessity’, so that our existence does not seem arbitrary, Jaspers says. We 
might try to evade or ‘outwit’ some perceived necessities but if it seems this 
cannot be done, when ‘necessity turns absolute’ then ‘it is as unbearable as 
chance’
501 .  Then we might try to free ourselves from the idea of ‘inexorable 
necessity by turning again to the idea of the possibility and opportunity of 
chance’
502. To escape from this circularity, requires us to recognise the 
situation as concerned with more than our finite existence, to recognise it as 
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a boundary situation, Jaspers says. This much ‘must be obvious before 
possible Existenz can shift to another consciousness’
503 . It is not then ‘pure 
chance’ which appears as the ‘historically definite’ ‘but a phenomenon of this 
accidental being’. What appears then, one cannot ‘grasp intellectually’ for it 
transcends ‘any comprehensible thought, but one can experience it or ‘feel 
sure of’ it, Jaspers says ‘as eternity in time’
504 .  ‘Existenz cannot be aimed at 
directly or actualised by some deliberate methodical procedure‘ it is not 
something one plans for, it is ‘not a goal but a source’505. In this ‘transcending 
I experience myself - shaken, first, and then as one with chance, which I take 
to be mine’
506.  Chance is mine to the extent that I am my chances. 
  Wallraff tells us that for Neumann, ‘suddenly the awareness that 
farming was impossible for him came to him as though from an unknown 
source’
507. 
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 ‘I know such moments (Momente), as they have turned up in my life, 
when all of a sudden the decision matured and was there, and then I 
find it hard to understand why it had not appeared this way long ago, as 
I so faint-heartedly loitered about the certain ending. Such moments 
(Augenblicke) then happen to me without my own doing, from the 
outside as it were, much like a voice external to myself, which speaks so 
lucidly and intelligibly. The solution could not be forced, and when it 
came it did so suddenly and inexplicably. When the circumstances are 
unthinkably complicated the resolution is experienced by the individual 
as almost miraculous as a gift.’
508 
 
It is noteworthy that the German text allows us to see a distinction between 
Momente as temporal occurrences in finite existence and Augenblicke as 
those moments which become recognised as decisive509 , elevated in their 
significance and allowing a communication with Existenz. Intriguingly, the 
moment is ‘like a voice’ which comes from ‘outside’ rather than inside as we 
might expect if Neumann was referring to an inner voice. There is a 
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confusion of subject and object
510, because it is neither, or it is beyond this 
distinction, it is given.  
 In  Philosophy II, Jaspers tells us that conscience comes as a voice, 
this voice does ‘not exist at every moment’ but comes at the ‘turning point’ of 
decision. One emerges from this turning point ‘as a gift’ to oneself’
511. The 
voice of conscience is a ‘communication of myself to myself; an appeal to my 
empirical existence from the source of my self-being. No one is calling me; I 
am calling to myself’’
512. In responding to this call by resolutely committing 
oneself to action, one is answering to a moral imperative, not based ‘upon 
formulas, conventions, and norms’ but in ‘the consciousness of the absolute 
earnestness of Existenz
513. ‘Moral resolutions of this kind are 
phenomenologically or experientially immediate but logically and 
psychologically mediate’
514, Jaspers says. This means that their affect is felt 
in the ‘momentary’ experience, but they are also interpretable; they can be 
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made sense of, be submitted to one’s will and their meaning can be found in 
retrospect. 
  On a surface view, perhaps Neumann ought to carry on with his 
profession and help his mother by avoiding change. But we can see 
Neumann’s choice as, in a sense, the only choice available. The only person 
we can become is the person we are, ‘we become ourselves by entering with 
open eyes into the boundary situation’
515. Neumann, we might say, educates 
his soul to this new person he has discovered in himself. Kurt Hoffman in The 
Basic Concepts of Jaspers’ Philosophy, calls the moment ‘the authentic 
instance … of transfiguration
516 by which, we might understand a change of 
appearance. One sees oneself in a new perspective, realising a new aspect 
not before recognised and seeing possibilities one never expected. One sees 
one’s world in terms of before and after. 
  Neumann cannot isolate his whole decision in one instant of time but 
can identify its emergence over a period of time as a transitional state. We 
have seen this indicated by the series of three leaps culminating in that 
sudden realisation and decision. We can still say that ‘the new enters with a 
leap’517 without the concept of Augenblick being hampered by ordinary 
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conceptions of time. Whether such a decision actually involves an immediate 
realisation or whether it involves a prolonged period of consideration, the 
arrival at the solution, when it occurs, has less reality as a temporal present 
moment than it does as the Augenblick. As noted earlier, Jaspers says, ‘The 
metaphysics of time moves in pictures and thoughts which repeals time in 
favour of eternity’518.  How can one convey to other Existenz such a 
subjective experience, which reveals its meaning only in the ‘pictures and 
thoughts’ of the one having the experience? That it cannot be defined is a 
feature which it holds in common with other key terms in Jaspers’ 
philosophising, which have ‘a clear use; but … no clear, distinct, objective 
content’519.  
Augenblick as Cipher. 
  Thyssen tells us that ‘Jaspers’ metaphysics reaches its climax in the 
deciphering or ‘reading’’ of cyphers
520. It is ‘the last great theme’, in his 
Philosophy ‘unifying the whole in a new climax’
521. Jaspers tells us: ‘We call 
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the metaphysical objectivity a cipher because it is the language of 
transcendence, not transcendence itself’
522.  In existence consciousness-as-
such cannot hear or understand this cipher language because it speaks of 
things that cannot be objectively or scientifically known
523. It is only as 
Existenz in ‘absolute consciousness’ that it can ‘accost’ and communicate 
with an individual as a direct language. This happens ‘at a singular historic 
moment’
524, such as the one we have investigated in this chapter. When an 
experience ‘becomes transparent’, Jaspers tells us, ‘it turns into a cypher’ 
and one finds ‘present fulfilment’ rather than the ‘abyss’ of the ‘desperate 
shortcoming, when the experience’
525 relates only to existence. Through 
ciphers we can experience Being itself, they provide the ‘signa’ or ‘indices’
526 
for ‘transcendental’ Being. 
  Having had such an experience, and returned to the ‘present sensory 
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reality’, we find that its content cannot be demonstrated, and it is something 
that cannot be known in empirical terms. But the ‘not-knowing’ of this 
experience is not ‘the negative limit of my experience of mundane things’ but 
it is rather a ‘fulfilled not-knowing’. One returns it seems to an altered reality, 
not ‘as a content of existence … but to reality as a cipher’
527 and with a new 
drive toward finding ‘my own experience of true being’
528. What is heard, so 
to speak, in the immediate experience of a decisive present moment is 
‘audible’ as an ‘echo’ of a language of transcendence. It can only  be passed 
on to other Existenz in a ‘second language’, ‘a narrative, an image, a form, a 
gesture’. This, Jaspers asserts, is how languages are created, ‘images and 
thoughts’ are ‘intended to convey what has been heard’
529  in the language of 
being. The language we use, in which we seek to communicate these 
momentary experiences, is a ‘second language’. Its conveyable content ‘can 
be replenished by relating back to its source’
530. Each new experience of an 
Augenblick, might be thought to replenish its meaning content and keep the 
word alive in language. 
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  ‘The ciphers that we have learned to employ derive in large part from 
our historical situation’
531. Each individual having such an augenblicklich 
experience can relate it to this well-used expression which necessarily has its 
root in ordinary everyday temporal existence. ‘In the blink of an eye’ is an 
analogy for the sudden and decisive moment of change. As Jaspers puts it, 
one ‘reads the original cipher-script by writing a new one’
532. In the 
Augenblick we have a figurative descriptive phrase we might almost say an 
‘image’, for it symbolises an inexpressible experience. Such experiences are 
an object of yearning, they are something which is desired but cannot be 
defined, that is why they are such a enduring subject of contemplation. 
Jaspers asserts that scientific knowledge, ‘by draining appearances of their 
magic, only makes these cyphers clearer and richer and more immediately 
effective by contrast. Science can neither create nor destroy them’
533.  
 The  Augenblick represents ‘a metaphysical speculation’ which 
becomes part of a ‘third language’ that of ‘philosophical communication’534, in 
which cipher language is interpreted and spoken. One way in which to speak 
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this language is ‘to transcend in reminiscence and foresight, pondering the 
origin and the end’
535. As birth and death this ‘origin and the end’ represent 
the outer limits of our existence; as the beginning of, and the goal or purpose 
of our acts, they represent the inner limits of thinking and planning. In the 
wider aspect, they represent the world and its horizons within which we come 
to be. When we are between these two at any point we consider ourselves 
standing in our present moment, they mark the boundaries of our past and 
future. ‘Remembrance and foresight alone give me access to being’, when 
remembrance of the past and foresight of the future meet in my present 
speculations, they permeate one another and the present, ‘no longer remains 
simply the present; if I read the cipher in a foresight permeated by 
remembrance, it becomes present eternity’
536.  We can take the Augenblick 
as a cipher which gains meaning through historical use. Only in ‘fleeting 
moments’ through ‘temporal ciphers’ of ‘decision, resolve, probation, or 
fidelity’
537 is a ‘knowledge’ of transcendence as ‘a glimpse of eternity 
present’. Only in Existenz, can it be grasped, as Jaspers says, ‘athwart its 
present temporality’
538. 
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  To conclude, Jaspers tells us ‘Philosophy means to be on the way’, 
and ‘this on-the-wayness’ as ‘man’s destiny in time - contains within it the 
possibility of deep satisfaction, and indeed, in exalted moments, of 
perfection’. This possibility, ‘never resides in formulable knowledge, in 
dogmas and articles of faith, but in a historical consummation of man’s 
essence in which being itself is revealed’
539. Philosophical questions emerge 
from practical life situations, and therefore ‘their form is at any given moment 
in keeping with the historical situation’. This situation is part of a tradition 
whose earlier questions are ‘still ours’ and are partly ‘identical with the 
present ones’. Questions are more enduring and essential than any answers, 
yet they are nonetheless subject to change and infinitely concerned with the 
contemporary situation in which we make them our own ‘by translation’
540. 
  Jaspers’ earliest thinking which, as we have seen, he describes as 
free from political attitude, gives way to a position in which he sees 
philosophy as important to ‘the contemporary environment, ethical and 
political’
541. How does the tradition of philosophical thinking especially in 
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regard to the Augenblick bear upon our time? We have presented here, the 
way in which the Augenblick can be nothing or everything. In 
Existenzphilosophie, Jaspers tells us that ‘the alternative ‘nothing or 
everything’ stands before our age as the question of man’s spiritual 
destiny’
542. 
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Chapter 4. 
Martin Heidegger’s Augenblick as ‘moment of vision’, and the 
Redemption of Being.  
 
  Our investigations into Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Jaspers has 
shown that the concept of the Moment is elevated from the moment as an 
ordinary instant of time. Yet the temporal domain is an inescapable basis for 
human experience and it is especially so in Martin Heidegger’s work. The 
present is primary as every moment  holds existential possibiliities in 
imminence. We will find the aspects of redemption in the Moment previously 
discovered in Nietzsche. The crisis point or limit of understanding again 
precipitates us into the Moment proper. There is a giving way to radical 
change by a leap to a connection with a transcendent and eternal ‘truth’ or 
knowledge. Again, it is not a scientific  knowledge but one which concerns 
one’s very existence. 
 As  kairos, this event occurs at the right time and crucially, as 
Kierkegaard stressed, with the right man present in the correct attitude. This 
attitude for Heidegger is one of attunement and resoluteness. The one who 
discovers knowledge in Kierkegaard and Nietszche is decribed in Heidegger 
as the one who asks the question. Jaspers followed Kierkegaard in 
discussing how one lives appropiately ‘in the moment’. The Moment is a site 
of the decisions involving one’s actions time in an historical sense and those 
decisions which concern one’s existential self. Heidegger approipriates 
Nietzsche’s concept of Eternal Return to describe the transcendent being  
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from out of which beings and events recur.  
  Heidegger's early lecture courses at Marburg University include The 
History of the Concept of Time in 1925 and Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology  of 1927 which constitute transitional texts bearing the 
beginnings of ideas, including that of the Augenblick which find fruition in 
Being and Time in 1927. Heidegger's concept of the Augenblick continues to 
develop throughout the course of his work. The word has an everyday sense 
in German of simply ‘moment’, which Heidegger uses until Division II of 
Being and Time where he discusses the ontological significance of 
temporality
543.  
  It is here that the translators mark a deepening meaning of Augenblick 
and address the word’s more literal German meaning as 'glance of the eye', 
from then on it is rendered as 'moment of vision'
544 . As such the term is as 
necessarily related to some kind of sight or insight (Einblick) as it is to the 
temporal experience of a sudden and fleeting yet momentous event. Further 
to this, as William McNeill in The Glance of the Eye (1999), says it involves 
Aristotle’s concept of theoria
545, whose original sense is of 'seeing' or 'pure 
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beholding', philosophy has traditionally used the concept of ‘seeing’ as 
‘knowing’. Throughout Heidegger's work the concept is informed by his 
glancing back to Aristotle; however, this aspect is outside the parameters of 
this chapter, though it is fully explored in William McNeill’s book.   
  Although Heidegger in his analytic asserts that we cannot discuss 
particular actions of individual Dasein ‘in any particular case’
546, it seems 
pertinent to involve a discussion of Heidegger's own particular situation and 
choices in and of ‘his time’. In this discussion it is necessary to refer to the 
actual historical events of Heidegger’s own contemporary situation caught up 
as it is within an apocalyptic zeitgeist. Unfortunately, commentary on 
Heidegger’s political stance often overwhelms discussion of his ontology, his 
allegiance to National Socialism in the 1930s and the new beginning he 
perceives it holding for Germany is well documented. More interesting is the 
new beginning in philosophy Heidegger wants to make by a return to ideas 
regarding being, to which he asserts, human being has become oblivious. 
Heidegger’s concern is always with our ‘Being-in-the-world’, where ‘world’ is 
that which surrounds human being as a whole. It is not this world as opposed 
to the heavenly realm, nor is it ‘the ‘worldly’ as opposed to the spiritual’
547. Yet 
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this is not to say that there is no ‘spiritual’ element to Heidegger’s thinking as 
we shall see, and his ontology can be seen as redemptive even though 
grounded in the world. 
  Apocalyptic themes pervade the philosophy of Heidegger in relation to 
the Augenblick. They are grounded in the idea that the social and political 
situation of a time is one of crisis which appears to move inevitably toward 
total destruction. The culmination point of the state of crisis, the 
eschatological moment, cannot but give way to change and the instigation of 
a new order, as such it is, one might argue, the central concept of 
apocalypse. The crisis is the concern of the immediate present and the 
change which inevitably emerges from such a situation is considered to be 
imminent.  The present situation cannot be held onto, it must be transcended 
and give way to the awaited future. Heidegger elevates the ordinary present 
to an authentic Present which involves the futural impetus of Dasein. This 
impetus compels us through life and onto ever new projects, it arises in 
Moments, and there are some rare moments of a special intensity which we 
may seize hold of and exploit.  
  There is also an intimation that only a few ‘select’ people can have 
access to what this Augenblick holds. For apocalyptic thinking, the presence 
of a ‘visionary’, Messianic figure is necessary to the recognition that ‘now’ is 
the time, a fitting person who is properly situated, who recognises and is 
prepared to seize the possibilities that the present harbours. The Augenblick  
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is linked to Heidegger's concept of  ‘attunement’, particularly ‘anxiety’ and 
'profound boredom'.  While one lives, a moment is just another instant in the 
flow of time. It is necessary to feel arrested in the moment, to be able to be 
astonished by the very fact of something's existence, in fact, by existence 
itself. In this way, a moment might seem to stand out in intensity rather than 
blindly passing, such a moment is not ‘given’, it must be sought or 
discovered. In the correct 'attitude', that of maintaining a ’mood’ or 
‘attunement’, a moment can be accessible. Then 'all at once' it is as if the 
atmosphere around things has changed and one can see the world as one 
has never seen it before. 
  By being ‘resolute’ one can be brought back from being ‘lost’ in the 
‘they’; back to one’s authentic self and be properly in the moment 
(augenblicklich) as a state of being. Resoluteness is the authentic 
counterpart to being irresolute which, as in the case of inauthenticity is the 
usual way of being in the world. But from out of this very irresoluteness and 
inauthenticity comes the possibility of reclaiming oneself, of coming into 
one’s own. Similarly, it is from the critical state of danger which Heidegger 
sees his contemporary world to be suffering that the ‘saving power’ emerges.  
  Heidegger draws on Nietzsche’s concept of Eternal Return to speak of 
an eternal quality of transcendent Being out of which human beings come 
forth into presence in a momentary yet momentous way. In the recently 
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translated Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)548  of 1936-8, 
Augenblick refers to the 'event' (ereignis) of this coming to presence. The 
thinking of Being in this way Heidegger asserts, heralds a new epoch in 
philosophy. The sudden and decisive yet enigmatic Augenblick is a concept 
which itself returns. In the Augenblick, then, Dasein can become 
augenblicklich; in Contributions Heidegger speaks of a further condition, that 
of Dasein’s being essentially Momentary (augenblicklichkeit). One might ‘own 
up to’ or take responsibility for this state of being. At the same time one might 
‘come into one’s own’, in the sense of being fulfilled or receiving what one is 
owed; perhaps being brought into the condition of the fulfilment of the 
promise of the Augenblick. 
Temporality. 
  There are various possible sources from which Heidegger develops 
his concept of Augenblick, amongst which are Edmund Husserl’s work on the  
phenomenology of the consciousness of inner or internal time549; the moment 
of Kierkegaard; and Jaspers’ work in relation to the limit situation which 
informs Heidegger’s thinking on being-toward-death550 . Husserl, by his 
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distinction between the German words: Erfahrung and Erlebnisse makes 
possible a differentiation between ‘objective time’, and that ‘time’ of lived 
experience. Erfahrung from its root Fahrt meaning ‘path’, Husserl used to 
refer to the ‘outer experience’, or the specific activities one engages in, e.g.,  
the fact that one goes to a cafe and has coffee. Erlebnisse from Leben 
meaning ‘life’, refers to what he called ‘lived experience’, and signifies the 
intensity of a moment, for instance, the ‘immediate’ experience of one’s first 
mouthful of that hot strong coffee at one’s favourite cafe.    
  Husserl spoke of past and future as belonging to our experience of 
ordinary or ‘outer time’, using ‘retention’ and ‘protention’ for the 
corresponding aspects pertaining to ‘inner time’. The ‘retention’ of passing 
time informs our expectations of an unfolding event, ‘protention’ is the 
projected completion of our expectations, of this unfolding. Together these 
form a synthesis which constitutes our horizon of expectations which, if 
thwarted gives a  shock of the unexpected - a moment standing out in 
intensity. This temporal unfolding is not divided into individual instants with 
each ‘now moment’ separate from the next, they are in a continuum. They 
evolve, each instant falls away as another arises, cohering in the present 
experience. Within this phenomenological horizon is included all of the 
aspects of an object in space or an event, those which pass and also those 
                                                                                                                             
and Jaspers, Editor: Alan M. Olson, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1994, pp.153-165 
  
228 
not-yet-known, they remain undetermined, until they occur, if they occur. 
  Heidegger redeploys Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time 
experience to encompass our human ‘being-in-the-world’. He understands 
human being as a ‘nexus’ of lived experience and he recognises the priority 
of the ‘lived’ world (Lebenswelt), and the importance of its three temporal 
dimensions, or, in his words ecstases in which we, as temporal beings exist 
all at once. In using the word ‘ecstases’ Heidegger points to the way in which 
the three elements of past, present and future stand out, rather than being 
part of the ordinary ‘levelled off’551 sequence of ‘now’ moments552. We actively 
draw on our past and project ahead of ourselves into the future, to enable our 
present, and it is our being concerned with the present that constitutes our 
Being. For Heidegger temporality holds the meaning of the Being of Dasein, 
he says:  ‘we shall point to temporality as the meaning of the Being of that 
entity which we call ‘Dasein’’553. Husserl’s ‘now’ moment is a ‘passive’ 
synthesis rather than ‘active’, the ego is the recipient, it does not actively take 
part. But in seeing a possibility of seizing an opportunity in a Moment, we 
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begin to mark the Moment as decisive, it is transformed into something which 
can shape one’s past and future. We might say it brings the ability to 
‘preconstitute’ and ‘precapitulate’554 our future, if we are able to think of it as 
extending itself out from the ordinary temporal reach of our notions of time.   
  Any abstraction of a concept of the Moment remains rooted in the 
temporality which we are. Any understanding derived from such a Moment 
serves to advance Dasein’s enquiry into its own Being.  As transcendent 
beings we move beyond our factical existence which precedes and 
conditions ‘essence’555 .  Through uncovering of the inner-time-consciousness 
of Dasein’s Being-in-the-World, Heidegger hopes to penetrate into the ‘inner 
heart of time’, his project is to move from the Being of time to the time of 
Being. By discovering Time as meaning in this way, Safranski asserts, can 
‘sharpen our sense for the throbbing heart of Time, for the ‘moment’’
556The 
concept of Moment may be crucial to this move. Both ordinary time and what 
Heidegger, referring to the inner experience, calls ‘originary time’, are  crucial 
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to the comprehension of a Moment. But most importantly, if time is 
understood in the ordinary way, that is with the ‘now’ as the present without 
its ‘‘Ecstatico-horizonal’ structure, Heidegger says, ‘there is in principle no 
prospect that in terms of this kind of ‘now’ one can clarify the ecstatico-
horizonal phenomenon of the moment of vision which belongs to temporality, 
or even that one can derive it thus’557 . This is because ‘temporality 
temporalizes itself primarily in terms of the future’558, he says, and this future 
aspect as we shall see is crucial to the Augenblick. 
  While extracting the phenomenon of the Augenblick from the now of 
Husserl, Heidegger purports to go beyond it. He also distances himself from 
his other source in Kierkegaard. Heidegger recognises that 'Kierkegaard is 
probably the one who has seen the existentiell phenomenon of the moment 
of vision with the most penetration’559, that is he has seen the possibility it 
contains of realising an understanding of oneself through existing itself and 
that 'What we here designate as 'moment of vision' is what was really 
comprehended for the first time in philosophy by Kierkegaard’560. 
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Nevertheless, Heidegger criticises Kierkegaard for failing to escape 
temporality, for not being ‘successful in interpreting it existentially’. He 
asserts that Kierkegaard ‘clings to the ordinary conception of time, and 
defines  the 'moment of vision' with the help of 'now' and 'eternity'’. This 
seems rather harsh, even ‘short-sighted and unjustified’ as Otto Pöggeler 
notes in his article Destruction and Moment561, when we consider how central 
to the Being of Dasein Heidegger says temporality is. Dasein is constituted 
by time; temporality gives meaning to beings whose world it mediates: ‘the 
primordial ontological basis for Dasein’s existentiality is temporality’562 .  
  But ‘when Kierkegaard speaks of 'temporality'’, Heidegger says, ‘what 
he has in mind is man's 'Being-in-time' ... Time as within-time-ness knows 
only the 'now'; it never knows a moment of vision. If, however such a moment 
gets experienced in an existentiell manner, then a more primordial 
temporality has been presupposed, although existentially it has not been 
made explicit’'563 . According to Heidegger, 'Kierkegaard grasped the 
existentiell problem of existing, but the existential problematic remained … 
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foreign to him.'564 However, as Pöggeler points out, Kierkegaard develops his 
Moment from ‘the Aristotelian description of the transition from possibility to 
actuality as kinesis and does not present time as a series of now-points’. 
Furthermore, Pöggeler asserts that Heidegger ‘does not sufficiently take into 
account' the fact that Kierkegaard ‘proceeds from open Socratic questioning 
to faith’'565, so that the basis of his development of the Moment is different to 
Heidegger’s. 
   Yet, Heidegger asserts that Kierkegaard’s comprehending of the 
Moment, although itself has not been properly understood, is a ‘decisive 
point’ in his philosophy which presents human being with ‘the possibility of a 
completely new epoch of philosophy'566. We will return to discussion of this 
later in the chapter. Meanwhile, the last word here goes to Kierkegaard, who, 
in the Journals567 does say that ’it would be an absurdity [Absurditet] if a 
period of time should determine the absolute relation to the absolute, and 
that fact manifests itself as absolute, precisely by its not being dependent on 
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time, even though it is historical’568 . 
Augenblick, as ‘moment of vision’. 
  Further concepts which underpin Heidegger’s Augenblick are, as Hans 
Ruin tells us in Enigmatic Origins: Tracing the Theme of Historicity through 
Heidegger's Works, the Greek concepts of exaiphnes as sudden and radical 
change, 'a word that formerly stressed the originating moment of emergence, 
a coming into presence as though out of nothing … the sudden onset of a 
mighty fire, a sudden igniting or flaring up, a coming into the light that brings 
its own illumination with it ‘569. And kairos as the fitting time for action, with the 
sense of all the elements being present, the time, the place, and the means, 
which includes the presence of the right person. With the right conditions and 
the ‘vision’ of those who can recognise the time and hear the call, action can 
be taken and a new beginning instigated. Ruin cites Walter Bauer who 
among the four uses of this kairos distinguishes one for ‘time in general; for 
the right or profitable time; for a fixed point in time’. But most significantly for 
this chapter, he also distinguishes one as an ‘eschatological’ concept in 
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which it signifies the last day, the time of the return of the Lord. It is the 
moment when this time will come to an end’570 . Ruin also tells us that this ‘is 
perhaps the first use in Greek of the literal equivalent to the German 
Augenblicke’571 . 
 Augenblick translates into English as the ’blink’ or ‘twinkling of an eye’, 
(Ruin proposes ‘‘gaze of the eye’ but with the connotation of a twinkling’’572), 
or simply ‘moment’ in everyday use. ‘In the blink of an eye’ carries the 
dimension of an experience of temporality as fleeting and momentary, with 
the inference of something momentous occurring. More than an experience 
of a sudden event, the moment holds a change more far reaching than the 
next ‘now’ moment of time, rather a radical turn about from one ‘world’ or 
view to another becomes possible. It implies a temporal passing away or 
transcendence. For Heidegger, the futural impetus of our Being, which 
compels us through life and onto ever new projects, arises in moments, and 
there are some rare moments of a special intensity which we may seize hold 
of and exploit. There is also an intimation that only a few people can have 
access to what this Augenblick holds.  
  While one lives, a moment is just another instant in the flow of time. It 
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is necessary to feel arrested in the moment, to be astonished by the very fact 
of something's existence, by existence itself. It enables a moment to stand 
out in intensity rather than blindly passing, such a moment is not ‘given’, it 
must be sought or discovered. In the correct 'attitude', that of maintaining a 
’mood’ or ‘attunement’, a moment can be accessible. Then 'all at once' it is 
as if the atmosphere around things has changed and one can see the world 
as one has never seen it before. The term Augenblick, Heidegger says, 'must 
be understood, in the active sense as an ecstasis'573. It is necessary to realise 
that Heidegger is using this word in his particular sense, and he is not 
meaning a state of ecstasy as a visionary trance. For Heidegger it is a 
standing out from the ordinary temporal dimension in the sense of how 
temporal modes come to our attention.      
  As stated earlier, the translators of Being and Time highlight the literal 
meaning of Augenblick as ‘glance of the eye’, rendering it ‘moment of vision’, 
thus pointing to its relation to sight or insight (Einblick). The existential 
significance Heidegger gives to ‘sight’ therefore, over the other senses, is 
that which can reveal ‘accessible’ entities ‘unconcealedly in themselves’, it 
gives ‘access to entities and to Being’574. We perceive both beings and Being 
itself. Sight is ‘grounded primarily in understanding’ of which, Heidegger tells 
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us, ‘intuition’ and ‘thinking’ are both derivatives575 . 
  The ‘vision’ into Being attained in the Augenblick reveals Dasein in its 
‘ownmost’ possibilities of Being. In the Augenblick, Heidegger tells us, there 
is a possibility that, ‘just for that moment’ Dasein can be ‘in a Moment’ 
(augenblicklich) ‘for its time’. At this point in Being and Time we find the 
concept has developed into an augenblicklich state of Being. The concept 
continues to deepen along the way of Heidegger's thinking, a decade later he 
is using the term augenblicklichkeit to speak of the essence of momentary 
being itself.  In the phenomenon of the 'moment of vision', Heidegger says, 
nothing actually occurs, but it may be seen as an authentic present place 
where Dasein can 'encounter for the first time what can be 'in a time' as 
ready to hand or present at hand'576, i.e. that which can be grasped and used. 
It represents the opening of the ‘own-most’ possibilities of human being 
rather than the revelation of an eternal, universal truth; a realisation of ‘the 
fundamental possibility of Dasein’s existence proper’. Based in factical 
existence, Dasein can experience an extraordinary and ‘totalizing’ sense of 
Being. 
  A ‘moment of vision’ cannot be derived from a ordinarily present ‘now’ 
without the unity of its corresponding ‘ecstases’ of future and ‘having-been’. 
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Dasein’s ‘facticity’ includes its existence as ‘projection’, that is it has the 
possibility of 'projecting' its future possibilities and this comes fully into its 
own in the ‘moment of vision’. There is a special character of the 'Present' 
which enables the 'moment of vision', which not every present moment has. 
Heidegger exploits the German for present, gegenwart which, by 
hyphenating ‘gegen’ and ‘wart’ becomes ‘waiting-towards’. Of the three 
temporal ‘ecstases’ which Heidegger says are equiprimordial, he maintains 
that the future has priority. Dasein is ‘futural being’, leaning toward what is to 
come. It is this momentum or impetus toward change or what change might 
bring, that denotes our particular type of being as that with a propensity to 
hope. 
  There is an important paragraph in Being and Time, which 
encompasses aspects of the Augenblick pertinent to this discussion and 
which Heidegger italicises throughout: 
Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free 
for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical there by 
shattering itself against death - that is to say, only an entity which, as 
futural, is equiprimordial in the process of having-been, can, by handing 
down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own 
thrownness and be in the moment of vision for 'its time'. Only 
authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible 
something like fate - that is to say, authentic historicality.
577
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  In this compact description, Heidegger speaks of the futural character 
of Dasein, which allows sight of the limit of its finitude, this knowledge can 
bring a most significant change to Dasein’s being when the fact of its own 
death is ‘accommodated’. The effect is of ‘freeing’ Dasein to realise the 
magnitude of its ‘having’ finitude as an inheritance. This paragraph speaks of 
the way in which Dasein ‘has’ its future and its past along with it. The 
‘facticity’ of human being for Heidegger is that it is ‘thrown’ into its world, but 
can overcome this by being in the moment (augenblicklich). By Being in the 
moment of vision for 'its time', Heidegger describes Dasein’s ownmost and 
intrinsic temporal being, but also the time of the lived experience of events in 
history. Both the factual events in the continuity of history and the 
experiencing of those events constitute being-historical itself, which he 
elsewhere refers to as ‘historicity’ (Geschichte). In speaking of this, 
Heidegger differentiates between the ‘fate’ of individual Dasein, and the 
‘destiny‘ of a people. The word ‘destining’ (Geschick) as we can see is, in the 
German related to historicity and is used by Heidegger to indicate ‘the 
changing happenings and experiences of Dasein’s historicity, as they are 
revealed in their unfolding. It refers to their fitness or aptness’ to our being 
and our adapting ourselves to them, ‘That which has the character of 
destining moves, in itself, at any given time, toward a special moment that 
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sends it into another destining, in which, however, it is not simply submerged 
and lost’578. 
Heidegger ‘in time’. 
  Heidegger perceives his contemporary world to be moving 
progressively toward ‘total destruction’ both politically and spiritually
579. As 
early as 1910 - 12 Heidegger is already talking of the moment. As a 
seminarian in a Catholic institution regarding a modern world outside in its 
fascination with speed and novelty, Heidegger laments the superficiality of 
concerns of what he calls the ‘they’ by which he means the general ‘mass’ of 
people. He considers contemporary human being to have ‘become bored 
with themselves’, and characterises their way of looking at the world as mere 
inauthentic580  ‘curiosity’. If, he says, one of these superficial characters, 
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were, ‘in a moment of Christian grace, to become conscious of the Big Lie of 
his rootless life, the altars of the false gods would be shattered’
581.  In such a 
moment he asserts, what is revealed to a person might change them 
radically and turn about the direction of their inclinations and thought. Such a 
conversion entails the redemption of self from the superficial world of 
everyday concern.  
  By 1919 Heidegger, following his experiences at the front in World 
War I, is writing in a letter to his friend Elizabeth Blochmann of having 
experienced ‘inspired moments which ‘vibrate’’ or oscillate in one’s Being. A 
tone of religious mystery surrounds his description of these moments, these 
‘high tension intensities of meaningful life’582. He writes, ‘we must be able to 
live in continuity with’ them and they must not be simply noted as occurring, 
we must incorporate them into the flow of life; the clarification which comes 
through them to us must be seized upon and exploited for a genuine 
knowledge of one’s self.  Being makes itself clear to us ‘primordially’, through 
basic intuition in these moments, before theorising and discourse take over. 
  Heidegger’s impression of the decadent modern world is strengthened 
by the 1930s. A new order is necessary to shatter and replace old values 
both in politics and philosophy itself. In 1933 Heidegger makes his own 
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decision to action which will be a point of discussion and contention for the 
rest of his life and after. Having, as he claims never been politically active 
until this time he begins to consider the political situation and that of the 
universities and students as hopeless. Four months after Hitler is named 
Chancellor of the Reich, he takes up the position of rector at the university of 
Freiburg. He delivers the famous rectorial address in which he speaks of the 
‘greatness and glory of this dawn,’ of the Reich (kingdom) and states that: 
‘The Führer himself and he alone is the present and future of German reality 
and its rule’. Hitler is the man of the moment of decisive change, one of 
whom Heidegger asserted were only a few insightful men who could 
recognise this opportunity in its fullness of possibilities. National Socialism 
was the political mechanism which would redeem the German people and its 
heritage.  
  His becoming rector he claims as ‘an attempt to stem the coming 
development by means of constructive powers which were still viable’583. He 
acts as he apparently sees fit in the situation at hand, to rescue the university 
from possible interference by party functionaries, and to get back to ‘the 
rootedness of sciences in their essential ground’584 . Heidegger had hope in 
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the young students, that they were the ones who could understand the ‘alert 
readiness’ he was advocating.  ‘Academic pursuit must become once again a 
venture’585, he says. He wanted to lead ‘science’ back to its original ground in 
the ancient heritage of Greek philosophy, and thus back to a ‘rigour of 
questioning’586. 
  The apocalyptic politic of fascism appealed to Heidegger’s notion of 
heritage and tradition. In National Socialism he saw a chance of a radical 
new beginning for Germany and for the institution of the university, ‘because 
he believed that it could give rise to an internal as well as external 
regeneration of the Germans.’587 Heidegger seems to have had a sense of 
having reached a decisive moment of history with the men proper to this 
kairos present: Hitler for Germany and Heidegger himself for the university.  
Although the values of the modern world were lost one could make a new 
beginning, not from complete destruction but by reaching back to certain 
revered traditions. 
  The fascist politic is apocalyptic in style, to quote David Cooper in his 
book Thinkers of our Time. Heidegger, it sees politics: 
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‘as the arena where big, radical decisions are called for in a struggle 
against the forces responsible for a crisis of civilization - decisions that 
can only be made by the few men, or single man, with an insight into the 
caesura, the moment of destiny, that has been reached, and with the will 
and power to carry it through’
588.  
 
 In  An Introduction to Metaphysics, based on his lecture courses of 
1935, Heidegger directly relates the question of Being to the destiny of 
Europe, ‘where the destiny of the earth is being decided - while our own 
historical being-there proves to be the centre for Europe itself.’589 He says 
‘The spiritual decline of the earth is so far advanced that the nations are in 
danger of losing the last bit of spiritual energy that makes it possible to see 
the decline’. He describes ‘the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, 
the destruction of the earth, the transformation of men into a mass, the 
hatred and suspicion of everything free and creative’590. This is ‘how is it with 
being’. 
  Heidegger sees the forgetfulness of being as the cause of the decline 
of both human being and nations. But when the question is entered into, 
there can be a ‘privileged, unique relation’ between the question and the 
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questioner who is thereby opened up ‘as a whole’591. One can catch a view of 
oneself as this questioning being in the very act of its questioning. Thus, 
Heidegger asserts, ‘one kind of essent persists in coming to the fore, namely 
the men who ask the question’592. This interrelation Heidegger sees as an 
occurrence which is ‘a privileged happening that we call an event.’593 And we 
shall soon see that for Heidegger, the notion of ‘event’ has its own intrinsic 
significance to the Augenblick. This question with its ‘hidden power’, 
Heidegger says: 
looms in moments of great despair, when things tend to lose all their 
weight and all meaning becomes obscured. Perhaps it will strike but 
once like a muffled bell that rings into our life and gradually dies away. It 
is present in moments of rejoicing, when all the things around us are 
transfigured and seem to be there for the first time, as if it might be 
easier to think they are not than to understand that they are. The 
question is upon us in boredom, when we are equally removed from 
despair and joy and everything about us seems so hopelessly 
commonplace that we no longer care whether anything is or is not - and 
with this the question ‘Why are there essents rather than nothing?’ is 
evoked in a particular form.
594
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  By the 1950s the danger reaches its apotheosis in the epoch of 
modern technology whose exploitative essence, as that which imposes the 
ordering and stockpiling of resources has its detrimental effect on human 
being itself. Technology, Heidegger asserts, renders human being as merely 
another resource, or ‘standing reserve (Bestand)’
595. This is, for Heidegger, 
the reason for the endangered state of human being and its root lies in their 
having forgotten the meaning of Being. The meaning is, in fact, so deeply lost 
and completely forgotten that it is consigned to ‘oblivion’; human being no 
longer even remembers that there is anything there to remember. 
Beginnings. 
  Heidegger’s desire is to break new ground, or rather to break up the 
old ground and begin anew the thinking of Being. This, though is not a 
superficial and fleeting new, but one with the solid heritage of past traditions 
so important to Heidegger. He announces his project as a new beginning for 
philosophy marked by a return to a more original thinking regarding Being, 
one he asserts that has been lost or neglected since the Greeks considered 
it. He sees his overall project to be that of rescuing the thinking of Being from 
contemporary ways. Heidegger comes to see his philosophical task as a 
turning point, everyday real life, actual historical events of the world must 
inform philosophy. The 'facticity' of human being in the world becomes his 
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declared focus. 
  The state of upheaval in Germany between the two World Wars gave 
rise to a revolutionary impulse and a mood of eschatological expectation. 
There emerged many prophets and charismatics. Safranski describes how 
almost every major town had one or more  ‘‘saints of inflation’, ‘eager to save 
Germany or the world in the streets, in the woods, in market squares, in 
circus tents, and in the smoke-filled back rooms of bars.’596. Max Weber 
spoke against the ‘steel capsule of modern ‘rationalized’ civilization’597 , which 
robbed human being of the ability to make its own value judgments and 
decisions and left no answer to the meaning of one’s life. And yet, ‘perhaps 
only needs the person who can ask ‘the right question’.’598 
  Heidegger is a master of questioning. The mood of the time matched 
his own stance of making ever new beginnings in philosophy. His first 
postwar lecture, The Idea of Philosophy and the Worldview Problem given in 
the emergency semester of 1919, went a step further than Weber and 
addressed the very fact that we make value judgments and form views of the 
world at all. This is the famous ‘Lecturn lecture’ where Heidegger speaks of a 
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‘primary experience’, and by the method of his speaking shows that what is 
significant is the ‘primary’ or ‘original’ experience, ‘which presents itself to me 
directly, without any mental detour via a grasping of things. Living in an 
environment, it means to me everywhere and always, it is all world, it is 
worlding’599. It is necessary to reach behind the perception of the world before 
theory destroys the ’primary experience’ in its self-transparency. This 
phenomenological experience enables one to see the world as if one had just 
been born into it. Heidegger says that in this choice between theory and 
transparency one can make the decision to make a leap ‘into another world, 
or, more accurately, a leap into the world altogether’. In taking the leap of 
faith one can experience a moment which contains an ‘almost divine 
promise.’600 But what is contained in the promise remains a mystery unless 
one risks the leap.  
  Heidegger becomes known for this lecture as ‘the little magician from 
Messkirch’, and as Hannah Arendt writes on the occasion of his eightieth 
birthday, the rumour spread that: ’Thinking has come alive again; the cultural 
treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are made to speak, and it turns 
out that they produce things altogether different than it had been presumed 
that they said. There is a teacher; one can perhaps learn thinking. The secret 
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king reigned in the realm of thinking, a realm that is entirely of this world, but 
is so concealed in it that one is never quite sure whether it exists at all…’601. 
  Pöggeler, traces the Moment from the concept of destruction in 
Heidegger, whose lecture courses and ‘letters to Karl Löwith manifest 
rejection, the desire to clear away, and dissatisfaction with everything. Such 
destruction nevertheless fell in with Edmund Husserl's philosophy, which 
wanted to allow nothing but ‘the things themselves’ (die Sachen selbst) to 
speak.'
602 Safranski calls Heidegger’s provocative stance at this time with his 
talk of the ‘primal intention of life’, ‘a dadaist episode in philosophy’. He 
reacts against ‘sham profundity’ and advocates the everyday experience as 
‘primary’ and in his explications it becomes ‘mysterious and 
adventurous…’
603. 
  We might ask what it is that is revealed in this primary experience. 
Heidegger’s concern is always for the question of Being and his project is its 
constant uncovering, this very ‘questioning’ he says, ‘is the piety of 
thought’
604. On one level, in his phenomenological analytic of Being in Being 
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and Time, Heidegger uses the term ‘disclosure’ to speak of the way in which 
things come to our attention or are ‘revealed’ as that which can be grasped 
and used. But, for Dasein as an entity for whom Being is always in question, 
or as Heidegger puts it ‘is an issue’
605, there might be, in Dasein’s looking 
further as it were, the chance to catch sight of the very ‘there’ (Da) of our 
‘there-being’ (Dasein). What is revealed is a ‘vision’ of Being itself, and an 
insight into the truth of Being.  
For Heidegger, the very way that human being is in the world is a 
‘revealing’. Dasein’s course through life is not revealed as a fated ‘inevitable 
course’ but as ‘destining’ (Geschick), which describes how all things come to 
presence or are brought forth from out of Being itself and are caught sight of 
by Dasein. He posits the possibility of a ‘more original revealing’ and that 
human being can be called by ‘a more primal truth’
606. Heidegger’s project is 
to retrieve thinking from philosophy which he considers has become 
‘science’, fixed and frozen by theoretical considering which denies the ‘direct 
experience’ in which the world and Being is held open and in question. He 
wants to get back to ‘the essential ground’
607 of the thinking of Being which 
he attributes to ancient Greek philosophy, back to a ‘rigour of 
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questioning’
608which can reveal ‘accessible’ entities ‘unconcealedly in 
themselves’, by a direct ‘pre-theoretical’ disclosure it gives ‘access to entities 
and to Being’
609. This revelation of Being leads to a consideration of the 
apocalyptic elements which are becoming obvious in Heidegger’s thinking. 
The literal meaning of apocalypse, from the Greek apokalupsis, is that of 
unveiling, in the sense of revelation.  
Apocalypse ’in the Twinkling of an Eye’. 
  Ancient apocalyptic texts were motivated by socio-political situations, 
especially situations of political oppression, usually when an oppressive 
regime was coming to an end. Most of them, though not all, had an 
eschatological character.610  Apocalyptic imagery gets redeployed at various 
periods of history to speak of contemporary situations, as such it carries 
secular and historical rather than religious significance. Such a moment 
within history demands a commitment followed by whatever action is 
necessary in the situation. It is a moment full of opportunity for humankind to 
fulfil its destiny. The urgency of a contemporary situation fills the present with 
critical significance.      
  In 1909 Albert Schweitzer in The Quest for the Historical Jesus, 
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describes the contemporary Jewish world of Jesus as one well acquainted 
with suppression and dominated by a foreign power. Their holy books, he 
says, ‘were almost all concerned not with the mysteries of internal prayer or 
personal salvation but with the promises made by God that he would deliver 
the nation from this captivity or that’611. Their hope was toward a free and 
peaceful Jewish state, not that of individual bliss in an otherworldly future life, 
but of the present Jewish Society living in peace obeying its own laws and 
worshipping its own God. The community would be altered almost beyond 
recognition, but on earth and in time. It is in Christianity that the apocalyptic 
expectation changes to that of the appearance of a new spiritual kingdom 
following the eschatological event of Last Things. Brought about by the direct 
intervention of God, it initiates an inner, spiritual transformation of an 
individual.  
  The event of the moment itself, according to Corinthians 15:52, arrives 
‘ in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and 
the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed’. This phrase 
as a visual and temporal metaphor both names and describes the concept. 
Such a figurative expression points to its harbouring meaning in excess of a 
mere moment in time, it describes the moment of something happening 
suddenly and swiftly, bringing about a change which is momentous and 
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decisive. Existential analysis uncovers ‘the conception of man’ which 
underlies the eschatological message’ and affirms the ‘relevance of individual 
human will and decision’
612. The urgency caused by the apocalyptic message 
comes to concern one’s individual decision, one might live not ‘as though the 
kingdom of God is at hand’ but in order not to miss a decisive moment in life. 
This is one focus of Heidegger’s moment, but it also unfolds into the decision 
which concerns the destiny of a whole people and ultimately to become the 
site of decision or will, as that which defines the essence of beings as a 
whole. 
  The different understanding of apocalypse in Judaism and Christianity 
give on to different concepts of redemption
613. The Christian view has a 
future-temporal characteristic which concerns the spiritual salvation of 
chosen human beings leading to their eternal life. The other is of a 
transformation of the world as it is known to bring about a new historical 
epoch in the present, a return to a remembered, or imagined, idyllic life. 
Although often used interchangeably, there is an important distinction 
between redemption and salvation. On the one hand, to redeem is to claim 
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back what one is owed or what one has given, such as a promise, something 
that one once was, in a sense, in possession of. In terms of a promise it 
entails the fulfilment of an obligation; one has a part to play. To ‘deem’ is to 
judge something to be a certain way, to make an assessment and therefore 
to, as it were, ‘re-deem’, suggests a reassessment of some ‘situation’. 
  On the other hand, salvation is to gain what one does not already 
have, or be extricated from a situation into a wholly new one. This is more 
suggestive of a spiritual transformation in which an individual is changed 
utterly, transformed in its spiritual being and transposed to a heavenly world. 
Considering this difference, the transformation indicated in the thinking of 
Heidegger is of an inner character though not spiritual, what he advocates is 
a return to an originary and primordial way of thinking Being. As such there is 
a redemption of the concept from neglect and through proper engagement 
with the thinking of Being, a redemption of an individual to an originary way 
of experiencing Being itself. 
The Eschatological Moment. 
   In Christianity the eschatological moment as the event of ‘Last things’ 
offers transcendence, it heralds the day of judgement following which the 
spiritual kingdom of God in eternity replaces the earthly one of man in time. 
This kingdom takes its place before us in the future, the phrase ‘the future 
life’ can be taken to refer to the eternal life after death. Heidegger comes to 
speak of the eternal in relation to the Augenblick, not as a realm separate  
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from this world, but relating to the way in which Dasein can bridge the 
‘cleavage’ between temporality as ordinary everyday being ‘in time’ and the 
transcendent ‘Temporality of Being’
614. For Heidegger, the concept of the 
Augenblick, is central to his ontology, in such a moment human being can 
transcend its ordinary, everyday temporal situation. Such a transcendence 
for Heidegger is not to another spiritual realm but to an experience of Being 
itself as a ‘pre-ontological’ state of Dasein’s constitution. 
  While eschatology in a religious sense usually refers to ‘end’ as the 
ultimate termination of the world and the end of history, the word ‘end’ as 
‘teleology’ refers to a ‘goal’ or purpose. Heidegger’s Augenblick is not an 
eschatological end of the world, nor is it concerned with the teleology of 
history. It is about human, historical being acting to take their part in the 
events of history and seizing a decisive moment. Such a moment marks an 
‘end of time’ in Heidegger, in the sense of the experience of a passing away 
of ordinary everyday temporality which, he says, is ‘the meaning of Being of 
that entity which we call Dasein’615. The temporal world as continuity is taken 
over by a unity, time as we know it passes away.  Although we might think of 
the end of a human being in death as a terminus, we can interpret an ‘end of 
time’ as referring to their end in finite time, allowing for an eternal element of 
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Dasein. The concept of apocalypse carries a sense of urgency, the critical 
present holds an anxious anticipation of change, an expectation of 
transcendence of the time or epoch, when one situation gives way to 
another, entirely new one. The counter to this anxiety is the hope that the 
event of the change’s coming to pass will afford a redemption through 
whatever the change reveals. It is the very situation of impending destruction 
which itself gives rise to the possibility of its transcendence. 
The Authentic Present. 
  For Heidegger, the present can assume a special character which not 
every present moment has, that of being ‘authentic’. An authentic 'Present' 
cannot be derived from a ordinarily present ‘now’ of time, he tells us, without 
the unity of its corresponding ‘ecstases’ of future and ‘having-been’. Of these 
three ‘temporal ecstases’, Heidegger asserts, the future has priority for 
Dasein whose ‘facticity’
616 includes its existence as ‘projection’. This means 
that  Dasein  has the possibility of 'projecting' its own future possibilities. It is 
this ‘futural’
617 being of Dasein which compels us through life and onto ever 
new projects and gives us an expectation of change and a propensity for 
hope. In expressing this special sense of the present, Heidegger exploits the 
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German for present (gegenwart) which, by hyphenating ‘gegen’ and ‘wart’ 
becomes ‘waiting-towards’. The ‘now’ of everyday temporality  takes on a 
transcendent quality as a unity of past, present and future which stand out in 
anticipation. From here, Heidegger elevates his concept of the Moment or 
Augenblick, ‘understood, in the active sense as an ecstasis'
618 and from 
which can come an experience of a ‘more primordial temporality’
619, that 
which is fundamental to Dasein. 
  As we have said, the figurative expression ‘in the blink or twinkling of 
an eye’ points to its harbouring meaning in excess of a mere moment in time, 
rather it describes a sudden and swift ‘happening’ which brings about 
momentous and decisive change. The moment comes, according to the St. 
Paul’s First Letter to the Thessalonians, ‘like a thief in the night’, it cannot be 
brought about by human actions but only by the direct intervention of God. 
Pöggeler, in Destruction and Moment tells us that Heidegger’s concern is 
with 'the philosophical indication that life-experience in general is factical, 
historical, and thereby oriented to the unavailable moment beyond our 
control.'
620  Heidegger asserts that in the ‘moment of vision’ ‘nothing can 
occur’, it is rather the site of ‘an authentic Present or waiting-towards’
621. As 
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Kierkegaard points out, there is no discernible moment of change we can 
identify as being when one state of being becomes another, or when 
something comes into or goes out of existence.  
  In the event of a personal moment of revelation, the reason is 
confounded by the paradox of the infinite meeting the finite. This is the state 
of perplexity which Kierkegaard asserts is the proper point of departure for 
philosophising, it is ‘with explaining the wonderful’
622 he tells us, that 
philosophy began. Heidegger echoes this in his insistence that a questioning 
stance is required for thinking, and for the direct ‘pre-theoretical’ disclosure in 
which  Dasein catches ‘sight’ of its ‘there’. The translators of Being and Time 
render the word Augenblick as ‘moment of vision’ and as such the term is 
necessarily related to ‘sight’ or ‘insight’ (Einblick). For Heidegger, what is 
attained in the Augenblick is the ‘vision’ into Being which reveals Dasein in its 
ownmost possibilities of Being, and through which Dasein can experience an 
extraordinary and ‘totalizing’ sense of Being. Yet some kind of action on the 
part of a particular individual is necessary to this moment.  
The Man who asks the Question. 
  What is needed is a person fitted to the task, who can risk meeting its 
challenge and seize its possibilities. Rowland informs us that apocalypse 
‘seeks to offer an understanding which bypasses human reason by being 
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grounded in the direct disclosure through vision or audition’623 . Particular 
individuals have visions which open ‘ultimate possibilities’, they are given 
insight hidden to others and thereby have a privileged role to play in history. 
Schweitzer sees Jesus, as ‘a man of his time’ who shares the beliefs of other 
Jews living in the constant expectation that the world is about to be remade, 
and who has the ‘vision’ to realise that ‘now’ is the time. For Heidegger, in 
relation to the Augenblick, there must be a person who is of a sufficiently 
courageous disposition to take up the possibilities which the Augenblick 
presents. Such a one must be receptive to the possibilities and in a state of 
readiness, which he describes in his concepts of ‘attunement’ (Gestimmtheit) 
and ‘resoluteness’ (Entschlossenheit). Jesus, Schweitzer says, understood 
himself to be the Messiah
624, and there is a sense in which Heidegger sees 
himself as one who can redeem the present disastrous situation in 
philosophy and thinking, which he asserts, underlies the political and social 
empasse of his contemporary world.  
  In terms of Heidegger’s own actual historical situation, a decisive 
moment with the person proper to it appears for him in 1933 when he sees 
Hitler as the august man of the moment. In his rectoral address at the 
university of Freiburg, he speaks of the ‘greatness and glory of this dawn,’ of 
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the Reich (kingdom) and states that: ‘The Führer himself and he alone is the 
present and future of German reality and its rule’
625. Hitler is one of whom 
Heidegger asserts are only a few ‘authentic and superior’ men who have ‘an 
insight into the caesura, the moment of destiny’ and ‘the will and power to 
carry it through’
626, those who can meet this opportunity in its fullness of 
possibilities and make the ‘radical decisions’ required. Fascism appeals to 
Heidegger’s notion of heritage and tradition but also demands a look away 
from an idyllic past and toward the future with a new energy and will.  
  At the same time as Heidegger sees Hitler as the Messianic figure for 
Germany he sees himself as the one who can rescue the university and 
return philosophy to the kind of questioning thinking in which, he says, there 
can be a ‘privileged, unique relation’ between the question and the 
questioner who is, he says, thereby opened up ‘as a whole’
627. One can 
catch a view of oneself as this questioning being in the very act of 
questioning and can ‘unlock’ what forgetfulness of Being has hidden. Thus, 
Heidegger asserts, ‘one kind of essent persists in coming to the fore, namely 
                                            
625 ONLY A GOD CAN SAVE US: Der Speigel’s Interview With Martin Heidegger, op cit, p. 271 
 
626 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics , op cit, p. 26 
627 Ibid, p. 4  
260 
the men who ask the question’
628, those who have a certain intelligence 
required to point their efforts toward the ‘psycho-spiritual process’
629 of 
fundamental inquiry.  
  For Heidegger, the metaphysical question of why there are beings at 
all, is hand in hand with the question of ‘how’ human beings are in the world, 
'how things stand'
630 with them in their situation. Being ‘inauthentically’ 
engrossed in or ‘lost’ in the world is the usual, unquestioning mode of 
Dasein’s existence, part of its ‘facticity’.  Heidegger uses the term 
‘irresoluteness’ to describe ‘the way things are in the ‘they’’
631. An aspect of 
this 'facticity', then, is that human being exists as 'thrownness’(Geworfenheit), 
it is ‘thrown’ Heidegger says, into the everyday world and also from the past 
toward the future. Heidegger describes this ‘thrownness’ as being in a 
condition of 'falling'
632 into the everyday ways of ‘idle talk, curiosity and 
ambiguity’
633, it can be understood to mean a ‘falling away’ in which Dasein 
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avoids its authenticity (Eigentlichkeit).  Lost in its everyday concerns, in an 
inauthentic present,Heidegger refers to this as ‘falling’ that is, the way in 
which Dasein usually is in the everyday world into which it is ‘thrown’. Being 
gets ‘taken along’, yet ‘never arrives at any other ecstatical horizon of its own 
accord, unless it gets brought back from its lostness by a resolution’. The 
everyday mode of the present is ‘the counter-phenomenon at the opposite 
extreme form the moment of vision.
634 As Heidegger says, 'Dasein can 
undergo a dull suffering’ and seek to lose itself further. But, ‘In the moment of 
vision and often just 'for that moment', existence can even gain the mastery 
over the 'everyday'’ though it ‘can never extinguish it'
635. This may in a sense 
point to a redemption of Dasein from the superficial world of everyday 
concern and indicate a momentary experience of the overcoming of its 
temporality. 
Attunement (Gestimmtheit). 
  The resonances of a moment which Heidegger experienced, 
foreshadowed by grace, in turn give onto his concept of ‘attunements’ or a 
profound ‘mood’ (Stimmung), which can allow the sudden and unexpected 
intense moments of experience to yield an insight. Heidegger’s concept of 
‘attunement’ is a heightened ‘waiting towards’ the moment, the event that 
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might occur, suddenly and decisively in the blink of an eye. In a continuation 
of the understanding of the authentic Present as ‘waiting-towards’, there are 
underlying ‘moods’ of Dasein which Heidegger describes as a ‘heightened 
waiting-towards’. These existential moods Heidegger calls ‘attunements’ and 
they can afford the possibility of a transcendence of the temporal domain. 
Dasein’s being ‘attuned’ is necessary to the experiencing of the Augenblick; 
when one is properly ‘attuned’ a moment can be anticipated. The main 
attunements are Anxiety (Angst636), derived from Kierkegaard’s ‘dread’, which 
occurs when Dasein confronts its own finitude, and Profound Boredom 
(Langeweile). As established by Kierkegaard, anxiety, unlike fear, has no 
object, it is an existential mode. Dasein 'flees' Heidegger says in the face of 
that threat which is grounded in anxiety, into an absorption in the everyday 
world of its concern, a 'dark' state of being which disallows insight or an 
attunement to the 'moment of vision'. 
 Langeweile, along with a sensation which might be described as the 
drawing away of, or loss of meaning of the world, also carries the connotation 
of an altered temporal experience of the present, a ‘lengthening of the 
while’
637. It can take hold of us, Heidegger says, ‘in an instant like flash of 
lightning’. In this instant the whole expanse of the entire time of Dasein is 
united there, not divided into past and future. 'Neither merely the present nor 
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merely the past nor merely the future, nor indeed all these reckoned together 
but rather their unarticulated unity in the simplicity of the unity of their horizon 
all at once.'
638The temporal experience in boredom is of a lengthening of the 
while, a ‘stretched 'now'. When Langeweile is awakened the while is long and 
it must be kept long in order to attune Dasein, not allowed to sink back into 
being that ‘sleeping giant’ at Dasein’s core. We must 'let it become awake', in 
order to 'give it space and freedom'639,  it attunes us if we do not try to mitigate 
it but allow it come upon us. The word ‘ennui’ indicates the weary 
dispiritedness and loss of world intimated in this concept.  
  Heidegger stresses over and over how the attunements belong to a 
deep existential level of one's Being, they refer to the state one is in, or 'How 
things stand with us', what 'takes hold of us’640 : 
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‘Boredom is the entrancement of the temporal horizon, an entrancement 
which lets the moment of vision belonging to temporality vanish. In thus 
letting it vanish, boredom impels entranced Dasein into the moment of 
vision as the properly authentic possibility of its existence, an existence 
only possible in the midst of beings as a whole, and within the horizon of 
entrancement, their telling refusal  of themselves as a whole.’
641    
 
  We might think of this 'entrancement' as a being overwhelmed or put 
out of action, in a sense Dasein is 'fascinated'. There is an etymological link 
in the German between this being fascinated and 'taken back', perhaps we 
can say 'one is taken aback'. One is taken back from, and taken aback by the 
worldly possibilities found in that rigid past, present and future. This  
entrancement 'lets the moment of vision belonging to temporality vanish'. 
This vanishing is the disappearance in such a moment, of Dasein's 
awareness of the seeming shortness of its existence within ordinary 
temporality. It is not the instantaneous sense of 'in a flash' of vision.  Dasein 
in this state of entrancement is thrust into the moment of vision, it cannot be 
otherwise, because it is the state of authenticity in which Dasein can glance 
at and grasp its ownmost possibilities in its essential Being. It arises from 
Dasein's Being-in-the-world which includes other beings, yet it elevates itself 
from temporal strictures and worldly concerns. The refusal or 'turning away 
from' is 'telling' or revealing of Dasein's self as an authentic 'one' amongst the 
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'they', now properly 'placed' regarding its ownmost possibilities. Dasein balks 
in the face of being swallowed back into in the 'they', and the everyday world.  
  In letting ourselves become attuned to these resonances, Heidegger 
maintains, a spark of illumination might leap across the gap in our Being. 
When this boredom comes it is not related to any particular situation or 
occasion it can erupt 'out of the blue'
642. It 'transposes us into a realm of 
power' over which we have no power'
643. It is of an 'overpowering nature', so 
that it would be impossible to struggle against it, he says, or to try to pass the 
time because ‘it has already transformed Dasein'
644. 
 These  ‘attunements’
645 allow the sudden and unexpected moments of 
experience to yield an insight, to ‘sound’ in one’s Being, then 'all at once' one 
might see the world as one has never seen it before. An attunement can be 
of an 'overpowering nature' so that it would be impossible to struggle against 
it, because ‘it has already transformed Dasein.'
646 ‘Dasein is ‘entranced’ by 
the long while, there is an apocalyptic sense of this word, that of ‘being 
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snatched out of the world that is about to pass away’
647 . In a translator’s 
note in Being and Time, it is pointed out that this powerlessness (Ohnmacht), 
can also suggest a visionary’s ‘mystical trance’
648. Heidegger describes this 
further as a state of 'resolute rapture' in which Dasein regards its ownmost 
possibilities revealed in a 'Situation', and holds onto them in anticipation of 
what they may disclose. Heidegger’s use of the word ‘rapture’ (Entrückung649) 
strongly suggests a state of being carried out of oneself, but again it is 
important to understand that Heidegger is not referring to being transported 
to a heavenly realm. What is disclosed to Dasein most forcibly in terms of its 
future potentialities of Being, is its ‘ownmost’ possibility of death. Dasein is 
carried away toward its possibilities. 
 As  Being-toward-death  Dasein carries, in Anxiety, an underlying 
anticipation of this most certain of events. In the face of the threat of loss of 
being the meaning and significance of the world and the situation which 
surrounds being as a whole drains away. In authentic attunement, it is as if 
one is released, or freed to gaze at death and comprehend it as the ultimate 
possibility for one's being. Dasein’s own death hovers in its horizon, as a 
‘possibility that it has inherited’. In grasping and ‘accommodating’ the finitude 
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of existence, Heidegger says, Dasein is rescued from the possibilities that 
are closest, the inauthentic ‘comfortableness, shirking, and taking things 
lightly’
650. Dasein’s 'facticity' or knowing of itself as a self, concerned with its 
own Being as 'being-there' allows it to catch sight of the moment of its own 
death. We become astonishingly aware that this certain event is for us.  
  In making itself ‘free’ for, or ‘accommodating’ death Dasein both 
inherits and chooses this possibility. In a sense Dasein ‘hands down to itself’ 
this possibility as ‘heritage’. Dasein cannot usually know, however, when to 
expect this moment; and neither can it, when the moment does come 
actually experience its own ‘demise’ (das Ableben). Dasein can never ‘have’ 
this moment, it is ‘unavailable’. In using the word ‘demise’ rather than ‘end’ 
Heidegger keeps the concept of death from being a final closing down of 
Dasein, it must, Heidegger asserts, be recognised as a state of Being
651 . He 
differentiates between the term demise as the ‘living out’ of human being and 
‘dying’ (das Sterben). Dasein’s  ‘being-towards-death, includes more than 
being-mortal; it is an aspect of disclosedness which discloses to dasein that it 
is  a mortal disclosedness, that it carries its end within it. Dasein, then, is not 
a mortality which happens to be self-conscious but in virtue of its very being it 
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is a mortal self-disclosedness’
652
. Human being stands between its origin and 
its demise at any given moment but cannot access the experience of its 
actual beginning or end, such moments are unavailable. 
  In terms of Being, Dasein as being-toward-death has its existence in 
the certainty of an inevitable event beyond its control, by its demise it may 
not have fulfilled its goal, the moment might come suddenly and rob it of the 
chance to take up further possibilities. Dasein has its Being-in-the World, 
Heidegger says, both for the ‘fortunate’ circumstances which ‘come its way’ 
and for the 'cruelty of accidents’
653. Dasein is situated in-between and 
including the two limit situations of birth and death. It cannot experience 
these absolutes as events and neither can it experience the Augenblick itself 
as fully present moment. Dasein is oriented in a certain way toward its Being 
by carrying the certainty of its own death with it.  
Resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). 
  ‘The term irresoluteness expresses the way things are in the ‘they’’654 
Heidegger tells us. It remains dependent on the ‘they’ and the world, and is 
dominant in the same relation as authentic to inauthentic. ‘The understanding 
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of this is one of the things that a resolution discloses’655 . The counter to 
inauthentic irresoluteness is ‘resoluteness’, not as practical ‘behaviour’ but a 
decisive mode of being-there, in which one lets oneself be summoned out of 
the lostness in the ‘they’, into a kind of existing which, Heidegger says, is 
‘primordial and authentic’. It is only through resoluteness that the 
attunements of which we have spoken can, as Heidegger puts it, ‘mount 
authentically’ in Dasein:  the anxiety in the face of finitude and the ‘rapture’ 
born out Langeweile. In resoluteness Dasein’s current factical Situation is 
disclosed to it, it is brought into and gives itself to the situation in a ‘free 
resolving’, that is, it holds itself open for current factical possibilities. It is a 
decisive mode of being-there, one lets oneself be summoned out of the 
lostness in the ‘they’, into ‘a kind of existing which is primordial and 
authentic’.  
  In being resolute, Dasein can retrieve itself from being engrossed in 
the everyday and hold a moment in authentic presence as the Augenblick.  In 
this state of 'resolute rapture' Dasein regards its ownmost possibilities 
revealed in a 'Situation', and holds onto them in anticipation of what they may 
disclose. Resoluteness refers to the loyalty one has to one's decision to 
grasp and make one's own those possibilities. So intimate is this relation that 
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‘Dasein itself is this revealing and Being-revealed.’656 ‘Resoluteness 
constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own Self’ and this loyalty, Heidegger 
says, is revering the repeatable possibilities of existence.‘657 For Heidegger, 
authentic historicality ‘understands history as the ‘recurrence’ of the 
possible’, a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it, as ‘resolute 
repetition’. At the site of the moment does recurrence save Dasein from the 
limit situation of its own death, its momentary fleeting existence owned in 
broader perspective as a culmination of past and future, death and birth? 
  Heidegger’s extension of this concept as ‘anticipatory resoluteness’ 
describes the ‘futural’ impetus of Dasein. But it also refers to Dasein’s way of 
existing authentically in understanding itself concerning its ‘potentiality-for-
Being’- that it can take over of its factical ‘there’ and the ‘individualization’
658 
into which is has been ‘thrown’. But this anticipatory, futural impetus of 
Dasein is only possible in a being within a present which has as part of that 
being accepted a past, or ‘has been’. Such a present held in authentic 
temporality, Heidegger says, is the ‘moment of vision’.  ‘It is in the 
counteraction to fleeing, when Dasein turns away from the everyday in 
attunement, which can allow a moment of vision’ which brings Dasein back 
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from thrownness.   
  ’Anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming-back to one’s 
ownmost Self.’
659 By being properly attuned and resolute, Heidegger tells us, 
there is a possibility, that Dasein can be augenblicklich. As an adjective in 
German, this word describes a state of Being of Dasein, it is translated in 
Being and Time as being ‘in the Moment’. Heidegger says that Dasein can be 
‘in the moment of vision for 'its time’’
660, this refers to Dasein’s ‘being-
historical’ which comprises both the ownmost and intrinsic temporal 
existence within which one might experience a personal and decisive 
Moment, and also one’s actual time in history, or one’s epoch.  
The Saving Power. 
 In  An Introduction to Metaphysics, based on his lecture courses of 
1935, Heidegger comes to see the inquiry into Being as concerning not only 
Dasein and the actual events of historical existence but the very ‘spiritual 
destiny of the Western world’.
661 Man’s forgetfulness of Being is due to 
something inherent in Western metaphysics from the beginning. Now is the 
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time Heidegger asserts, that it is precisely ‘today’
662 that the situation has 
arisen or come to a culmination point, that we have both ‘fallen away from’ 
the meaning of Being and that it is necessary to find ‘our way back’ to it in 
order to grasp and understand the truth regarding the historical being of 
Germany. Heidegger sees Europe at this time as a nation, ‘in a great pincers’ 
between Russia and America which he considers to be metaphysically the 
same ‘in regard to their world character and their relation to the spirit’. They 
display ‘the same dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted 
organisation of the average man’
663 .  Europe however, although a danger to 
itself because it is without ‘vision’ is, Heidegger asserts, metaphysically 
superior and has therefore an ‘historical mission’
664 to grasp the opportunity 
for change. 
  Could it be, Heidegger asks, that oblivion regarding Being ‘was the 
most powerful and most central cause’
665 of the decline of these nations. 
They have fallen prey to the ‘sway’ of technology and its reduction of ‘the 
human spirit on earth’
666. Heidegger’s later questioning in The Question 
Concerning Technology, regarding the essence of modern technology aims 
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at opening ‘our human existence’
667 to this essence
668, out of which comes 
the type of revealing which Heidegger calls ‘Enframing’ (Ge-stelt). The 
‘monstrousness that reigns’
669 as a result of ‘Enframing’, he tells us, 
represents the most extreme danger: ‘the danger as such’. Due to the 
insidious nature of this essence of technology, human being itself is 
‘endangered’ and comes to a ‘fall’ where he must take himself as merely 
another resource, or ‘standing-reserve’ (Bestand). Arendt tells us 
‘technology’s very nature is the will to will, namely, to subject the whole world 
to its domination and rulership, whose natural end can only be total 
destruction’
670 . The counter to this danger, Heidegger tells us, comes 
ambiguously from out of this very ‘Enframing’. Due to ‘the mystery of all 
revealing’
671, the essence of technology contains also a ‘saving power’ and 
the closer human being is to the danger, Heidegger asserts, the ‘more 
brightly … the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more 
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questioning we become’
672. The danger is not counterable by human activity, 
the action which Heidegger refers to here is that of thinking. Arendt explains, 
that Heidegger’s concept of will comes to refer to ‘thinking that obeys the call 
of Being’ and to think in this way is to ‘say the unspoken word of Being’ and it 
is this which constitutes authentic ‘doing’, a doing which transcends ‘all 
human acts’
673.  
  Heidegger, it transpires, is mistaken in the redemption he expects of 
National Socialism, which harbours the very opposite of a saving power. 
There is, however, a redemption to be found within Heidegger’s ontology 
both in the sense of his hopes for a return to a proper engagement with the 
concept and in the allowing of a redemptive experience of Being itself for 
human being. From out of the ‘danger as such’ comes the ‘saving power’, 
and from out of oblivion, Being itself calls as if it had always already been 
there.  
Recurrence and the Event (Ereignis) of Being itself. 
  In his later work on Nietzsche, Heidegger utilises the concept of 
Eternal Return or Recurrence of the Same. This thought he says, as strange 
and ‘burdensome’ as it is, must be preserved, because it ‘pertains to the truth 
concerning beings as a whole’ and ‘as such has the fundamental character of 
                                            
672 Ibid, p. 35 
673 Arendt, op cit, p. 175  
275 
the will to power’ and ‘can as a whole only be eternal return of the same or 
vise versa’674 .
 He understands it as the ‘metaphysical expression for’ ‘the way 
in which the whole of beings comes to presence’, its essential occurrence. In 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, as we have seen, Zarathustra, from a position of 
being in the gateway can see the two eternal roads instead of a single road 
one way into the future. Being augenblicklich or ‘in the Moment’ is to be 
resolute in that moment of meeting. Heidegger says that this ‘is the authentic 
content of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence’, ‘eternity is in the Moment, that 
the moment is not the fleeting “now”, not an instant of time whizzing by a 
spectator, but the collision of future and past.  Here the Moment comes to 
itself.  It determines how everything recurs.’
675 As Nietzsche establishes, the 
revelatory experience of the gateway moment itself also recurs
676. In the 
gateway past and future clash but only for the one Heidegger says, who 
himself is the now, the one who is pressed by the urgency of decision, who 
stands in the moment and takes their part in its event. It is only by entering 
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the gateway that the dialectic of Recurrence is available.  
  In partaking of the insight of Eternal Return and overcoming death by 
affirming life, one is taking part in ‘the beingness of beings as a whole’, 
Heidegger says, and this is to will.  ‘Beings as a whole’, knows no ends to 
which it moves because it has no ends outside itself and is ‘continually 
underway toward its essence’, it is ‘end-less’. Yet it is finite and it has limits 
because it cannot be, as Heidegger puts it, ‘infinitely expanding’, ‘it cannot be 
new unto infinity’. We cannot find any purpose or ultimate value of ‘beings as 
a whole’ because it is ‘value-less’, in the same sense in which we say 
something is priceless. When we determine a total value we give it conditions 
which it must adhere to, but this is to destroy the notion of its being absolute, 
and so questioning towards values must always remain questioning. It is 
Heidegger says ‘beyond human capacities’677 to discover absolute values. 
That there are ‘eternal truths’, Heidegger asserts, ‘will not be adequately 
proved until someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been 
and will be for all eternity’678. 
  Heidegger asserts that Dasein by being resolute takes over ‘that entity 
which it already is, and that ‘In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth 
into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. If Being-as-having-been is authentic, 
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we call it ‘repetition’ (Wiederholung)’. ‘The resoluteness which comes back to 
itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of 
existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly - 
that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-
there.’679  Heidegger thinks of ‘Return’ as a retrieving of former possibilities, 
which are ‘handed down’ or ‘transmitted’ and are in a sense constantly there. 
Heidegger refers in a note to ‘the traditional conception of ‘eternity’ as 
signifying the ‘standing ‘now’’ (nunc stans), as ‘‘constant’ presence-at-
hand’680.  He says, ‘If God’s eternity can be ‘construed’ philosophically, it may 
be understood only as a more primordial temporality which is ‘infinite’’681. 
Further to our earlier discussion of the ‘now’ as starting point for the 
Augenblick, we can take into account Heidegger’s comment that ‘even Plato, 
who directed his glance in this manner at time as a sequence of ‘nows’ 
arising and passing away, had to call time ‘the image of eternity’.  ‘The ‘nows’ 
pass away … The ‘nows’ come along …’682 yet in their changing they are also 
‘self- same’, and therefore, ‘as this thing which changes’, Heidegger says, ‘it 
                                            
679 Ibid, p. 437 
 
680 Ibid, p.499, note xiii 
 
681 Ibid, p.499, note xiii 
 
682 Heidegger, Being and Time, H423, p.  
  
278 
simultaneously shows its own constant presence’
683. In the Augenblick comes 
the revelation of human being as an entity which understands itself as 
coming into and passing out of existence, partaking for ‘a time’ in the 
‘transcendens’
684 that is Being.   
  This revelation, paradoxically, ‘comes out of Being itself
685 and by 
1936-8, in Contributions to Philosophy (On Enowning), the Augenblick has 
come to be seen as historically determined in a further way, ‘not by the 
historicality of Dasein as in Being and Time but by historicality understood as 
the happening of being itself, to which human actions are responsive’
686. 
Rather than the ‘resolute openness’ of the Augenblick belonging to Dasein, it 
is Dasein which ‘always already and in advance’ belongs to the Augenblick 
as the originary site of the disclosure of a world and of the historical destiny 
of the event of being’
687. In Being and Time Heidegger tells us that in 
disclosure Dasein ‘appropriates’ or makes its own what it gains sight of 
through circumspection. This appropriation now emerges as the 'event' 
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(ereignis) itself, the very occurrence of things coming to presence, 'the event 
of presencing itself'688. The word Ereignis is rendered as ‘enowning’ by the 
translators of Contributions and as such carries a sense of 'an un-possessive 
owning’689, perhaps a belonging with rather than to.  What 'eventuates' in 
ereignis is the enactment of decision, though not in reference to individual 
actions. What resolute action brings to ‘Presence’ is a disclosure of ‘Being in 
its finitude and singularity’ and as such cannot itself become something 
present but remains inaccessible to theoretical apprehension. ‘Enowning’ 
also conveys a sense of being brought into a certain ‘condition’, of taking 
responsibility for and carry out one’s obligations to one’s self. Dasein, in 
achieving authenticity might be said to ‘come into its own’. The terms 
‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity,’ Heidegger tells us refer to ‘an ‘ecstatic’ 
relation of the essence of man to the truth of Being’
690. 
  As Heidegger says, nothing can happen in the Augenblick but an 
authentic ‘waiting towards’, resolute rapture and being entranced allow a 
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sight of eternity not as the linear Christian future but, as Pöggeler says, ‘in 
terms of eternity as the passing which again and again has its hour but is 
never at our beck and call’. In this way human being becomes a 'momentary 
one''691. In the Augenblick there is no actual content we should be seeking 
until the possibilities it holds come to presence for us. Empty of content but 
full of possibilities it is everything and nothing as Kierkegaard has 
established. ‘Eternity’ represents the potential possibilities which might arise 
in any moment. The Augenblick is nowhere for it is locatable neither in a now 
of time nor a here or there within the horizon of our temporal being; yet it is 
everywhere in the horizon of Dasein as there-Being. In the Augenblick, 
Dasein can become augenblicklich, but in Contributions Heidegger now 
speaks of the essence of Dasein’s being itself as augenblicklichkeit, which 
has been translated by George J. Seidel in  Musing with Kierkegaard as 
‘momentous momentariness’692.  
A New Epoch. 
  An event is that which happens or eventuates and significant events 
can gather their time around them to define an ‘epoch’ of history: 
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‘All essential philosophical questioning is necessarily untimely. This is so 
because philosophy is always projected far in advance of its time, or 
because it connects the present with its antecedent, with what initially 
was. Philosophy always remains a knowledge which not only cannot be 
adjusted to a given epoch but on the contrary imposes its measure upon 
its epoch’
693
.
 
 
  Heidegger says that Kierkegaard’s initial comprehending of 
Augenblick ‘gives onto the possibility of new epoch of philosophy’. In the 
realm of thinking, if we can catch sight of ourselves as augenblicklichkeit, we 
can be brought into a condition which transcends temporality as 
everydayness and as the linear future temporal notion of eternity. In 
Contributions Heidegger speaks of the ‘restoration of beings’; Being is 
elevated, not to some quasi-divinity, it is not Heidegger’s intention to posit 
divinity within human being, nor to suggest that Being is a god, the gods or 
God, for all this is nothing in light of the astonishing experience of the fact of 
Being itself. 
  Early on Heidegger speaks of the need to find ‘transcendent values of 
life’ underpinned by tradition and heritage. The ‘false gods of the modern 
world’ must be ‘shattered’, but what must replace them? An experience of the 
site of the Augenblick, Heidegger asserts, can transform human beings into 
'the coming future ones' (zu-künftigen). We might hear in this an echo of 
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Nietzsche’s Ubermensch. The traditional values which Heidegger considers 
to have fallen away in the modern world will appear anew for them. These 
coming future ones, he says will ‘receive the hints of the last god’, and be 
prepared for ‘the passing of the last god' (Götterung)'694. There is a prophetic 
quality to these ideas, those who hint of gods are prophets. And the last gods 
who pass, what do they give way to? If apocalypse refers to the decisive 
moment of a change of epoch, perhaps Heidegger is heralding a new world 
where human being no longer seeks otherworldly or spiritual transformation, 
or looks to a god as absolute value. 
  Iin his developing analytic of Being, Heidegger also indicates a future 
move from the ‘Being of time’ to ‘the time of Being’. The Augenblick, as the 
crux of temporal existence must lie at the heart of this move. It is in the 
closing pages of Contributions that Heidegger extends his thinking in regard 
to Gods: ‘[Gods] not from within ‘religion’; not as something extant, nor as an 
expedient of man; rather [theycome] from our of be-ing …’695 The ‘necessity 
of being ‘ is the highest question relating to the ‘freedom of man’, man 
‘thrusts’ what is essential and own-most to him into ‘ab-groundness’, 
because its home is in the most intimate and closest aspect of him. The 
question now becomes ‘impossible’, ‘then en-owning is, for a moment, 
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enowning. This moment is the time of being.’696  What is nearest, ‘the simplest 
intimacy of its en-ownment’, is the furthest from theoretical understanding. 
The Augenblick as an immediate and intimate experience is the experience 
of this central paradox, that the moment is time in its closest relation to us, 
our Being. A realisation of this in one’s depths can only be a fleeting glimpse, 
not staying to be analysed. When ‘en-owning is, for a moment’ fully 
‘enowned’, we exist intensely.   
  In conclusion, Albert Schweitzer considered the claims of eschatology 
to be: ‘appropriate … to any world, for in every world they raise the man who 
dares to meet their challenge’, this man can rise ‘above his world and his 
time, making him inwardly free, so that he is fitted to be, in his own world and 
in his own time, a simple channel of the power of Jesus’
697. This resonates 
with Heidegger’s ideas that the person present must be in a state of 
readiness, in the correct condition of attunement to and resolution in the 
Augenblick. That Dasein, as a futural entity and at the same time ‘having 
been’ can be ‘in’ the moment for its time, and transcend the ordinary 
temporal domain. I interpret Dasein’s ‘being-in-the-world’ as first 
encompassed by each individual Dasein’s span of life but also the recurrence 
of ‘things’ in its world that already have been. In having-been Dasein inherits 
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its past, in its authentic presence it makes the past its own and in its futural 
impetus it runs before itself as being-toward its own certain death. In being 
‘free for death’ Dasein accommodates its ownmost state of being finite or 
momentary and is ‘transposed into a realm of power’, not that of Jesus or a 
godly power, but of will as the truth of Being. 
   Recurrence might orient Dasein to its finitude, or ‘do down’ death, but 
perhaps the deepest Angst is due to the underlying possibility of the finitude 
of ‘world’ and of Being itself. This expectation of disaster is an aspect of the 
very mood of the time of Heidegger’s work and Jaspers expresses eloquently 
it when he says in Philosphy III, ‘all the experience of human history 
suggests that some day, somewhere, somebody will do the worst that can be 
done.’698 Dasein  is being-toward its own certain death, but also, I would like 
to posit, toward the possibility of the death of all Being, of heritage and of 
‘world’. Eschatology refers to this moment of complete change, when the old 
world will pass away in favour of the new. But in terms of an individual 
human life span, for one who comprehends the event of Being itself in its 
significant momentariness, that is when Dasein experiences its Being (as) 
Momentary, if I may be allowed to combine momentary and momentous to 
coin that word, then Dasein embraces its essence as Momentariness 
(augenblicklichkeit).  
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Chapter 5.  
Henri Cartier-Bresson’s Images à la Sauvette (Images on the Run), and 
the Image as Still. 
 
  Having traced the development of the concept of the Moment from 
Kierkegaard’s theology to Heidegger’s existentialism, I now change my 
approach by using the Moment as a conceptual tool. This is enabled in part 
by following Jaspers’ explication of the cipher and finding that the Augenblick 
itself is one such cipher. By looking through the Augenblick, we can come to 
certain understandings of events both historical and personal. We can also 
analyse the products of certain individuals, in this case the photographs of 
Henri Cartier-Bresson.   
Aspects of the Moment which we have noted previously come to the 
fore in this chapter, beginning with Heidegger’s descriptions of the correct 
attitude in which one might seize a Moment. The character of the ‘learner’ is 
revealed as a flâneur and a spy. The concept of kairos reveals further 
nuances pertinent to the unfolding and seizing of a Moment, and we meet 
again the nunc stans in the form of a photographically ‘captured now’. The 
notion of there being movement or a process, out of which arises a moment 
which holds itself open, a hiatus corresponding to Kierkegaard’s pause of 
wonder, filled with possibilities. The idea that what is seized is a ‘now’ replete 
with meaning occurs again. Heidegger asserted that one could be ‘in a 
‘moment of vision’ for one’s time’ in two senses. Correspondingly, in this  
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chapter Henri Cartier-Bresson is attributed the ability to seize an image which 
not only sums up the prevailing zeitgeist, but also describes something that 
has already been there in terms of the human condition.   
I was initially drawn to Cartier-Bresson's book The Decisive Moment 
(1952) by the title, though I did not expect to find in it quite the moment I was 
investigating. Still I was curious as to what this phrase 'meant' to the 
photographer. In relation to photography it may seem to have no more to do 
with a decisive moment than the clicking of the shutter at an opportune 
moment in time and capturing one fleeting moment of life. It may therefore 
seem erroneous to link it to the complex and rich 'moment of vision' of 
Heidegger. However, while reading Cartier-Bresson's book and other 
commentaries on his work, 'street photography' or 'photojournalism' in 
general, connections of interest have emerged which I wish to explore; not 
least because it is contemporaneous with Heidegger's initial explications of 
the 'moment of vision'. Furthermore, the title The Decisive Moment, which 
can refer both to the content of the photographic image as well as to the 
moment of its capture, turns out to be an American translation of Cartier-
Bresson's original French title, Image à la Suavette meaning literally, 'images 
on the run'. The term ’decisive moment’ has all the elements of kairos in its 
non-biblical use, whose basic sense is of the ‘decisive or critical place or 
point’, ‘whether spacially, materially or temporally.’699 We will come to see that 
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Cartier-Bresson's moment incorporates all of these; the event in the three 
dimensional spacial world he grasps, the two-dimensional material images 
which result, and the temporality both of Cartier-Bresson and of the action. 
Jean Clair of the Musée Picasso in Paris maintains that the notion of  kairos 
is implicit in the seemingly ‘trivial and apparently mechanical act’, that it 
actually ‘presupposes a whole philosophy, ethical framework and body of 
knowledge that are those of the ancient world’700. 
  Peter Galassi in the catalogue to an exhibition of Cartier-Bresson’s 
early works of 1932-34 held in New York in 1987, refers to the title The 
Decisive Moment as ‘an over-simplification’ and tells us that ‘Cartier-
Bresson’s photography is celebrated as the expression of an intuitive talent 
beyond the reach of historical analysis' and 'is classified as an exemplar of 
an anonymous formal principle: the capacity of the small, hand-held camera 
to seize a telling picture from the flux of life.'701 We will come, in the course of  
this chapter to see Cartier-Bresson’s ‘intuition’ as more than a mysterious 
and inexplicable ability, to appreciate the importance of this revolutionary 
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little camera, and to understand the moment as more than the grasping of a 
fleeting image. Colin Westerbeck and Joel Meyerwitz's explication of the title 
Image à la Suavette in their book Bystander, A History of Street 
Photography702 also reveals further nuances of the title which, instead of 
breaking the tentative link to Augenblick as a 'moment of vision', reinforces 
and deepens the significance of the idea of the photographer's recognising 
and seizing of a 'decisive moment'.  
  The period in European history leading up to the 1920s and into the 
1930s which Heidegger and Cartier-Bresson share, appears to have been 
itself decisive in its very fullness of decisive moments as is discussed in the 
final chapter which follows. It was an era of rupture and upheaval and the 
'mood of the time' was impulsive and destructive giving rise to movements 
such as Dada and Surrealism.  It is possible to draw parallels between 
certain concepts of Heidegger and the work of Cartier-Bresson at this time; 
their descriptions of the circumstances surrounding a 'moment' and its 
seizing are strikingly similar. These concentrate on the Augenblick as an 
'authentic' encounter with an 'event' of 'moment' which comes to presence, 
and the 'stance' of an artist who is out to get an impression of the world, as 
one who sets out to see, encounter, grasp and express something. This is 
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exemplified by the new 'art' work of street photography which emerges in the 
1930s and the practise of which involves the total circumstance of the 
photographer himself out in the world. As a 'photojournalist', Cartier-Bresson 
recognises that his talent is 'rooted in direct observation of ordinary life'703. We 
might think of a photojournalist today as going out specifically to collect an 
image of a newsworthy event, but as Galassi informs us, Cartier-Bresson 
only rarely does this. He seeks rather to describe 'a place, its people and 
culture', what he calls the 'texture of its everyday life.'704 We will hear Cartier-
Bresson himself referring to the ‘picture-story’.  
  It may be taking a liberty to describe the attitude of the photographer 
as akin to Heidegger’s fundamental attunement of Angst, but this does seem 
to be an underlying mood of the period. It also provides the photographer’s 
impetus toward seizing a moment before it vanishes, a pictorial image 
through the contemplation of which one might gain some insight not only into 
oneself but the wider human condition. This is something which, in fact, 
Walter Kaufmann in his book of photographs of Indian cities and people: Life 
at the Limits705, asserts the Existential philosophers, especially the German 
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ones have neglected. However, the images taken by Cartier-Bresson, 
although the product of an individual’s stance toward the world, have been 
noted as representing ‘the plight’ which ‘has always already been 'there''706. 
This discussion of Cartier-Bresson’s particular work leads to a consideration 
of the nature of a still photograph in more general terms which, taken out of 
the continuum, (the sequence of an unfolding event), can sum up that event 
and hold it in presence, so to speak, as representative of a decisive moment 
of an epoch. Even in the age of the moving image, still images and the 
‘decisive moment’ retain their significance as I shall discuss in the final 
section of the chapter with reference to the ‘cut’ in film editing. 
  I shall be using the term 'photographer' to encompass the various 
senses of 'street-photographer', 'photojournalist' and 'artist', as Cartier-
Bresson is all these things. Although perhaps ‘artist’ is a term we apply in 
retrospect and not one Cartier-Bresson would have given himself. Cartier-
Bresson began his career as a painter dedicated to 'Art with a capital 'A''707. 
He aligned himself with the Surrealists, becoming a photographer when, as 
he said, his adventurous spirit 'felt obliged to testify with a quicker instrument 
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than a brush to the scars of the world'708, work that can only be done ‘with the 
speed of a reflex, so that it prevents us from trying to make Art’709 . 
  Galassi describes an abstract character he calls ‘the Surrealist’ and 
his particular attitude to the world and we can confer this label on Cartier-
Bresson to indicate how much it now seems his attitude and work owe to 
Surrealism.  His colleague Robert Capa’s advice to Cartier-Bresson was to 
call himself a 'photojournalist' rather than a 'Surrealist' if he wants to work in 
America. The question as to whether the images of photojournalism are ‘art’ 
in a deeper sense, in that they require a technical ‘art’ will not be gone into, 
but perhaps their status has changed with the world they represent and the 
audience they serve. It may be that when the time of the event pictured is 
long enough passed for the picture to be viewed on its compositional merits 
within the environment of a gallery exhibition, then the individual images 
become ‘art’. As works which we might say reveal something of the world 
rather than simply represent it, they adhere to Ernst Bloch’s contention that 
art ‘is fundamentally concerned not with the imitation but with the revelation 
of the world’710   
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Circumstance. 
  Before considering the nuances of the moment as 'images on the run', 
it is important to speak of the circumstances or ‘environment’, i.e., that which 
surrounds the appearance of such a moment. In Being and Time, Heidegger 
speaks of how ‘one comports oneself (verhalten) towards entities, even 
toward oneself’ in cognizing or making assertions about things or in relating 
oneself to other things, (or even, as the translators of Being and Time, 
Macquarrie and Robinson, emphasise in a footnote, in holding back from 
relating to things). In so doing one assumes ‘Being’ in an ‘average’ kind of 
understanding behind which lies ‘a priori an enigma’711 . This average 
understanding of Being means that its true meaning ‘is still veiled in 
darkness’ and for Heidegger this is actually the reason that the question 
concerning Being must be raised again. The comportment of the 
photographer includes his stance (haltung) or state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), 
which Heidegger expounds in relation to Dasein as an entity for which its own 
Being is its questioning concern. 
  Befindlichkeit is translated by William McNeill as ‘disposition’ which is 
an alternative also offered by Joan Stambaugh in the preface to her 
translation of Being and Time, in order, she says, to avoid the too 
psychological connotation of ‘state-of-mind’. She chooses, however, to use 
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the word ‘attunement’ for Befindlichkeit, though the choice of ‘attunement’ is 
confusing because as we have seen, it is a concept with its own sphere of 
meaning in Heidegger’s work. (Macquarrie and Robinson have ‘attunement’ 
as the English translation of Gestimmtheit.) For Heidegger, 'state-of-mind' is 
'how things stand with us'; how one is positioned toward the 'world' in an 
existential sense is integral to our 'seeing', as both taking notice and 
understanding. The photographer, understanding himself in this way, is to 
understand himself in his possibilities of Being and in terms of them - he 
must hold himself in question. This very kind of inquiry might be said to be 
the subject of the photographer's work. Cartier-Bresson maintains a 
questioning attitude toward the world and himself, which is representative of 
the authentic attitude identified in the previous chapter. As Peter Galassi 
writes in his catalogue essay for an exhibition of Cartier-Bresson's early work 
at The Museum of Modern Art in New York, 'throughout his life’ Cartier-
Bresson ‘has tried always to put himself in question'712 . 
  One looks around in the world with ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht). This is 
one of a group of words with the prefix -um, which Macquarrie and Robinson 
inform us can not only mean ‘around’ or ‘about’, but ‘can also be used in an 
expression such as … ’in order to’’713 . This gives us the added intimation of 
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intention in this looking about. The word Umsicht, however, might better be 
translated as ‘circumvision’, in order to distinguish it from specto, 
spectator
714. This serves to enhance our discussion concerning how a 
‘moment of vision’ can arise from the comportment and circumspection of the 
photographer who, it could be climed, can look or see into the moment. Clair 
asserts that Cartier-Bresson weighs up and judges the world but is also ‘a 
seer’715, making predictions regarding what is about to happen. For 
Heidegger, there is an ordinary kind of ‘sight’ by which we make our way 
around in the world, it is grounded primarily in understanding. The 
circumspection of concern is understanding as common sense 
[Verständdigkeit] he tells us, of which ‘Intuition’ and ‘thinking’ are both 
derivative. 
  Human being as a nexus of 'lived experience' is a notion basic to 
Heidegger's analysis of human being as 'being-in-the-world'. As temporal 
beings we draw on our past and project ahead of ourselves into the future in 
order to enable our present, that which intimately concerns us and is, as 
Heidegger says, the very meaning of 'the Being of that entity which we call 
Dasein'716 . Descriptions of and by the photographer Cartier-Bresson and his 
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‘lived experience’ or immediate encounter with 'world', parallel the 
explications of Heidegger regarding one's authentic stance toward the 
'moment of vision'. 
  The total circumstance of the photographer out and about in the world 
includes his movement within it, his attitude to it and to his own work. In 
Cartier-Bresson's own words this is 'the joint operation of the brain, the eye 
and the heart'717, which includes what one might take as his technical know-
how, the learned craft and also what Cartier-Bresson himself calls 'intuition'. 
These are the aspects of being which he relies on in action, to discover the 
fitting moment of action or kairos. They are elements which are part of the 
aesthetic experience of the artist at work and the aesthetic expression he 
wishes to convey. One must also include the temporal aspects of this 'lived 
experience', Cartier-Bresson's 'ownmost' time of Being, in the sense of how 
the moment unfolds for him and the time, the era itself which his images 
reveal. 
  In an everyday mode human beings go along negotiating the world 
around them almost automatically. Occasionally things might come to us 
unbidden, but mostly 'just lived' moments, as both Heidegger and Ernst 
Bloch refer to them, pass 'darkly' and are not lit up with significance nor are 
they available for seizing. While one lives, a moment is just another instant in 
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the flow of time. It is necessary to feel arrested in the moment, to be able to 
be astonished by the very fact of something's existence. It enables a moment 
to stand out in intensity rather than darkly passing, as it does when one is 
'too close' to one's life. Yet in the correct 'attitude', that of maintaining an 
attunement, Heidegger asserts, a moment can be accessible. Then 'all at 
once' it is as if the atmosphere around things has changed and one can see 
the world as one has never seen it before. He says that the term Augenblick, 
'must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasis'718 . The everyday 
mode of Being of a photojournalist, is one of being out and about alone, alert 
and 'attuned'.  
  For Heidegger then, ‘comportment’ or the way in which one moves 
around and navigates things in the world is brought to a heightened pitch or 
state of awareness when one is properly attuned. The photographer also, 
when properly attuned, is absorbed in his task. Heidegger sees absorption in 
various ways; one way is an inauthentic being subsumed by, engrossed in 
the everyday, never raising one's head above the flow, going along with the 
crowd, looking around. He calls this kind of superficial looking, 'curiosity'. 
There is a sense also in which one might 'lose oneself' in an activity in such a 
way that one might lose sight of oneself and 'flee' into the everyday. Yet the 
everyday world and how one manages in it is fundamental to Heidegger's 
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understanding of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and it is also fundamental to 
the work ethos of Cartier-Bresson. We remember from the last chapter that in 
the Augenblick one could even ‘gain mastery over the everyday’719  
Stance. 
  The absorption of the photographer is more like a 'self-effacing 
concentration', as the critic Arthur Goldsmith describes Cartier-Bresson in his 
work. It is a kind of 'self-abandonment', in order 'to make the sort of street 
photographs Cartier-Bresson does', he says 'one's presence must be turned 
into an absence in this way.'720 As though time is forgotten, as if time itself 
stops. On the street the photographer cultivates an anonymity, an eclipse of 
ego in order to concentrate on the subject. Tuning in to these inner 
oscillations one may discover something on the side of the way, flickering at 
the edge of vision. When once 'lifting the gaze', so to speak, and turning 
one's attention, or one’s glance to the subject, one has assumed an attitude 
of authentic looking, and listening, sounding out the world and one's self 'in' 
it. In this the act of turning and looking is crucial to the object or situation to 
which it is directed. 
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  One of Heidegger's types of 'attunement' is 'anxiety' (Angst); unlike 
fear, anxiety has no object, it is an existential mode. Heidegger says Dasein 
'flees' in the face of that threat which is grounded in anxiety, into an 
absorption in the everyday world of its concern, a 'dark' state of being which 
disallows insight or an attunement to the 'moment of vision'. In order to allow 
a 'moment of vision', anxiety must be kept awake in some way. In parallel to 
this 'anxiety' we can think  of the photographer as being 'geared up', that is, 
through his essential mode of maintaining intensity in his working frame of 
mind. Delightful descriptions of Cartier-Bresson at work in this way are 
plentiful and clearly illustrate this kind of comportment. ‘I walked the whole 
day on tenterhooks,searching the streets in order to snatch photos, as it 
were, in flagrante delicto’721, caught in the act. 
  Clair likens Cartier-Bresson to Kairos the god himself… ‘Anyone who 
has ever seen him walking, light, airy, on the tips of his toes, anyone who has 
seen him taking photos, …  will not be too surprised to discover in him a 
resemblance to the famous statue of Kairos by Lysippus: 
 
‘You, who are you? 
I am Kairos, the master of the World! 
Why do you run on tiptoe? 
I am always moving on. 
Why do have winged feet? 
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Because I fly like the wind. 
Why do you hold a blade in your right hand? 
To remind men, that I, Kairos, am sharper and swifter than anything’
722. 
 
  Truman Capote describes seeing Cartier-Bresson 'dancing along the 
pavement like an agitated dragon-fly, three Leicas swinging from straps 
around his neck, a fourth hugged to his eye, click-click-click (the camera 
seems to be part of his own body), clicking away with a joyous intensity, a 
religious absorption’. However, Westerbeck and Meyerowitz tell us that 
Cartier-Bresson himself claims never to have carried more than two cameras 
and ‘The animation with which this photographer impresses witnesses is the 
sort that only characters in cartoons are capable of'723 . Clair, on the other 
hand gives a corresponding picture of Cartier-Bresson, observing him with 
his camera ‘concealed in his palm, silent, invisible’724 . (A la sauvette can also 
carry a connotation of being unauthorized, something done ‘on the sly’ or 
‘with stealth’725 . This adds an element of espionage to our image of the 
photographer which is not out of place). One of Cartier-Bresson's colleagues 
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Malcolm Brinnin, experienced the photographer's immersion in his work 
when they collaborated on a project (never completed), to capture America in 
pictures. Brinnin suffered such rough and rude treatment from Cartier-
Bresson as he chased a scene, that, he reports, he had wanted to push him 
under a fire engine: 'Focussing on one thing, he quivers in the imminence of 
ten others.... When there is nothing in view, he's mute, unapproachable, 
humming-bird tense'. There is, he says, something out of control about him. 
The act of photographing is a compulsive, involuntary one...'726 . Westerbeck 
and Meyerowitz say: 'Cartier-Bresson has freely admitted on numerous 
occasions that he is bundle of nerves. But, he explains, 'one must seize the 
moment before it passes, the fleeting gesture, the evanescent smile ... That's 
why I'm so nervous - it's horrible for my friends - but it's only by maintaining a 
permanent tension that I can stick to reality'.  
  ‘This permanent tension is what makes him equal to all the unresolved 
ambiguities of which reality, truly seen, consists.'727  A completely dedicated 
professional then, when out working he was known to physically elbow 
people, even colleagues, out of his way if they stood between him and the 
picture he was on to. However, Cartier-Bresson himself has spoken of 
photographers as 'intruders' who 'must approach on tiptoe, ... Its no good 
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jostling or elbowing ... Unless a photographer observes such conditions as 
these, he may become an intolerably aggressive character'!728  Cartier-
Bresson denies he was anxious, but we confine our use of this term to refer 
to the underlying ‘mood’ which constitutes an aspect of ‘how’ the 
photographer is in the world. We might also think of it as a necessary 
counter-part to the underlying ‘yearning’ of which we have spoken, the 
craning toward some thing, we know not what.  
  Heidegger asserts there is a special character of the 'Present' which 
enables the moment of vision, which not every ordinarily present moment 
has.729  It is not a moment which marks a present ‘Now’ of 'within-time-ness' 
but is something to discover and to gain. When the authentic 'Present' is 
disclosed 'the future and the having-been are united'730 and Dasein is thereby 
brought into the 'moment of vision'. The 'having been' contains 'recollection', 
perhaps in the case of the photographer, the recollection of a familiar mood 
connected to being in a certain work situation. The background mood that 
one assumes may be recognised though the actual events may be new. One 
might stretch the being of 'attunement' here to include remembering as 
something 'ringing a bell' for us or 'sounding' in our Being. By the repetition of 
                                            
728 Cartier-Bresson, op cit, [iv] 
 
729 Heidegger, op cit, pp. 387-388 
 
730 Ibid, p.449  
302 
an attitude, the photographer assumes the right frame of mind, with the 
necessary orientation to a 'moment of vision' and its contingent 'stance'. By 
this repetition or recollection the photographer is able to recognise (to 'see' or 
to ‘know’) a decisive moment. The past, or 'having been' thus enables the 
present and the future.  
  The artist cultivates this mood or attunement of being aware in order 
to invite to 'presence' or to the authentic 'Present' that which he pursues, that 
which will disclose itself in a decisive 'moment of vision'. This attunement 
comprises the temporality of the photographer as Dasein, that is, in his 
ownmost time of duration which belongs to his essence and in the ownmost 
time of the moment, the duration which belongs to its essence. In two 
meanings of the phrase Cartier-Bresson 'took his time': he took his own inner 
time in finding and taking the picture and his pictures captured the 'outer' 
time, his epoch. In the words of Jean-Noël Jeanneney in his essay Seeing Is 
Everything, it is as if he is ‘blessed with luck’
731 in his uncanny ability to grasp 
images which show ‘the very moment when history hung in the balance’. 
Photography, or the images it produces, would seem to mediate between the 
inner reality of the photographer, and the outer realities of the world. 
The Surrealist. 
  Peter Galassi tells us that 'photography appealed to the modernist eye 
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.. because it lay outside the conventional boundaries of art' . Provocative and 
inventive it owes 'an enormous debt to modern painting’ in its ‘formal 
innovations … and its devotion to innovation as an end in itself’732 . The 
surrealists loved the idea of photography because it is purely mechanical and 
automatic; it seemed to offer a direct conduit between the psyche and reality, 
free from the habits of consciousness and from the hated conventions of 
aesthetics. Such immediate creation throws up the surprising juxtapositions 
of which surrealism is so fond. 
   Galassi describes how '... the Surrealist wanders the street without 
destination but with a premeditated alertness for the unexpected detail that 
will release a marvellous and compelling reality just beneath the banal 
surface of ordinary experience. His every act is calculated to disrupt the 
conventional patterns of life, to invite irrational obsession...'733 . It requires 
practise to lose one's way in a city, one must be as if one had relinquished 
control of navigation or directedness yet be in a state of intensity, open to 
possibilities. It is in itself an experimental process. This is a practised and 
controlled meandering, a familiar method. The early 19th century figure of the 
flaneur is one who wanders aimlessly, an observer taking in impressions but 
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essentially doing nothing, never intervening. The photographer however, 
though also wandering, acts as observer and witness; he is out in pursuit of 
something essential, as Cartier-Bresson says '... of some situation that was 
in the process of unrolling itself before my eyes'734 . However, he still cannot 
intervene in events, as Susan Sontag in On Photography, asserts, ‘'the 
person who intervenes cannot record; the person who is recording cannot 
intervene'735.  
 The  word  flanerie is translated variously as improvisation and also 
idling. One who idles goes along in a low gear but nevertheless is geared to 
expect something, the photographer maintains readiness to improvise action 
when the time comes, perhaps even to notice, on the spur of the moment 
that an unfolding scene might yield a worthwhile image. Maintaining this 
desirous expectation is a kind of hope, a craning toward a future event. 
Cartier-Bresson describes how he 'craved to seize the whole essence' of a 
situation; to 'crave' is to hold a strong desire, an intense longing for a thing. It 
might be described as being like a yearning which relies on the absence of 
that which is yearned for, where 'yearning' is lost in being satisfied by the 
arrival of what is desired. With the yearning satisfied, the moment is fulfilled. 
The photographer is physically self-restrained yet straining toward a goal, he 
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maintains a level of engagement, expecting with 'bated breath' and a 
sharpness of attention, an 'attunement'. 
  Such is the state-of-mind of the photographer. This mode of 
meandering wonder can be also likened to Heidegger's method of thinking as 
described by Charles E. Scott in the Companion to the Contributions, - that 
is, as a 'progress' or journey in search not of his own private feelings but of 
something which 'has no clear way leading to it'. It is an exploration which he 
says is 'less a position than it is a manner of disciplined alertness with the 
occurrence of being'. That which is sought: 'appears as beings come to pass, 
and Heidegger wishes to think alertly in the eventuation of this happening.'736  
For Heidegger, real historical life is the foundation of his philosophy, life itself 
must reveal itself and for this, he asserts, an un-theoretical attitude is 
necessary. Cartier-Bresson also stresses the importance of setting out with 
no fixed plan and seeking the ‘texture of the everyday’ which might be 
transformed in this seizing, into a revelation of something underlying the 
ordinary surface of the everyday.  
  Cartier-Bresson’s description of his work as 'a joint operation of the 
brain, the eye and the heart'737 can be taken to refer to his early training, his 
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technical skill and deftness with equipment, those learned things which might 
be said to have become 'second nature' to him. In 1927 Cartier-Bresson 
entered the painting studio of André Lhote who had worked out his own 
mathematical system for determining the perspectival composition of a 
picture by geometric principles derived from the analytical method of 
Cézanne and the Cubists. Cartier-Bresson's work has been described as 
having a 'geometric clarity' and a 'principle of discipline, not as the rote 
application of formal rules but as the definition of a set of precise conditions 
that clarify an artistic problem and thus release the imagination to work on 
it.'738 . He bore in mind such conventions if only to flout them, though his skill 
still underlies his spontaneity. 'I left [Lhote's] studio', he says 'because I did 
not want to enter into that systematic spirit. I wanted to be myself …  I took 
off on adventure... I made a clean break … To paint and to change the world 
counted for more than everything in my life.'739  At this time Cartier-Bresson's 
work has taken him out of the studio and into the street, from formality to 
spontaneity. His concerns are with events in the world and the place of 
human beings within the world, the photographer amongst them.  
  Surrealism provides a foil for this exactitude, not only in the aesthetic 
composition of Cartier-Bresson's work but in the aspects of social and 
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political life; his encounter with Surrealism precipitates a rebellion against 
convention. Surrealism, as André Breton put it, was not just an artistic 
movement but a 'moral and spiritual crusade' which drew art 'into political 
debate [and] aimed at provoking a crisis of conscience.'740  The '...growing 
concern' was with 'content, with human beings, with social and political 
implications.'741 . Breton speaking on art in the 1924 Manifesto of Surrealism 
advocates working in the form of '... a monologue spoken as rapidly as 
possible without any intervention on the part of the critical faculties, a 
monologue consequently unencumbered by the slightest inhibition and which 
was, as closely as possible, akin to spoken thought'742. Cartier-Bresson is 
influenced more by the ideas of Breton than Surrealist painting: 'the role of 
spontaneous expression [jaillissement] and of intuition and, above all, the 
attitude of revolt.' It is he added, a revolt 'in art but also in life.'743   
  Cartier-Bresson's Surrealist freedom however, is informed by a 
technical 'know how' with equipment and his training in composition. The 
organisation and form of the picture comes from his craft of vision involving 
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what he calls 'a developed instinct'744 . At the moment of taking the picture 
'the decision is made by the eye' and things come together. 'Composition' he 
says 'can stem only from our intuition, for we are out to capture the fugitive 
moment, and all the interrelationships involved are on the move'745 . As Clair 
says, the moment in which the world ‘reveals itself, before the waters roll 
back and chaos returns, when light and shade are perfectly in balance … in 
which form emerges from amid a confusion of forms’746. 
  The photographer also moves within the movement of the world, with, 
as Cartier-Bresson says 'a suppleness of body', modifying perspectives; ‘with 
a gentle flexing of the knees, we make lines meet simply by moving the head 
a fraction of a millimetre’747. The photographer is also composed, he is 
himself 'together' and there is a ceremoniousness in the stance he takes 
born of practice and experience. In 1932, having discovered the Leica, 
Cartier-Bresson abandoned studio Surrealism and, like Breton and Aragon, 
‘gave himself up to the surprises of the street’. Galassi tells us that  ‘two 
previously separate elements of the Surrealist aesthetic’ are brought together 
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in this stepping out: the ‘sensitivity to the unpredictable psychic force of the 
straight photography’ and the ‘vision of the street as an arena of adventure 
and fantasy only thinly disguised by the veneer of daily routine748 . But it is the 
new small camera, the Leica, which Galassi credits with enabling the results. 
Gear (Zeug), the Camera. 
  Cartier-Bresson's training and experience inform and enable his 
action, but together with the art of doing come the 'doings' of art, what 
Heidegger calls 'gear' or equipment (zeug). For Heidegger, Dasein’s 
environment includes the things one uses and handles, things 'to hand' 
(zuhanden) and things one 'procures'749 . The 'moment of vision' brings these 
things to attention [to presence] and 'permits us to encounter for the first time 
what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand'750 . Most crucial 
at this time is Cartier-Bresson's discovery of the new hand-held Leica 
camera, itself a revolution in photography. Mistrusted initially on account of 
its small size, its lightness and ease of use, Cartier-Bresson says of the 
Leica: 'It became the extension of my eye, and I have never been separated 
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from it since I found it.'751  It becomes his chosen instrument of work, it gives 
him freedom of movement, as Clair describes it, the camera is ‘his balance’, 
it is ‘a judge’ with which ‘he weighs up the world’752 . Cartier-Bresson speaks 
of weighing the perspective and bringing objects into alignment through the 
viewfinder, yet even with all this going on, it is still an immediate reflex 
action753. 
  As Galassi explains, ‘the photographer could now pursue the action as 
it unfolded, as one potential subject transformed itself  by almost 
imperceptible stages into another'754 . Galassi reports the photographers 
using this small camera being filled with ‘delight in the new freedom’ it gives 
them. It ‘spawned a whole class of pictures that celebrated instantaneity for 
its own sake', Galassi says, although this notion of instantaneity, if too much 
is made of it, can impoverish Cartier-Bresson’s notion of the 'decisive 
moment'. On this subject of ‘gear’ or the ‘tools’ of the photographers’ trade, 
we might also mention that in Westerbeck and Meyerwitz's book Bystander, 
they suggest that the photo agency Magnum also constituted a tool in that it 
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relieved Cartier-Bresson of the necessity to sell or distribute his images 
himself. 
À la Sauvette. 
  Let us turn now to the aspects of 'moment' which, as mentioned 
earlier, are given expression in the French title of Cartier-Bresson's book, 
Images à la Sauvette. Nuances of this phrase have already shown 
something of themselves in our explications of the photographer's stance.  
The photographer moves in pursuit of the action as it unfolds and is in this 
sense himself ‘on the run’. In the midst of the movement of the world events 
occur, moments appear and as the picture moves into balance hopefully 
something is grasped. This grasping does indeed take place immediately, 
without delay so as not to be missed. Cartier-Bresson maintains that the 
immediacy of action of taking a picture 'on the run', the framing in the 
viewfinder at the moment of 'seeing', is crucial to grasping the scene. He 
does not believe in cropping or otherwise altering the picture in the darkroom, 
the picture 'framed' by the eye at the time which does not compromise the 
subject can be the only true testament. Yet this 'immediately' carries not only 
a sense of time and of place but more a sense of close relation between the 
subject which has 'come to presence' and the photographer, who is ready for 
it. 
  Westerbeck and Meyerowitz say of the moment: 'The instant being 
described is the one when you are just about to take off, the point at which  
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the shortstop is ready to dash in any direction as he watches the batter step 
into the ball...'755  This element of the moment is a hiatus and not one of 
conclusion but of anticipation, that which is just before a decision is made. 
Clair, as we have said, describes an aspect of the photographer’s skill as 
being able to make predictions ‘in a millisecond what is about to happen 
next’756. He can do this ‘because he remembers that he can predict’757. There 
is an element here, of the time being opportune yet pending, held in 
readiness, and thus the photographer who is all action is also is poised 
before action. Cartier-Bresson in The Decisive Moment says: 'We work in 
unison with movement as though it were a presentiment of the way in which 
life itself unfolds. But inside movement there is one moment at which the 
elements in motion are in balance. Photography must seize upon this 
moment and hold immobile the equilibrium of it.'758 Strikingly, we remember 
that the concept of the pause in Kierkegaard's moment has an aspect which 
Kierkegaard describes thus: '... in every such moment there is in each instant 
a pause, where wonder stands in pausa and waits for the coming into 
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existence’759 . The state of wonder or astonishment (thaumazein) we have 
spoken of as being a starting point for philosophy. 
  The Greek word, aporia or 'being at a loss' refers to places where 
impasses of thinking or meaning occur. It is not a state in which one can 
remain, hovering before a resolution, but rather precipitates fulfilment. It is 
the point from where one sets out to encounter and grasp an 'idea' in a 
certain mood or attunement which Heidegger tells us is necessary to 
embarking on philosophical thinking. This may be what Heidegger has in 
mind when he describes Dasein, enraptured before its ownmost possibilities 
of Being as '...held in resoluteness.'760  In this state, Dasein is authentically 
'there', resolute before the 'moment of vision' in a Present which is held on to, 
but in which he says 'nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or 
'waiting toward'761 .  
  At this point of perplexity, Dasein turns to consideration of itself in 
‘comprehended time’, or inner time, in its own-most temporality which, 
crucially, is oriented toward its future. Risen from its immersion in the 
ordinary and everyday Dasein can be 'in the moment of vision for ‘its 
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time’...’762 . The photographer works 'in his own time', the altered sense of 
duration belongs to him alone as 'authentic temporality'. Authentic 
temporality, as we have established in chapter 4, is fundamentally ‘futural’, 
and these concepts run on into a futural notion of the decisive moment in its 
rendition as 'images on the run'. Westerbeck and Meyerowitz tell us that the 
phrase ‘à la sauvette’ contains an 'untranslatable future element'763 . The 
Latin word momentum signifies more than just the temporal instant, for it 
gives the moment its movement, and within this movement outstanding 
possibilities as futural elements hover. The futural impetus of the 
photographer, his movement within the movement of the world, can be 
thought as being open to possibilities always unfolding in the environment, 
and not just to the 'now' instant. 
  Here, being authentically 'futural' and being held in the hiatus before 
the moment, give on to the Augenblick in its possible translation as 'glance of 
the eye'. The glance of perception given to an object, an opportunity or a 
possibility, gives a clue. It reveals an aspect of the world and one can fill in 
the rest from one's own knowledge and expectations. Cartier-Bresson's 
practised 'eye' creates something of a 'presentiment', a foreshadowing in the 
atmospheric 'feel' of the scene. If, in the darkroom, when it seems that a shot 
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has 'failed' due to hesitation or uncertainty, Cartier-Bresson says it is usually 
'because your glance became vague, your eye wandered off'764 . One might 
say he missed his aim. Jean Clair in his essay Kairos: The Idea of the 
Decisive Moment in the Work of Cartier-Bresson, explains that one sense of 
Kairos is ‘power of discrimination… for the hunter this skill lies in shooting an 
arrow accurately’765. The skill of the archer is almost ‘mercurial’ or 
‘hermetic’766, he adds. 
   The word 'glance' seems to reinforce the sense of a momentary 
action, linked as it often is with the word 'fleeting'. But this glance of 
perception, the moment in which one looks or turns toward something, is 
integral to the actual point of grasping the object, the moment of illumination 
is a moment of connection. The glance toward the scene and the 'seeing' of 
the picture which the artist must grasp comprise the attitude of authentic 
'looking', sounding out the world and one's self 'in' it, as we have said. The 
act of turning and looking is crucial to the situation towards which it is 
directed, and we find this idea in Westerbeck and Meyerwitz who assert that 
the title, Images à la Sauvette, 'characterizes the photographer's actions as 
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well as his subjects - it looks to both out and in.'767 We might also think of an 
‘image on the run’ as the one which escapes capture. Having been captured, 
this ‘privileged moment turned into a slim object’768 can still out run any fixed 
meaning we try to apply.  
  Similarly, Cartier-Bresson describes looking through the lens, with one 
eye outward on the scene and one inward to himself. He sees himself 
seeing, Cartier-Bresson says, '... the discovery of oneself is made 
concurrently with the discovery of the world around us which can mould us, 
but which can also be affected by us. A balance must be established 
between these two worlds - the one inside us and the one outside us. As a 
result of a constant reciprocal process, both these worlds come to form a 
single one. And it is this world that we must communicate.'769 Clair tells us 
that in this statement Cartier-Bresson is ‘spelling out a rule of etiquette’. In 
relation to kairos, ‘To discover the ‘decisive moment’ is effectively the same 
thing as to arrive ‘at precisely the correct time’, neither too early nor too late; 
in other words, it is a rule of ethical and social behaviour on which an exact 
consensus can be reached with contemporaries. It is a question of being in 
tune with the times … it is also a rule of aesthetics, incorporating concepts of 
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beauty, the measure or equilibrium of things and the kairos capable of 
apprehending them in an instant.’770  Cartier-Bresson directs his regard to the 
perceiving act, he watches himself watching out for the prominent aspect of a 
moment or event as it comes into balance. He recognises the moment by 
which he can, as he says, communicate some kind of 'truth' or 'reality' which 
he has seen in the subject.  
Seizing. 
  This 'reciprocal' constitution of the Augenblick, emerges as that which 
one might, following Heidegger, call 'event' (ereignis). One can think of 
'moment' as that which is 'of moment' or significance, and as that which 
arrives and happens (the French arriver, to happen), and is decisive for one's 
project of Being. It is not the moment in its type or level of intensity which is 
of primary importance but one's own-most experiencing of it. Ereignis is, for 
Heidegger, 'the event of presencing itself'771; it refers to events which unfolds 
in their ownmost temporality, that which is intrinsic to them. This includes our 
own encounter with 'event', in our ownmost or 'authentic' temporality. As we 
have said, ereignis can be thought of as enowning  in the sense of 'an un-
                                                                                                                             
 
770 Clair, op cit, p. 50 
 
771  McNeill, The Glance of the Eye, op cit, p.116 
  
318 
possessive owning'772 .  
  What 'eventuates' in ereignis is the enactment of decision, the 
'decisive' moment is one in which something is decided. Such a moment 
'makes a difference', something is changed radically in a determined 
resolution, it is brought to fullness in a satisfactory conclusion. This is the 
meaning of kairos, the appropriate moment for action duly considered and 
using the knowledge of one's experience and technical expertise, the 
moment of decision. Resolute action brings to Presence or discloses what 
this moment holds. In Cartier-Bresson's case, something hidden is revealed.  
  In a brute sense events occur, but Heidegger asserts they must not be 
noted as simply occurring but seized and made to mean for Being. Dasein 
must be seized 'in its essence'773  by its questioning . A 'moment' becomes 'of 
vision' when insight or 'understanding' comes to one through it and is used to 
gain a knowledge of oneself in the world. Cartier-Bresson, by his resolute 
holding of himself in question, is in a position to access a decisive moment. 
The photographer seems to live the metaphor of wandering and seeking 
something he will not know until he sees it. Full of anticipation at this time he 
is authentically 'futural', open to what might happen. Here there is an 
expectation and a waiting to be gripped by something when it appears on the 
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'horizon'. Exercising the 'craft' of thinking towards the 'world', of straying in 
one's thoughts as one does in the street, allowing the 'eye' to roam, gains a 
kind of access which enables the immediate seizing of which we have 
spoken. 
  What is seized by Cartier-Bresson in this 'event of presencing' is an 
image or 'idea'. He has said that he was driven by the pursuit of a gripping 
representation as an 'idea' rather than simply a beautiful visual image. Cartier 
Bresson’s photograph entitled Behind the Gare St. Lazare, (Paris, 1932), is 
perhaps the most frequently discussed of his images. In the foreground a 
man leaps from a piece of ladder floating in some water, he is pictured mid-
leap. His reflection is clear. His leap is echoed by a poster of a dancer on the 
wall behind (which itself repeats in a portion of a second identical poster next 
to it).  Pieces of curved metal lie in the water and echo the ripples made by 
the man’s taking off on his leap. In contrast, another man behind the railings 
is standing idly. The railings between the leaping man are echoed by some 
scaffolding on the station rooftop. Another poster reads: ‘Railowski’. 
  One could go on finding elements and visual echoes which make this 
picture so unique. Is it possible that Cartier-Bresson saw all these elements 
in the view finder at the instant the man leapt? In fact he claims to have put 
the camera up to a hole in a fence and not even looked at the image as he 
shot it. Perhaps he sees a man running and seizes his chance; however it 
may be the reward is great. Clair, however, asserts that Cartier-Bresson 
‘never left things to chance. As an artist, he is in control of phenomena - in  
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control of events, to the extent at least that he is able to predict them. Kairos 
is that control’774  
  We can make assumptions as to what this well-composed figure of the 
leaping man may have meant for Cartier-Bresson. But this image, out in the 
public domain is available to meanings we impose upon it. It might stand as 
representative of Cartier-Bresson himself leaping through the air like a 
dancer and never being seen to land with a splash in dirty water. This image 
might stand for the leap of hopeful human striving in doubtful and 
unpromising times. This is an image that has been preserved because as an 
object it fulfils the required value expectations that we have of the 
photograph as art. 
Still Now? 
   Estelle Jussim in The Eternal Moment, Essays on the Photographic 
Image, reports William James calling the now ‘the thickened present‘ which, 
as with so many ways of speaking of time, is a spatial analogy. It lets us 
imagine a moment which coalesces and adheres itself to reality, becomes 
quickened as well as thickened, it comes to life. However, attempts to identify 
the duration of ‘now’ by amounts of time result in some arbitrary and 
meaningless computations, William James suggests that ‘now’ lasts three 
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seconds. ‘A student of his claimed it lasted for twelve seconds.’775  However, 
as Kierkegaard says, ‘it need not be long, for it is a leap’776 . 
  The paradoxical question of whether we can hold the ‘now’ still in an 
image is the paradox of the Augenblick itself. There is nothing in the 
Augenblick, it is ‘empty’, ‘dark’, ‘unmediated’ as both Heidegger and Ernst 
Bloch describe, it is ‘lived (gelebt) but not experienced (erlebt)’777 . It would 
seem, therefore, that the moment can only experienced before or after it has 
passed. Wayne Hudson, describes a moment in the work of Ernst Bloch, as 
‘rare, short-lived experiences of an anticipatory ‘still’, in which a vertical 
lightning effect falls on the unmediated content of the moment, and makes it 
seem ‘almost mediated’’778 . Bloch, according to Hudson, holds that the 
moment is ‘the blind spot of our vision: the region of existence which is too 
near for the perspective necessary for something to be seen . We do not see 
the moment in which we live: there is an invisibility at the heart of our 
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existence’779 . 
  Hans Georg Gadamer in his essay The Continuity of History and The 
Existential Moment (Die Kontinuät der Geschichte und der Augenblick der 
Existenz), asks of time ‘what is this which in truth can never at any moment 
be identified with itself as that which is present [da]?’780 The problem of the 
idea of a continuity of history, Gadamer tells us is contained in this question - 
how can a continuity of events which we call ‘history’ emerge from time in its 
continuous flow when the ‘now’ as a moment of time cannot be held onto or 
identified. The answer to this question of history, and for that matter the 
question of the ‘now’ itself, is that what matters is not a ‘now’ as time. It is not 
directly from ‘the continuous experiencing of unrolling nows’ that the 
‘continuity of history receives its problematic’781. But ‘It may well be that the 
experience of continuity is grounded in … a continuity of historical 
relationships built out of the endless flow of changes.’782 So that when we 
speak of the ‘now’, we are not speaking of a moment of time but an event of 
moment which occurs. It is events themselves that are the subject of images 
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caught on the run. Viewed always in the present, an image represents a 
moment caught on the spot. Jussim asks whether a photograph stops time783 
of course it can’t but it can isolate events in time. Changing events are the 
content of time, what we see now is always changing, change is the nature of 
discontinuity or vise versa. The image, as Sontag says is ‘a psuedo-presence 
and a token of absence'784 and actually refers to ‘what lies beyond’ the image. 
  For Ernst Bloch, the nunc stans is the ‘stationary moment, the 
captured now’785, and the now moment as a nunc stans is, Hudson says ‘a 
foretaste of eternity’786. We must take care when we call the captured image a 
nunc stans . Boethius describes it in The Consolation of Philosophy, as ‘that 
abiding present’ of eternity, in which the whole ‘fullness of everlasting life, 
which lacks nothing of the future and has lost nothing of the past’ is 
simultaneously held. This world of ours cannot do this, but, he says, the fact 
of its infinity makes it able, 
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 ‘in some measure to emulate that which it cannot fulfil or express. It 
does this by attaching itself to some sort of presence in this small and 
fleeting moment, and since this presence bears a certain resemblance 
to that abiding presence, it confers on whatever possess it the 
appearance of being that which it imitates’787.   
 
We cannot properly say then, that this or that moment is a nunc stans, what 
we mean is that it emulates the ‘abiding present’ of eternity to which we have 
no real access. Something enduring and, in that sense ‘eternal’ and 
transcendent may seem to be captured in an image. Jussim asks, in relation 
to the leaping man: ‘has Cartier-Bresson in his ‘decisive moment’ somehow 
abstracted this fellow from all time? Since in the photograph, he can never 
move forward, is he not in the now at all, but rather in what we call 
eternity?’788 Cartier-Bresson's pictures have been said to 'describe not so 
much the plight of the early thirties as the one that has always existed, has 
always already been 'there'.'789  Not the particular contemporary political 
situation but a general ‘human condition’, that which Kaufmann declares 
‘almost all philosophers have ignored. Existentialism poses as the one great 
exception and bases its claim for wide attention on its exploration of extreme 
                                            
787 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V. p. 164 
 
788 Jussim, p. 52 
 
789 Westerbeck and Meyerowitz, op cit, p.163 
  
325 
situations’. It is art, he asserts that can give us ‘insight into the human 
condition’790. 
  We might say there are eternal facts in events that have certainly 
happened and cannot be reversed. A still image of a particular event which 
becomes well-known can come to represent a time, and we have said that 
Cartier-Bresson takes his own inner time. Jeanneney considers that Cartier-
Bresson ‘made a record of  his twentieth century’, and ‘through his eyes’. But 
‘it becomes ours as well’791, as Cartier-Bresson captures the 'outer' time, the 
epoch. Jeanneney says that his images are often ones of a scene rescued ‘in 
the nick of time … before a whole world vanishes’ and might bear the titles: 
‘The last moments of China before Mao, the last moments of English India and 
also the last moments of great political and literary figures, such as the final 
image of Gandhi, assassinated barely an hour after the sitting’792 .  What 
comes to presence is brought to the fore, something 'stands before us', 
though not present in time. An event stilled and held constant in the ‘now’ 
shows us what was ‘then’, but this ‘then’ is always tempered by the present 
and personal perspective. Neither does this ‘then’ remain identical to its own 
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moment in the ‘now’, it gains significance and meaning as we carry it with us 
into the future. 
  In this age so full of moving visual images, the still image retains its 
power. The Magnum photography agency mentioned earlier as a ‘tool’ of the 
photographer’s trade, and which Henri Cartier-Bresson and his colleagues, 
Robert Capa and 'Chim' were instrumental in establishing, is still in business 
today. Though based in New York City their photojournalists are usually not 
in that city but out and about where major events are unfolding. However, on 
September 10th 2001, there happened to be a board meeting at Magnum 
which broght some of their top photojournalists to New York, many of them 
photographing the events next day. The millions of images taken of the 11th, 
whether by these professional photographers or by amateurs, whether of the 
events themselves or of missing loved ones pasted on walls, has brought out 
the power of the one still image to sum up a situation or event, and also the 
nature of being impelled to photograph at all. A 'still' is still, it stands still and 
still remains as a moment which represents far more than itself, having the 
power to encapsulate a whole event in one 'decisive moment'. 
  Such a moment of course is the province of the news media; they are 
the means by which visual images of momentous events reach the public. 
The ‘news’ is closest to the ‘now’ (‘That’s the news to now’ the anchor person 
says). Television and video capture whole sequences of action but print 
media carries the still pictures. The Weekend Australian’s Inquirer section , 
on September 15th-16th 2001 ran a full page picture of the moment when the  
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second plane hit the World Trade Centre, the headline in large capitals: ‘The 
Day The World Changed’. It is surely not often that such a statement is true. 
Inside, small boxes carry condensed reports of eyewitnesses, stories of the 
experiences of individuals at the very moment of the event. Each carries the 
title ‘The Moment’, these glimpses might also be called ‘images’, the word 
need not only refer to the visual. Like these stories, the still photographs are 
‘now moments’ plucked from the continuum of time. What use is it then to 
debate how many seconds the now lasts? 
  Gadamer, writing in 1972, says that today people speak of ‘living in 
the epoch of atomic energy’, what we ourselves hear is that we are living in 
the epoch of terrorism. The specifics of the threat to the continuity of the 
human race changes but the threat remains. Images of nuclear bomb 
mushroom clouds are old. ’Something ‘new’ has happened such that it will 
not soon be cancelled out by some other ‘new’ and conversely, that in the 
light of this ‘new’ we must denominate the ‘old’ as old in a  qualitatively 
distinct and unambiguous sense. Thus ‘war’ meant  something qualitatively 
and fundamentally different before the epoch-making event of the discovery 
of atomic power’793.  Conflict means something different for us since ‘The Day 
the World Changed’. ‘When this sort of thing happens, it is as though time 
itself has grown old … in the sense that its own future stands under the 
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epoch-making event’794.   
  In still images of past events we see time grow old and our 
perceptions of the future itself changed. Gadamer quotes Kant on the event 
of the French Revolution, that ‘such an event does not let itself be forgotten’. 
This phrase, language treats ‘as an acting being’; language, he says, ‘is 
pointing at something… which is contained and retained in man’s 
consciousness’795.  We might substitute the language of images here for 
verbal language. In contemplating the fact of these historical events together 
with our individual experiencing of them is to understand what Gadamer calls 
‘The Existential Moment’. 
  The notion of instantaneity in photography is embodied in the camera 
'flash', the holiday 'snap', and is perpetuated in advertising which promises us 
access to 'Kodak moments'; this idea is captured in the very naming of a 
camera - an Instamatic. Such expressions reinforce a superficial notion of 
picture-making, that which Cartier-Bresson's title is reduced to in its 
translation as The Decisive Moment, pithy though the phrase is. Cartier-
Bresson says, 'Of all the means of expression, photography is the only one 
that fixes forever the precise and transitory instant. We photographers deal in 
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things which are continually vanishing.'796  Sartre says,‘It is important to grasp 
the present in the form of an instant, for the instant would be the moment 
when the present is. But the present is not; it makes itself present in the form 
of flight.’797 The one 'vanishing' momentary image seen in the flow of images 
on a contact sheet can sum up a whole narrative scene. Cartier-Bresson as 
photojournalist is well aware of this, as he says in his book, '... the decisive 
moment is not only a pictorial climax that yields a satisfactory photograph but 
also a narrative climax that reveals a truth about the subject.'798   
Still in Sequence. 
  'Cartier-Bresson has said that the photographer himself is revealed 
more clearly by his contact sheets than by prints... you can see the sequence 
of shots building toward the best picture ... 'I prefer to look at contact sheets,' 
he told Le Monde, '[because] there one see the individual'799 . The sequence 
reveals the individual photographer, but this does not extend to moving 
images, Cartier-Bresson asserts that he dislikes the collaborative aspects of 
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film making'. But the notions of an individual ‘vision’, of a search for balance 
and harmony and the methods of achieving it are all relevant to a discussion 
of the ‘decisive moment’ in relation to film editing. We might point at many 
moments which are decisive to the history of film, and to moments of 
decision represented in film, but if we stay with the part of our theme in this 
chapter which discusses the moment in relation to the work of the ‘artist’ as 
practitioner we can find some interesting observations in a book by Walter 
Murch, In the Blink of an Eye, A Perspective on Film. Murch gives us insights 
gleaned from his years of practise in the field of film editor, working on such 
films as Apocalypse Now (for which he won Academy Awards) and the film of 
Kundera’s novel, The Unbearable Lightness of Being. To work in this genre, 
he says, you need ‘to have a sense of who you are dealing with’, one needs 
to get one’s ideas or ‘vision’ across to a director or producer ‘in the right 
context. And that has to do with your whole working  history’800. 
  Perhaps in common with Cartier-Bresson’s process of shooting a 
sequence of pictures to create a ‘picture story’, Murch describes the process 
of editing as 'not so much a putting together as it is a discovery of a path'801. 
Forming a story involves recognising the relationships between images or 
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sequences and choosing between them to create the movement of the 
action, in doing this the editor is choosing between infinite possibilities (of 
images). The film editor builds the total piece of work from its tiny fragments 
of detail. Cartier-Bresson would never crop an image or change it in the 
darkroom because he believed this destoyed the integrity of the work. Murch 
tells us that ‘in the States film is 'cut', which puts the emphasis on separation. 
In Australia and in Great Britain film is 'joined', with the emphasis on bringing 
together'802 and it is the bringing together of ideas to form a story which 
constitutes the ‘path’ which editing discovers and which we might think of as 
‘musing’ or a path of thinking. These two terms of separation and bringing 
together, reflect the concepts of destruction and construction, antinomies of 
the moment from which can spring a new possibility even an actuality.  
 Lysippus’ statue of Kairos holds a blade in his right hand, as a 
reminder that ‘I, Kairos, am shaper and swifter than anything.’803 He cuts time 
precisely ‘now’, and he can also cut time into pieces, isolate moments from 
an unfolding life sequence (world process) into still images.  In Murch’s terms 
there is a 'total and instantaneous displacement’, ‘of one field of vision with 
another’; one sense of kairos is that it ‘marks a break in continuity and logical 
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progression of things’. 'Editing’ Murch says ‘is a kind of surgery'804, 
presumably one which requires another aspect of kairos, that which pertains 
to the doctor’s knowing when and where to intervene in the patient, if 
necessary to cut into the body. ‘Choosing an appropriate location in space, or 
a decisive spot on the body’ is the doctor’s ‘power of discrimination’, similarly 
for the hunter this skill lies in shooting an arrow accurately805 . 
  Such a displacement, happening ‘in just a few milliseconds’, he tells 
us ‘sometimes also entails a jump forward in time as well as space', at the 
moment of the ‘cut’ or ‘join’, 'when the visual displacement is great enough … 
we are forced to re-evaluate the new image as a different context'806. The 
moment marks where one idea is brought to an end and something else 
begins. It is important to emphasise that the cut by  itself does not create the 
‘blink moment’’, he says, adding ‘the tail does not wag the dog’807 In everyday 
life, Murch says, we experience 'a continuous stream of linked images' and 
would therefore seem likely to reject such displacement when seeing it in 
film. However, we can assimilate this new ‘reality’, perhaps because by now 
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we have become accustomed to seeing it and how it plays with locations in 
time and space in ever more distorted ways. Yet, it may be that we do not 
find displacement unusual because our incoming flow of images is constantly 
interrupted quite naturally by our train of thought. Our ‘inner dialogue’ has 
things to interject about the flow of sensations, observations, memories and 
phantasies which it throws up against them as they pass. We do interrupt the 
continuity of thought when we imagine or remember things, unconscious 
images constantly surface to break the continuity, ‘kairos breaks through the 
prevailing logos’808. 
  Murch believes that these ‘‘filmic’ juxtapositions’ take place when we 
dream as well as when we are awake. He goes further, asserting that they 
are ‘not accidental mental artefacts but part of the method we use to make 
sense of the world: we must render visual reality discontinuous, otherwise 
perceived reality would resemble an almost incomprehensible string of letters 
without word separation or punctuation’809 . It is because of this, he says, that 
‘we find edited film a (surprisingly) familiar experience. ‘More like thought 
than anything else’, in Huston’s words’810 . We have spoken of the 
juxtapositions in Cartier-Bresson’s images which provide an impetus to 
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assembling meaning from the image. Although film is made up of ‘many 
different pieces of film joined together’, Murch tells us, there are examples of 
films which use one unbroken shot, Hitchcock's Rope is the example he 
gives, but more recently we might think of Russian Arc. In one whole 
movement, a figure wanders through the history of a museum, in a present 
moment suspended in and over time during which selected aspects of the 
past are observed. 
  Murch has his own six criteria for what makes a good cut811, the most 
important for him is whether the cut remains ‘true to the emotion of the 
moment. The cut must also ‘advance the story’ and happen at a ’moment 
that is rhythmically interesting and 'right'’. In relation to this, John Huston tells 
of directing Gene Hackman in The Conversation, and realising that the actor 
'would blink very close to the point I had decided to cut'. Huston uses this 
devise to identify where separations will work convincingly. This leads us to 
Murch’s next criteria that the cut must concern itself with the location and 
movement of the audience's focus of interest at any one moment, Murch 
refers to this as ‘eye-trace’. A cut must respect the ‘planarity’ or the two-
dimensional plane of screen by attending to ‘the grammar of three 
dimensions transposed by photography to two’ and correspondingly, it must 
‘respect’ the continuity of the actual three-dimensional space in which people 
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appear in relation to one another, or the action. 
  Although to ‘cut’ film is a sharp action and suggests a sharp contrast 
between images, not all ‘transitions’ between images are arresting, Murch 
speaks of ‘cross-fades’ as ‘a long moment’812 and says ‘transitions reveal the 
soul of a film’. The arrangement of images can quicken our heart rate, one 
can follow the action wide-eyed and astonished, mouth agape with wonder or 
aghast in terror, breath held as events unfold either swiftly or in slow motion. 
In an extended impression, one might clamp a hand over the mouth813 for an 
an unblinking moment, and one does not blink until the moment is over. John 
Huston’s assertion that ‘film is like thought’, and his observations regarding 
the blink deserve some comment here. When one looks across a room at an 
object and then back again, he tells us, ‘You blinked’. These, he says,‘are 
cuts’814', they are punctuation. Moving the eye across the room, (unless the 
eye is unfocussed), is not a smooth action, the eye attaches to objects as it 
goes. The physiological mechanism of the blink, Huston asserts, 'interrupts 
the apparent visual continuity of our perceptions: my head may move 
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smoothly from one side of the room to the other, but in fact I am cutting the 
flow of visual images into significant bits, the better to juxtapose and 
compare those bits'.  This discussion relies on the work of John Stern815, on 
the psychophysiology of eye movements in the blink. His observations tell us 
that sometimes someone angry or concentrating will not blink, they might 
stare at you to make a point, or they blink rapidly in anger. A person may 
blink when they have understood or assimilated what you have said to them 
so far, or when 'being assailed simultaneously by many conflicting emotions 
and thoughts, and is trying desperately (but unconsciously) using those 
blinks to try to separate these thoughts and to sort things out'816 . In this way 
the blink can be an indication of an emotional state as well as registering the 
occurrence of differing thoughts. 
  In terms of the ‘stance’ of the photographer or film editor, Murch, like 
Cartier-Bresson advocates physicality as an important part of the work. In his 
discussion of new electronic of systems of editing he tells us that most 
editors are not and should not be comfortable with an increased use of the 
computer keyboard. He says, ‘there needs to be an easy and immediate 
kinetic feedback between the material and the eye-hand co-ordination of the 
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editor, both in terms of selecting the desired frame and making the splice 
itself’817 . He goes on to say in a distinct echo of Cartier-Bresson, ‘Editing is a 
kind of dance and this depends on engaging as much of the editor’s body as 
possible.’818  
  The Blink of an Eye of Murch’s title is not a flippant use of our 
‘beautiful expression’, his discussion refers to the ‘decisive moment’ of 
Cartier-Bresson while he looks into the importance of the single image-frame 
within a sequence. While editing the film The Unbearable Lightness of Being, 
he tells us, he would choose ‘at least one representative frame from every 
set-up and take a still photograph of it off the workprint.’’ One frame to 
represent a whole sequence, would be printed as a still and pinned up on a 
board. The images he selects in this way could be 'read' from left to right or 
vice versa, up and down or vice versa, and this method would sometimes 
produce ‘sparks’, ‘it would cause you to think about things, editorial leaps, 
that otherwise you might never have thought of...'819  'In choosing a 
representative frame’ he says, ‘what you're looking for is an image that distills 
the essence of the thousands of frames that make up the shot in question, 
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what Cartier-Bresson - referring to still photography- called the 'decisive 
moment'.'820 Each of these single frames of film in containing an essential 
kernel of the whole sequence of action can serve as what we can call an 
Ansatzpunkt -  a devise of literary criticism found in Erich Auerbach’s 
Mimesis. Ansatzpunkt can refer to an original starting point or idea from 
which is developed an extended body of ideas. In Mimesis Auerbach uses a 
brief text taken from a whole work in which, he asserts, the work’s main 
theme is manifest. He describes his ‘procedure’ as ‘citing for every epoch a 
number of texts and using these as test cases for my ideas’. This he tells us, 
‘takes the reader directly into the subject and makes him sense what is at 
issue long before he is expected to cope with anything theoretical.’821 As a 
hermeneutical device for interpreting texts it reduces a text to its smallest 
components and through this ‘promises the discovery of a key to the larger 
whole’.  Ansatz as a ‘base’ or ‘root’ suggests something which as well as a 
starting point to progress outwards from, might also be a point which gathers 
meaning to it. 
  As we have said, maintaining the emotional continuity is an important 
aspect of film editing for Murch; how one wants the audience to feel is an 
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important consideration. It is desirable that they share the emotion and the 
idea the film want to put across because, he asserts, that ‘how they felt’, is 
what they remember afterwards. He describes the isolated stills or ‘photo 
moments’ as 'hieroglyphs for a language of emotions'822, complex and 
nameless emotions such as, in his example, ‘anger tinged with melancholy’ 
require careful use of visual language, emotions for which there are no words 
but can be seen in the isolated images. ‘I want it to embody that nameless 
but familiar emotion I see in that photograph.’823  
  Existentialism deals with the underlying, fundamental ‘moods’, but as 
Kaufmann824 points out, they neglect the nature of emotions as complex. 
Perhaps the paucity of words for varieties of emotion, especially in the 
English language is to blame, or perhaps it is that another language can 
speak of them and make them observable in a more fitting way, perhaps in 
the language of the visual image, or of music. In music it is as with our own 
thoughts, Murch tells us, ‘the way one realisation will suddenly overwhelm 
everything else, to be in turn replaced by yet another’. Returning briefly to the 
notion of suspension in the blink, Murch tells the story of 'a famous live 
recording of the pianist Sviatoslav Richter playing Mussorgsky's Pictures at 
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an Exhibition during a 'flu epidemic in Bulgaria many years ago … while he 
was playing certain passages there were no coughs. At those moments he 
was able to suppress, by his artistry, the coughing impulse of 1500 sick 
people’825. The musical image holds one in its gaze. The expression and 
representation of these complex, simultaneously experienced emotions in 
visual and musical ‘imagery’, is one of the focal points of our next chapter.  
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Chapter 6. 
A Decisive Epoch and the ‘Existential Moment’ (der Augenblick der 
Existenz) in Art. 
   In the previous chapter we loooked at the ‘decisive moment’ of 
Cartier-Bresson in a period of turmoil which he shares with Heidegger. We 
noted that this period or epoch itself appears to have been decisive in its very 
fullness of decisive moments, and this is the focus of the present chapter. 
While the previous chapter considered the Moment in relation to the visual, 
specifically photographic image, it is now extended to consider the visual 
image of art and musical ‘imagery’. We will meet various aspects of the 
Augenblick again, both the Greek concepts of kairos and the nunc stans. The 
idea of the moment as encompassing an historical event and an individual 
experience which describes a certain zeitgeist occurs, and this zeitgeist 
described in relation to Heidegger’s Augenblick as ‘apocalyptic’ is now 
described as ‘dissonant’.  
  That this epoch can be accurately described as ‘dissonant’ reflects 
that aspect of the Moment which is seen as being held open with all its 
possibilities, as it were, ‘up in the air’. Arnold Schoenberg’s exhortation to 
‘emmancipate the dissonance’ can be read as a call to be fully engaged with 
the situation, to be authentically ‘in the Moment’. What comes out of the 
dissonance, for instance certain artistic movements, might arrive as a 
seeming revolution but proves to be part of an evolutionary process. Even a 
moment of artistic ‘inspiration’ is, as Adorno explains, inseparable from the  
342 
process of creation of the object which follows. 
  The figure of the ‘learner’ from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and the 
individual involved in a process of decision in Jaspers are connected to the 
idea that the individual must be in a proper ‘attitude’ of striving. This 
individual who’s striving takes them to a limit becomes an exagerated 
character, one who in venturing to go beyond that limit falls. This fall, as we 
have seen is necessay, but in this case appears to lead to irrevocable 
damage to the individual in their existential self and to their intentions (the 
producing of something ‘new’ as a  work of art). 
My investigations have concentrated on nineteenth and twentieth 
century conceptions of the 'moment'. This period also loosely encompasses 
that of Modernism, even though it is disputed when the beginning and end of 
that period actually is, if indeed there has been an end to modernism. We 
have seen that the development of the idea of moment as an existential 
concept has followed the path of the development of modernism itself. The 
fact that a period should bear the name of ‘modern’ points to the fact that it is 
concerned with the contemporary, with the present time and with things ‘new’ 
within it. To be ‘modern’ is to exist ‘now’, in this sense we carry the modern 
along with us, it will always be ‘now’ with us. Like the moment itself, the 
period called ‘modernism’ spans an indefinite time, its exact duration and 
ends are uncertain. It appears that within this period that portion spanning 
the two world wars in Europe defined as ‘high’ or ‘late’ modernism represents 
a most poignant and fertile time for consideration of the ‘moment’. It is a  
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period of great social and political upheaval, impinging on artistic and 
philosophical aspects of European life. In the title of this final chapter I 
identify this particular epoch as standing out from others as ‘decisive’.  
  Gadamer posits that an epoch shows up as different from other 
epochs through a discontinuity of events, yet what we call ‘history’ is the 
series of events through which can perceive a continuity. The idea of 
continuity relies, however, on the notion of the flow of time; but rather than 
history being the flow of time, Gadamer tells us, it is made up of the flow of 
changes. It would seem that it is the position from which these changes are 
seen or experienced, relative to the notion of the flow of perishing and 
becoming which determines the significance we assign them. The notion of 
perishing and becoming seems, as Gadamer says, to be where the ‘truth of 
historical consciousness’ reaches ‘its fulfilment’, this endless coming and 
going of change builds ‘a continuity of historical relationships’826.  We are able 
to come to the point of celebrating the momentariness of our existence 
(augenblicklichkeit), because we understand it relative to the notion that 
‘there is no perishing without a simultaneous becoming’827. Ernst Bloch, as 
Wayne Hudson informs us, interprets the process of the ‘now’ as a section 
which reveals the structure and content of the world process. Bloch 
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understands this process as ‘heliotropic’, this word indicates that he 
considers it to be a continually growing process moving in a particular 
direction toward the light of an ‘end’.  ‘This process’, Hudson explains, 
‘begins again in each moment: as a process to solve the question of its 
origin; and every moment contains both the datum of world completion and 
the data of its content.828 The process is ongoing it seems, ‘an unsolved world 
process in which the intensive That drives toward its missing What or 
essence, and the structure of the moment reflects the structure of the 
process.’829  
  Gadamer says that we can ‘never know with certainty whether or not it 
is correct to attribute epoch-making significance to an event’830, as we did in 
the previous chapter. The future effect of any event is uncertain but ‘it is 
enough’, he says that we might have the impression, ‘an enduring conviction’ 
that an event ‘was epoch-making’, that we ourselves instil an event with such 
meaning. Such events signify ‘an epochal time span’; ‘Everything is dated 
from such an event’831 because something of such great importance to our 
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lives has occurred ‘that from then on everything is different’832. For 
Kierkegaard, Christ’s coming is an historical fact, with the advent of the 
eternal we have the initial ‘moment’ upon which all other moments depend. 
The Augenblick is established as pivotal for the consideration of the eternal 
or transcendent aspect of human being. With it comes a capacity for faith, for 
absolute hope beyond the experiences and aspirations of the everyday. Even 
in situations such as those presented by the turmoil of this epoch, human 
being is consigned to ‘hope’. Hope is relentlessly there in the face of 
seemingly unavoidable and complete destruction. Walter Benjamin 
understood very well that ‘it is only for the sake of those without hope that 
hope is given to us’833. Gadamer recognises ‘the birth of Christ’ as ‘an 
absolute epoch-experience’, not only as he says, ‘on religious grounds’, but 
also as the basis of ‘the history of ideas’. The Christian message of salvation 
establishes ‘history in a new sense’, Gadamer asserts. The order of 
‘providence’ is introduced into the disorder of destiny as the ‘waxing and 
waning of happiness and unhappiness, as the opening and closing of the 
conditions for a happy and wholesome outcome or for a painful disaster’834.  
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  Heidegger considers that Kierkegaard’s comprehending of Augenblick 
is an event which ‘gives onto the possibility of new epoch of philosophy’
835. 
Philosophy itself is a kind of knowledge which ‘imposes its measure upon its 
epoch’
836.  It is the existential understanding of ourselves in the world which 
emerges as the defining philosophical knowledge of this ‘epoch of the 
Augenblick’, if we can now call it that. Shortly after Kierkegaard posits the 
‘new age’ of Christianity and salvation, Nietzsche raises the notion that God 
is dead. Both of these seemingly antithetical positions are concerned with a 
deep individual response to, and a taking of responsibility for one’s 
existence. God’s death might be seen as a gradual demise which has a 
culmination point in the early part of the twentieth century, when it comes to 
attention as significant to the particular time. People, desperate for 
redemption, when order is again overwhelmed by disorder, might easily 
doubt that there is ‘order’ in God’s provinence.  
  It is possible to say that the Augenblick constitutes the very ‘historicity’ 
of this particular time. This term ‘historicity’ (Geschichtlichkeit) for Gadamer837 
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as for Heidegger and Jaspers denotes factual events which occur, which can 
be identified as connected, along with the experiencing of them. The concept 
of historicity ‘has come to hold an ‘ontological claim’. For Jaspers, as Alan. 
M. Olson explains, ‘the legacy of modernity is the legacy of thoroughgoing 
historicism, to wit, that there is the ‘life’ of an ‘external historical reality’ which 
can be explained by its own conditions, and there is my ‘life’ - the two being 
divided. The outstanding problem is that of uniting the human individual and 
their history. Man is ‘an exile from the secure providence of metaphysics - 
standing at the meridian of consciousness and history’838 . From here, Olson 
says, ‘Jaspers attempts to see beyond the ‘secularized residue’ of the past, 
the ‘failed supernaturalism’ of the ‘eschatological consciousness’ of 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. He does this through the notion of ‘epochal 
consciousness’839 in which there can be ‘unanticipated shifts’840. 
The Existential Moment in Art.  
  Through events coming to attention, a continuity is perceived; through 
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the individual experiencing of the event (ereignis) we perceive our Being in 
time. These two aspects combined are what Gadamer denotes ‘the 
existential moment’. Art deals with an inner subjective experience and an 
outer, objective (re)presentation. As such, art provides examples of the 
‘existential moment’ grounded in, perhaps unique to, the particular time and 
place that produce them.  Art provides a repository of the inner ‘feelings’ of 
the individuals involved which reflect the outer mood of the time itself. 
Through art works we can bring an extraordinary period to the fore, not as 
dry dates and factual events but as living testimony to the experiences of 
those involved, and with the power of a renewed emotional affect in the 
present. Peter Selz tells us ‘the artists pointed at the symptoms, as artists 
often do. The civilization to which they belonged was not to last’841 . The 
artists’ discriminating glance recognises the kairos, the decisive point for 
intervention. 
  In this chapter then, we consider the existential moment, its relation to 
art, and the documents including works of art which describe the prevailing 
zeitgeist. We look at the decisiveness of such an epoch with its seemingly 
revolutionary upsurge in artistic movements and ideas. We note how the ‘will 
to form’ expresses the protagonist’s relation to the world. We notice certain 
parallels in the development of abstract art in painting and expressionism in 
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music, represented respectively by Wassily Kandinsky and Arnold 
Schoenberg. We elucidate the ‘moment of inspiration’ as found in Adorno’s 
concept of Einfall . We revisit the idea of the authentic individual, now in the 
form of those who ‘venture beyond’ and ask what it is they venture beyond. 
We look at some attempts to represent the Augenblick in art works 
themselves and find out what it is about this venture that constitutes what 
Ernst Bloch refers to as ‘the Faustian Moment of fulfilment’. Finally we will 
arrive at a ‘resolution’. 
  Only in a discontinuous model of time as change can identifiable ‘now’ 
moments be endowed with any special meaning. If the Augenblick is empty 
as a portion of time; as the concept of a significant event, it is full. There is in 
fact a danger of giving the Augenblick too much fulness, of finding the 
Augenblick everywhere, and in everything ‘augenblicklichkeit’. However, we 
have pointed to certain of its elements: the part the resolute individual plays, 
the anticipation or apprehension of change, being prepared and yet unable to 
fully access the actual moment. The sense of urgency of the time and the 
primacy of the present are features of this particular period, when people are 
preoccupied with their own present moment. We have considered the 
Augenblick as a figurative expression: ‘the blink of an eye’, an image which 
represents an idea about how human being experiences its existence in the 
temporal world.  The subjective individual experiences which result in the 
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contemplation of this idea have also been given attention. The word 
Augenblick as a metaphor, a sign in a language, is a literary image, but we 
have extended it for consideration in relation to a visual image, that of the 
photograph. We now extend ’image’ to include the visual image in art and in 
music and the subjective experiences which artists attempt to elucidate 
through their various media.  
Documents of a Zeitgeist. 
  What gets remembered and makes ‘history’, depends on what gets 
chosen and saved as documentary evidence842 . The art of a period is 
document and evidence of the ‘ambience of the period’, the ‘zeitgeist’843, and 
‘a zeitgeist it seems, caused the most radical innovations in music and art 
just prior to World War I.’844 The possible loss of documentary evidence of our 
existence concerns Jaspers, for whom the destruction of such evidence 
represents a loss of ‘human continuity’ which we wish to preserve with a 
‘passionate will’. The desire to ‘save the phenomenality of being proper, 
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drives us to rescue its documents’845, he tells us. That is, the evidence of 
being, the ‘that we are’, so to speak. The assurance that we are, depends on 
the assurance of the ‘that we were’, the saving of evidence is also crucial to 
assure us as to the future, that we shall continue. Details of the past are 
often only partially or erroneously remembered. On the one hand, this 
distorts the ‘story’ of history while, on the other hand, it allows for 
reinterpretations and the emergence of new ideas. Jaspers’ statement that 
‘some day, somewhere, somebody will do the worst that can be done’846 
suggests that the worst thing would be the total loss of existence and further 
of any evidence that we ever existed. ’There is no interpreting the ruin of 
oblivion’, although Jaspers means this in relation to forgetting or losing the 
memories contained in ‘documents’, the mood of the time in which he spoke 
is one full of the possibility of impending total destruction. It is not only the 
loss of evidence of our factual existence which impels us to save its 
documents, but to preserve the evidence of our existential being. That we are 
and that we have been aware of and concerned with our very existence; that 
we strove to articulate a meaningful inner life. Loss of the works of art which 
evidence this striving are particularly poignant. 
  Along with loss there is the possibility of discrepancies in documentary 
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evidence, and although we rely on the documents of art to illustrate this 
epoch, we recognise as Herbert Read does, that ’It is a curious but well-
known fact that contemporary records are often inconsistent, and even the 
artists sometimes contradict themselves in their recorded statements’847.. 
However, in parallel with the statements of artists, we have their works and it 
is possible to imagine that in these resides the expression of existentiality in 
a form which we can ‘read’ or ‘hear’. We can never fully access the 
immediate experience of the artist but only its echo, as individual subjective 
beings we interpret it according to our own inner experience.  
  The documents we retrieve in order to glimpse the events of the time 
are those that have been preserved according to a certain system of values 
as Gadamer maintains. In this chapter we rely on documents of the time 
preserved through such a system, choosing from amongst them to articulate 
our ‘idea’. The factual evidence is necessary to determine the context which 
defines the prevailing historical situation, as Jaspers tells us. That this 
particular epoch comes to our attention as being so significant and 
memorable indicates that there is something in it of a ‘boundary situation’. 
The boundary is, as Jaspers states, the very situation ‘that we are in 
situations’ and that we are ‘historically defined’ by context; the context of 
which we speak is the particular existential ‘situation’ of modernity. Jaspers’ 
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concern is with the spiritual nature of modernity. The English translation of 
his book: Die geistige Situation der Zeit  (1931) which appeared in the same 
period as his Philosophie, as ‘Man in the Modern Age’ indicates Olson 
claims, an aversion to the idea of the spiritual in an age when its meaning  is 
reduced to indicating something spectral. Jaspers’ use of ‘geist’ must be 
understood in light of its ‘essential metaphysical nuances’848. The ambiguity of 
the meaning of this word geist is ‘retained in Jaspers’ ‘modification of 
‘situation’ by ‘spiritual’ in the title of this book’849, because it is essential to 
Jaspers’ intention. As well as referring to ‘factors having a bearing on the 
well-being of humanity’, it also ‘refers to the ‘nameless unconditioned’ which 
is the source and goal of transcendence and value, as experienced in a 
particular existential ‘situation’’850. The severing of the notion of ‘value’ from 
the transcendent and its confining to ‘a utilitarian immanentalism’, Jaspers 
suggests, ‘is the sure and certain recipe for disaster’851 . So when we speak 
of zeitgeist it must involve the intellectual attitude and the metaphysical frame 
in which the epoch unfolds. In choosing the representative artists and 
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documents from this period, we find attempts to bring the ‘spiritual’ to 
presence to be of primary concern. Artists attempt to reach the inner 
subjective experience of something ‘eternal’ or ‘transcendent’ in human 
being, to bring it to presence in an objective work in order to express and 
convey it to others. 
  For the purposes of this chapter then, we have chosen to concentrate 
on a ‘select few’ representatives who share a concern with elucidating a 
‘spiritual’ aspect of human being through the medium of art. Indeed in some 
cases art itself is thought to embody the ‘spiritual’.  In such an epoch, 
permeated with possible ‘sightings’ of the Augenblick, we must choose which 
examples to use for our present purpose and which to hold in reserve. We 
must choose individual practitioners from a complex web of connections and 
changing ‘constellations’. Various ‘movements’ flourish and fade with 
increasing rapidity. The individuals of the epoch we have singled out are 
closely interrelated, the parallels of developments in thinking and in art are 
striking. We will focus on the music of Arnold Schoenberg, the painting of 
Wassily Kandinsky; and the theories of Theodor Adorno in relation to the 
atonal technique of Schoenberg. We will explore Bloch’s expressionistic 
elaborations on the moment of fulfilment with its overtones of a Faustian 
pact; and consider the antics of Dada. Their works are not distanced regards, 
but a heartfelt attempt at an engagement with an inner experience which 
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seeks its correlation in an objective work. Even Adorno writing on the 
phenomenon of Schoenberg’s music, does so in reaction to his actual 
experience of the music. This is also the case with Kandinsky, who sees his 
own feelings and objectives echoed in the sounds of Schoenberg’s music. 
A Decisive Epoch. 
  Discontinuity and radical change rather than continuity and flow define 
this particular period between the wars. Rüdiger Safranski quotes the view of 
Oswald Spengler in Man and Technics: ‘world history proceeds from 
catastrophe to to catastrophe … as abruptly as a flash of lightning or an 
earthquake’. We must, Spengler says, ‘emancipate ourselves from the 
nineteenth century idea .. of an evolutionary process’
852 
.
 
‘History is a volcanic 
crater: it does not occur, it erupts. That is why one has to be swiftly and 
meaningfully present before one is buried’. Safranski suggests, one must be 
prepared for the eruption in which ‘the decisive’
853
 takes place. A person 
loving the moment must not be too worried about his safety. Dangerous 
moments call for adventurous hearts’
854
. Life at this time is staid and 
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mechanised, one of ‘utility’, full of trained minds but empty hearts.  Max 
Weber speaks against the ‘steel capsule of modern ‘rationalized’ 
civilization’
855
, which rob human being of the ability to make its own value 
judgments and decisions and leaves no answer to the meaning of one’s life. 
  Safranski refers to the sudden discontinuity caused by radical change, 
as an 'epochal caesura’
856
. With 'the collapse of yesterday’s world in a world 
war,'  the ground was shaking and a new beginning had to be made. A new 
beginning comes at the height of, or the culmination point of modernism. This 
‘realises itself’, Marshall Berman tells us, in ‘cubist painting, collage and 
montage, the cinema, the stream of consciousness in the novel, the free 
verse of Eliot and Pound and Apollinaire, futurism, vorticism, constructivism’. 
We might add to these ‘isms’: Purism, Orphism, Suprematism, 
Expressionism, the earlier Fauvism and the later Minimalism. Berman 
continues: ‘dada, poems that accelerate like cars, paintings that explode like 
bombs’
857
. At this time a rich overlap in and cross-fertilisation of ideas can be 
identified. Many artists are working in more than one discipline with the same 
aims and coming to the same conclusions. Modernism comes to fullness in a 
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conjunction of events and those who experience and seek to elucidate both 
the events and themselves within them. Berman manages to give the 
impression of this conjunction as a centrifuge, drawing the past into its centre 
and spinning out again toward the future. 
  Thomas Harrison recognises the year of 1910 as pivotal to this period. 
Taking Arnold Schoenberg’s famous phrase as his title he points to 
dissonance as the central motif and mood of this disturbed time. In extending 
the use of Schoenberg’s exhortation in this way, as an analogy for the time 
we can understand dissonance as the alienation of the individual from the 
world which has become increasingly harder to understand, less close and 
more uncanny. People are also physically/geographically displaced and 
exiled. Distance and unresolvedness are apt motifs for this period, keeping 
things in the air, maintaining tension while so much changes. ‘Halley’s comet 
shatters the peace of Europe’s skies. As tends to happen at such moments 
of cosmic disturbance, the event evokes deep-seated anxieties, articulated in 
newspaper editorials on doom and degeneration. For each collective concern 
there are thousands of personal ones’858; cases of loss of ‘some life-
sustaining faith’ leading to desperate acts. Suicide is so rife that Harrison 
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asks whether there is an ‘’idea’ at work in these deaths?’859 .  
  Researchers at the time come to the conclusion that ‘personal 
behaviour is always a function of larger, communal patterns’860. This mood, 
‘this knowledge or perception’, Harrison tells us is called ‘nihilism in 
philosophy and expressionism in the arts. It comprises a vision of history as 
nightmare, an obsession with mortality and decay, a sense of human 
marginalisation from the autonomous developments of culture, and the 
responses they spur’861. Peter Selz, recognises that certain Expressionist 
works reflect a firm belief in the ‘final release and absolution of all things, 
whether they please or torment’ like the novels by his contemporary Thomas 
Mann. Mann’s work, Selz tells us, is proof that ’a work of art, even if it is one 
of despair, can ultimately only be interpreted as a belief in life’862. Despite this 
view, many of the protagonists, Harrison tells us, died young sometimes by 
suicide and ‘had as precarious a grasp on their intentions as the age on its 
course.’ Whether they realise their intentions in works of art, literature or 
music, whether those intentions are in fact realisable, in a sense, Harrison 
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says, ‘the real act of completion lies in the suicide itself’. Harrisson quotes 
Gottfried Benn: ‘1910, that is indeed the year when all the scaffolds began to 
crack’863. 
  Some of the plethora of movements which come and go produce 
journals, certain of which survive to give us the documents from which we 
can, to some extent, interpret the period. Founded in 1910, the weekly 
periodical Der Sturm, ‘became the catalyst of the modern movement and the 
focal point of Expressionism’. This itself is a term Der Sturm’s founder 
Herwarth Walden made popular ‘as the appellation of the new art which it 
was to champion’, in response Selz tells us ‘to the pulsations of a remarkable 
age’864 .  In 1911 Der Sturm published the art historian Wilhelm Worringer’s 
seminal essay Abstraction and Empathy in which Worringer maintained that 
‘Expressionism was an historical necessity of the time, one by which the 
artist, rejecting merely rational forms, seeks a return to the irrational 
abstraction of primitive and elemental forms’.  In a later work, Worringer tells 
us that the ‘metaphysical anxiety’
865 ‘of the Gothic soul finds its outlet in art. 
Herbert Read tells us that in Worringer, ‘for the first time a will to abstraction 
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in art was postulated as a recurrent historical phenomenon.  
‘Worringer’s argument, … would serve as a description not only of the 
artistic movements that were to develop in Munich from 1912 onwards, 
but generally of the development of Expressionism throughout Europe 
and America in our century. It would not  be difficult to find the parallels 
in literature (in the prose style of Joyce’s Ulysses and Finnegan's Wake; 
in Bert Brecht’s plays and in the verse forms of Ezra Pound, William 
Carlos Williams, and Boris Pasternak); and even contemporary 
architecture (in Frank Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier, and Luigi Nervi) 
exhibits the same restless linear activity and refined construction’
866 .  
 
Bertolt Brecht’s practise of an ‘alienation technique’ is seen by Safranski as 
analogious to the terminology of Heidegger, ‘because what is being 
examined here is ‘not a strange and unfamiliar matter, but on the contrary the 
nearest, which is perhaps precisely why it leads us astray into mistakes’
867. 
  The year 1910 also marks the inception of the Blaue Reiter almanac 
produced by Kandinsky and Franz Marc. Kandinsky showed Schoenberg’s 
self-portraits in the first Blaue Reiter exhibition in that year.  In 1912, Walden 
exhibited Kandinsky’s work of 1901 to 1912 and thus ‘showed the origins of 
non-objective painting’ stimulating Guillaume Apollinaire to begin his own 
experiments with ‘the elimination of subject-matter.’868 Schoenberg’s Theory 
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of Harmony and Kandinsky’s On the Spiritual in Art  appear shortly after one 
another in 1911; both are ‘completed before the exchange of ideas between 
the authors began’869. Simultaneous with Kandinsky’s discoveries regarding 
non-objective painting Schoenberg, from within the intellectual and artistic life 
of conservative Vienna is exploring atonal music.  
 The  Blaue Reiter was represented at the first German Autumn Salon 
of 1913, the ‘climax of Waldren’s activities870. Marc‘s ‘guiding idea for the 
selection and hanging of the pictures was at all times to show the 
extraordinary spiritual engagement and energy’ of the work, an impression 
which he is sure, ‘is designated for the soul’. It is Marc’s belief ‘that a person 
who loves his time and is in search for its spiritual meaning, will go through 
the exhibition with a pounding heart and find it filled with good surprises’871. 
  In Zurich, in neutral Switzerland, an ‘exceptional conjunction of 
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circumstances’ and ‘an international constellation of artists’872 occured. The 
city was a centre for expatriates, refugees from Central and Eastern Europe, 
of ‘many different persuasions’873. Here were Russian Socialists and 
revolutionaries, (including Lenin), pacifist German expressionists, 
Hungarians, Roumanians notably Tristan Tzara and Marcel Janko.There was 
the Alsatian visual artist Hans Arp from Strasbourg who was also connected 
with Kandinsky and the Blaue Reiter. Hugo Ball whose interests were mostly 
literature and theatre, arrived from Germany, and later Richard Huelsenbeck, 
also a poet. Membership of these groups of artists and intellectuals was to an 
extent interchangeable. The dadaists were a more or less ‘coherent’ group 
although Ball, in his Dada Diary, Flight out of Time (Flucht aus der Zeit), says 
they were never ‘in complete or simultaneous agreement, … The 
constellations change’874,  and they were not isolated from interactions 
between others groups with whom they shared an attitude of anti-tradition. 
  In 1912 the philosopher Ernst Bloch met ‘the anarchist’ Ball finding 
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him ‘both enthusiastic and anxious’875. Bloch himself, Vincent Geoghegan 
tells us, made his ‘discovery’ in 1907, at the age of 22, of the category ‘Not-
Yet’ (Noch-Nich), which forms the foundation of his work. Bloch refered to it 
as ‘the origin’ of his philosophy.876  Bloch’s ‘phenomenology of the darkness of 
the lived moment was a major theme of his early utopian philosophy’ and 
reappeared in his later work ‘as support for Bloch’s claim that the world as 
‘process’ contains ‘concrete utopia’’877. Bloch, Geoghegan explains, ‘develops 
a whole armoury of concepts to encompass the utopian moment of fulfilment  
- Ultimum, Totum, the Upright gait’878. Interestingly, in regard to the web of 
relationships with which we are concerned, Bloch later meets Theodor 
Adorno who speaks of ‘the great Blochean music’.  Later still, somewhat 
incongruously, as refugees form Hitler’s Germany, Adorno, Schoenberg and 
Thomas Mann ‘lived within a few miles of each other just outside 
Hollywood879. From there the three explored in their various works, ‘the 
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intertwining of enlightenment and myth, reason and barbarism, civilization 
and cruelty’ in response to ‘the diabolical force that had driven their creators 
into exile’. Our protagonists are timely, they recognise the moment, and in 
Benjamin’s words ‘the Now of recognizability is the moment of awakening’880  
An ‘Epochal Consciousness’ and the ‘Will to Form’.   
  Jaspers refers to the ‘few who knew themselves to be the true 
representatives of their age’881 as an ‘epochal consciousness’. He points out, 
Olson tells us, that within an ‘epochal consciousness’ ‘there is always the 
tendency to view one’s own epoch as ‘final’ even though ‘we know there are 
new epochs to unfold’. ‘Thus the natural psychological predilection of 
‘modern man’’ is ‘to a ‘realized eschatology or immanentalism’. We assume 
that in future the patterns recognised in the present will come to 
‘completion’882. This in itself then is an inherited pattern of thinking. Ernst 
Bloch urged that we should make such a pattern ‘think against itself’ at a time 
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when we perceive in it ‘a limitation’ and when ‘no alternative is available’883. In 
this way the historical consciousness comes to be expressed in new works. 
According to Kandinsky, ‘each period of culture produces an art of its own 
which can never be repeated’884. It must ‘spring from contemporary feeling’ 
and not only be the ‘echo and mirror of it, but also has a deep and powerful 
prophetic strength’885. We break the patterns of the past with new ideas, and 
consequently change the view toward the future. 
  Those of an ‘epochal consciousness’ are driven to articulate this 
decisive epoch, which constitutes their general historical ‘boundary situation’ 
as well as the individual specific situations which they suffer (the ‘wall upon 
which they founder’). Amongst them are philosophers and artists who each 
find their own method of expression of the situation, their ‘praxis’, the 
necessary action over contemplation. We might extend Jaspers’ reference to 
philosophy as ‘a practice’ which only becomes real ‘in the living appropriation’ 
of the contents of philosophical texts, never in an indifferent ‘theoretical 
contemplation’, to the practice of art.  Only in this way can their contents 
have a ‘resurrection’, and be appropriated in a variation fitted to its time and 
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to the individual practitioner. Art can be seen as a repository of a zeitgeist 
which can be vicariously experienced by us in our present time.  Adorno tells 
us that the ‘anxiety of the lonely person’ in their alienation from society is a 
gesture which can be quoted: ‘the Expressionist reveals loneliness as 
universal’886. In Expressionism, ‘anxiety has emancipated itself from the 
bourgeois taboos on expression’887. The content of Expressionism however, 
is not only the ‘absolute subject’ but society itself is also reflected in the 
isolation of the Expressionist movement’. We have mentioned the work of 
Thomas Mann, and in Mann’s novel Magic Mountain, we find the character of 
Hans Castorp in the rarified atmosphere of a mountain sanatorium. He sits 
apart from the war raging in the world down below; perhaps reflecting a more 
general wish to be ‘out of it’, Mann himself describes Magic Mountain as a 
‘nunc stans’888.  
  The marked mood of ‘anxiety’ or ‘dissonance’ of the time, is reflected 
in the personal conflicts of individuals; the existential moods reflected in the 
very mood of the time. In Dada Diary, Ball speaks of his tendency ‘to 
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compare my own private experiences with the nation’s’. He sees it, he says, 
‘almost as a matter of conscience to perceive a certain parallel there’, Ball 
asserts that he ‘could not live without the conviction that my own personal 
fate is an abbreviated version of the fate of the whole nation’889 . Robert 
Hullot-Kentor describes Schoenberg’s break from tonality in music as 
achieving ‘a depositional expression, a docket of the historical unconscious 
that registered impulses of isolation, shock, and collapse’890. It is in this way 
that Jaspers ‘speaks as one situated zwischen den Zeiten’891, that is, situated 
in amongst the times; ‘remembering the classical European civilization that 
was no more … scrutinizing the various utopian dogmatisms identified with 
modernity’, and ‘pondering the new world of apparatus and technology 
coming into being but the meaning of which was still unclear.’892 Upheaval so 
severe produces changes too great to assimilate without struggle. 
   Adorno considered that ‘art becomes the unconscious writing of 
history’893 and uses changes in music as an analogy for the economic and 
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cultural crisis in society at the time. To Adorno, Schoenberg especially 
articulates modernity in crisis894 . The ‘chaotic fermentation in music’, he says, 
‘the resolution of which is nevertheless expected to ‘restore order to disorder’ 
in some ‘future renewal’ is a denial of ‘events of the past and elements that 
can be suppressed, but not eradicated’895. The ‘objective consequences’ of 
music, Adorno asserts, have made the idea of a polished work of art invalid 
and ‘disrupted the collective continuity of the effect’ of art. Musical material is 
permeated by ‘traces’ of the social process and there is an altercation 
between the composer and the material which is the same as that between 
the composer and society. It finds its expression in his work, not least in the 
disturbances it causes to the fabric of a work. For music to be ‘timely’ it must 
fulfil its function’896. Accordingly Schoenberg’s music is ‘timely’, it mirrors the 
conditions of the times which produce it through Schoenberg. 
  The uncertainties of the era lead to an anguish which is ‘released 
through and reflected in the art’897, Charles Rosen tells us. Given that, it is 
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fitting that Schoenberg should be working on a style of music that maintains 
the dissonant tension of this time. In 1936 Schoenberg made this 
retrospective comment which recognises that the times themselves were 
partly responsible for the way his music developed: ‘Supposing times were 
normal - normal as they were before 1914 - then the music of our times 
would be in a different situation’
898. Not identifiable until they are passed, 
possibilities exist which are unimaginable. Here again we find the idea that 
the moment is only recognisable when it has already passed. As Kierkegaard 
says in the Journals, ‘Life can be interpreted only after it has been 
experienced’899 . Perceived as a sudden and unexpected rupture in the 
continuity of musical progression, Schoenberg’s form can still be seen as 
naturally following on from the works which preceded it. Rosen says: ‘To a 
certain extent the stylistic revolutions of those years were merely the 
exploitation of already existent possibilities within the artistic languages, the 
drawing of unavoidable conclusions’900. 
Revolution or Evolution. 
  The emergence of ‘new’ art forms or works is perhaps an evolution 
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rather than a revolution. What appears as a revolution from a distant 
perspective might indeed be an evolution whose connections are more 
distant.  Schoenberg himself tells us in relation to dissonant or ‘atonal’ music 
that ’a new approach to expression of moods and characters was discovered’ 
which ‘many people, instead of realising its evolutionary element, called (it) a 
revolution’’901 . We might think of the coming into being of a work as an 
‘emergence’ which suggests something which grows organically in a natural 
process. Our protagonists stress this natural and organic vector of their art 
even as it appears in some cases most unnatural and ‘constructed’. We 
might say that an art movement ‘erupts’ into being, it comes unexpectedly 
and suddenly yet from out of where it has been in immanence, biding its 
time. 
  In the case of Kandinsky and Schoenberg, their work up to a certain 
point constitutes an ‘artistic revolution’; but it is also important to realise that 
they both retain traditional forms as their departure points. The new emerges 
from the dissolution of the old, the old and the new confront one another yet 
work together; traditional methods and forms are retained - although 
Schoenberg rejects the harmonic tradition, he is conservative in this regard. 
While working with atonality and dissonance, he composes in the traditional 
styles of chamber music, opera and oratorio. Kandinsky, while developing 
                                            
901 Schoenberg, Style and Idea, Selected Writings of Arnold Schoenberg,  Editor: Leonard Stein,  
Faber and Faber, London, 1975, p. 50  
371 
abstraction, still makes pictures in oil or water-colour and produces drawings 
and woodcuts. The Dadaists, who left few art works compared to the level of 
their notoriety, might stand as a different example, most of what they did 
happened there and then in the momentary performances at the Cabaret 
Voltaire. Dada ‘erupts’ into being there in Zurich, in1916, founded by Hugo 
Ball in the middle of the First World War. Serge Lemoine asserts it is ‘born 
out of the war itself’ as a ‘direct consequence’
902. After the war there are also 
Dada occurrences in other cities in Germany: Berlin, Hanover and Cologne, 
followed by those in Paris and in New York, but the event of Dada is dated 
from this public manifestation at the Cabaret Voltaire. These events bring 
together a like-minded group of people to express their revulsion against the 
war by means of ‘anti-artistic events’
903. 
  The desire for destruction which gives birth to the new ‘precipitated 
Ball into the Dada cultural frenzy’
904
. He declares, ‘The central clock of an 
abstract epoch has exploded’
905
, and that ‘Dadaism is the only training ground 
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for the great moment that would make everything new’
906
. Dada succeeds in 
being sacrilegious, subversive and outrageous. ‘And then came the dadaists, 
endowed with the acuteness of sleep-walking alcoholics, to attack the arts, 
that last refuge of idealism. …’ ‘’the most sacred possessions’, of which the 
Kaiser had spoken … were being desecrated, drugged and poisoned. The 
ideal of beauty was brought up against life, ugly life, earth, being, even not-
being’
907
. 
  Artists and philosophers question the 
world, the most obvious appearances will never satisfy. Dada seems to 
originate in chance, accident and arbitrariness. The Dadaist Hans Arp 
comments on the intense moment of Zurich Dada and is the first of the 
Dadaists to proclaim das Gesetz des Zufalls , the laws of accident as a new 
basis for artistic creation. He describes his work as ‘ordered according to the 
law of the accident, the accident which, … is but an element of the 
inexplicable reason, the incomprehensible order by which nature herself is 
governed’908. The very establishing of the name ‘Dada’ happens by a famous 
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though contended method of arbitrarily choosing a word at random from a 
dictionary. Tristan Tzara asserts the spirit of Dada, however, is  undermined 
by the retrospective arguments as to dates and details, ‘What interests us is 
the dada spirit, and we were all dada before Dada began …909 Dada turns out 
to have even longer roots. A group of painters, illustrators, writers and 
musicians called the Incohérents, in Paris in 1882 aim to ‘ridicule all forms of 
artistic expression as well as the institutions of their day’910 . They are known 
to the Zurich Dadaists, as evidenced by a poster in the Cabaret Voltaire. 
  In a sense it is ‘the fate of modern art’ to be the place or time when art 
is transformed. There is a sense of necessity and inevitability of the change 
and of those who bring it about  - indeed Schoenberg almost proclaims 
himself to be necessary:  ‘In the army, a superior officer once said to me: ‘So 
you are this notorious Schoenberg, then.’ ‘Beg to report, sir, yes, ‘ I replied. 
‘Nobody wanted to be, someone had to be, so I let it be me.’911 Adorno, 
however, compares him to the elect who refuse their mission. 
  ‘Throughout these decades, art moved fundamentally against fiction, 
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against portraying or representing the world, and toward essence.’912 In 
search of an ‘elemental origin’913 of art.  Kandinsky’s theory of non-objective 
art seeks the moment of dissolution of the objective/subjective dichotomy 
and constitutes ‘a revolution that is still felt today’914 . ‘Does not the dissolution 
of the portrayed object correspond to the dissolution of traditional tonality in 
music?’ asks Jelena Hahl-Koch, ‘does not the emancipation of colors and 
forms … correspond to the emancipation of dissonance? And do not both 
correspond to the dissolution of grammar and syntax which began about the 
same time, as for example with the German Expressionists, with the … 
Russian Futurists, on up to dadaism and concrete poetry?’915 . Adorno shows 
that Schoenberg does this in the medium of music, with the dissolution of the 
‘grammar’ of music in dissonance. The impetus for the work of art is the 
desire for the dialectic of the antithetical elements of inner content and outer 
form, or the spiritual and material to reach a synthesis.  
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Adorno’s Einfall. 
  In artistic creation the initial words, images or notes come to mind and 
are transferred to paper. This first act of creation is often seemingly 
simultaneous with the idea or the initiating notion, its ‘inspiration’. Theodor 
Adorno has a term for this: Einfall. This refers not only to the subjective 
moment of inspiration but contains also the objectivising moment. The word 
can also mean ‘invasion’, which gives a graphic description of the experience 
of having an idea suddenly occur as if from nowhere, and be so impelling 
that it is impossible to ignore. The verb, einfallen carries the meaning ‘to 
collapse’, and here we might recall Kierkegaard’s sensation of being 
confronted by notions which he trembles before, that seem alien and in which 
‘he could not recognise himself’. But when the understanding surrenders and 
gives itself to the idea, one reaches ‘that happy passion’ which is faith. The 
invasion of thought is not always welcome, but it is still impelling: it is ‘a 
sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy’916. This double action is 
not mediated but immediate, it is ‘the wonder’, a revelation. Schoenberg’s 
stages by which he creates a musical composition917 and Kandinsky’s 
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sources of a ‘symphonic composition’918, share a first ‘moment’ of direct 
‘impression’ or ‘inspiration’ which comes from an ‘inner compulsion’. This is 
followed by the composition or construction as a matter of the artist’s skills, 
gaining a more substantial existence as a concrete entity, but which yet 
remains faithful to the initial urge. 
  Our theme of the impossibility of language to express inner thoughts 
and feelings, the aporias inherent in translation must be brought to attention 
again  when we consider the moment of inspiration for a work of art. 
Adorno’s concept of Einfall, is found in a footnote within his chapter 
Schoenberg and Progress in Philosophy of Modern Music (1948). It is, the 
translators tell us, ‘impossible to translate’, but ‘it involves the idea of a 
decisive inspirational occurrence bordering upon revelation which becomes 
the basis for a work of art.’919 But there are two inseparable aspects of the 
Einfall involving both the subjective inspirational moment and the resulting 
objective elements which make up a work of art. 
  The concept of Einfall, Adorno tells us ‘was defined in order to 
distinguish the theme as a matter of organic essence from its creative 
transformation in the work as a matter of abstract, hypothetical ordering. 
‘Einfall’ is not just a psychological category, a matter of ‘inspiration’, but a 
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moment in the dialectical process manifest in musical form.’920  This ‘moment 
in the dialectical process’ refers to that stage in the process of development 
of the piece of music which follows from the initial ‘inner’ impetus. The next 
stage is a translation of this impulse into music in a natural and not too 
‘conscious’ way to begin with; this becomes more a ‘conscious’ effort to 
render into form the idea as the process goes on.  
  Schoenberg professed to be against form, even though his atonal 
scheme is itself a form to which he must keep, like the logical development of 
an argument.  The ‘idea’ he says is preeminent over style. In Prisms, Adorno 
explains: ‘Both practically and theoretically he steadfastly rejected the notion 
of ‘style’, in the sense of a category existing prior to the subject-matter and 
oriented on external consensus; instead he spoke of the ‘idea’, meaning the 
pure elaboration of musical thoughts.’921 Leonard Stein, the translator of 
Schoenberg’s Style and Idea, outlines in his preface the difficulties inherent 
in translating these terms ‘style’ and ‘idea’.  ‘Perhaps the central among all 
his ideas’, Stein tells us ‘is that of Darstellung der Gedanken’. ‘Gedanken’, he 
says ‘is easy enough’ to translate as ’ideas’, but ’Darstellung’ depends on 
what an ‘idea’ is. According to the context, it can refer either to ‘something 
one puts forward, expounds, ‘presents’ (darstellt), like a plan or a 
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proposition’, or ‘something like a stage character whom (in sound) one acts, 
depicts, ‘represents’ (darstellt)’. The idea is arrived at by Erkenntnis - another 
crucial and problematic concept’ for Schoenberg it ‘represents something 
akin to intuition or insight … or ‘realisation’’922. 
  Although this subjective moment works ‘as a driving force’923, the 
‘working out’ represents ‘the process of objectivity and the process of 
becoming’. This adherence to the ‘idea’, however, can leave irrevocable 
‘scars’ or ‘blotches’ on the work, Adorno asserts. Here, we will remember the 
adverse effect on the polished work which Adorno attributes to the anguish of 
the times. Adorno tells us that Schoenberg’s problem ‘is that of mastering the 
contradiction between essence and appearance’924 .  
‘Richness and plenitude are to be made the essence, not mere 
ornament; the essence, in turn, will appear no longer as the rigid 
framework on which the music is draped but rather as concrete and 
evident in its most subtle traits. What he designates as the 
‘subcutaneous’ - the fabric of individual musical events, grasped as the 
ineluctable moments of an internally coherent totality - breaks through 
the surface, becomes visible and manifests itself independently of all 
stereotyped forms’
925.  
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And thus the inward dimension moves outward. ‘Ordering categories, which 
reduce the difficulties of active listening at the cost of the pure elaboration of 
the work, are eliminated. The absence of all mediations introduced into the 
work from outside makes the musical progression seem fragmented and 
abrupt … with the impression increasing in direct proportion to the actual 
degree of inner organization.’926  
  Schoenberg’s innovations in form, Adorno tells us, ‘serve the 
breakthrough of the reality of this content’927.  This breakthrough does not 
happen, however, without leaving ‘scars’ and ‘blotches’ on the work, Adorno 
asserts, whether in Schoenberg’s painting or music. Irremovable, these 
blotches ‘destroy the surface’,  but the ‘authentic suffering’ indicates that the 
‘autonomy of the work is no longer recognised by this suffering’928. The work 
loses its autonomy as a work of art because it has become, as it were, a 
vehicle of the suffering. Schoenberg’s pieces as ‘case studies and 
construction in one’ have no conventional structure from within which ‘a 
freedom of play’ is allowed. Schoenberg rejects play as he rejects illusion, 
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decoration and everything superfluous. 
  Adorno compares Schoenberg’s technique to an attempt in writing 
which might try to use a different grammar and vocabulary for each individual 
piece. Schoenberg attempts to express inner meaning through the very fabric 
of the music. The phenomenon of the ‘shrinking and expansion in time’929 in 
music is symptomatic of the difficulties of these technical restrictions, Adorno 
asserts, and are ‘evident not only in reflection’ on a work ‘but in the dark 
interior of the work itself’. Schoenberg’s works exhibit ‘concentration and 
consistency of formal structure’, the brevity of his (and his pupil Webern’s) 
‘shortest movements’ is a ‘direct result of the demand for the greatest 
consistency’. It ‘precludes the superfluous’, the ornamental and ‘opposes 
expansion in time’ which has been the ‘basis for conceptual work since the 
18th century’.930 ‘Music, compressed into a moment, is valid as an eruptive 
revelation of negative experience. It is closely related to actual suffering’931. 
The moment in terms of condensed time is found represented in ‘The 
monodrama Erwartung’, Adorno notes, ‘which develops the eternity of the 
second in four hundred bars’, and the notion of a moment too swift to register 
in time is found in ‘the rapidly revolving pictures of Die glückliche Hand, 
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which takes back a life unto itself before it has a chance to find its place in 
time.’’932  
  As Nietzsche pointed out, Adorno tells us, ‘the essence of the great 
work of art lies in the fact that it might be totally different in any of its given 
moments.’933 Within the play of forms lies the possibility of change in every 
moment. There is the possibility of new ideas emerging in every moment, but 
also, if a work of art is to endure it must be able to communicate something 
relevant in each new and changing situation. ‘The definition of a work of art in 
terms of its own freedom assures that conventions are binding’. Nietzsche 
takes a positive position toward aesthetic conventions, but, Adorno tells us 
this ’is consistent with this possibility of constant change and his highest 
wisdom is the ironic play with forms whose substantiality has diminished’934. 
The denial of possible change inherent in Schoenberg’s work restricts its 
meaning to the standing moment and robs it of the powerful and enduring 
aspect of art - that it can change its meaning or rather it can reveal the world 
anew. That the interpretation of a work of art can always vary is what makes 
it enduring. 
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  By this reasoning, it is a form of ‘barbarism’ to flout convention, there 
is even something, Adorno asserts which is ‘childish’ about it, we might even 
say retrogressive: ‘Progress itself in its passionate protest against 
conventions has something of the child - a retrogressive tendency’935. It is the 
barbaric nature or ‘primitivism’ of Schoenberg’s early atonal compositions 
rather than ‘their complexity’, Adorno says, especially the Piano Pieces 
(which so appealed to Kandinsky) which shocked the audience. Schoenberg 
breaks the ‘taboos of form’936, to present the passions, not in a stylised form 
or ‘image’ of them but more immediately without disguise through the 
medium of music’. His desire is to bridge the [impossible] gap between the 
subjective experience and its objective expression. These aims bring about a 
‘moment’ when there is a ‘breakthrough’ of a new style of art and hence 
underline again this ‘time’ as the decisive moment’s moment.  
Figures of Venturing Beyond. 
  We might consider that what Schoenberg has done in his work is to 
venture beyond certain limits. Ernst Bloch in the Principle of Hope III 
describes those who venture ’beyond  the limits’937. His main examples are 
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Don Giovani and Faust whose predecessors include Shakespeare and 
Goethe. In their ‘performances’, he tells us, they ‘gazed at life colossally in 
the poetic magnifying mirror’, all ‘the sleeping giants’ of their inner life ‘rose 
up’, in a procession of ‘heroes938. These ‘heroes’, ‘poor devils and great men 
amongst them’, Bloch goes on, all act as if they were ‘the tinderbox of the 
Hans Christian Anderson story’ which held the means to fulfil their ‘every 
wish’939. They ‘all venture beyond what is apportioned to them, flare up like 
fire’940 . The desire to be different can only be maintained throughout life by 
those sufficiently ‘insatiable’ and restless. But because this very thing they 
seek ‘is not there, such unrestrained characters do not turn back’
941. The 
dandy and the flâneur, Bloch asserts originate in ’the barbaric elegance of 
the fin de siècle’
942; they are characters seeking only worldly pleasure, 
making gestures ‘of living life to the full at any cost, as if it could be bought 
like this’943. 
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  However, Ball makes a distinction between an adventurer and a 
dandy which gives us a different interpetation. The adventurer is, he says, 
led by ‘mood’, he trusts in chance and his experiences are ‘gratuitous’ and 
his ‘own affair’. ‘He seeks not insights, but confirmation of his superiority. If it 
is necessary, he risks his life, but he hopes to get away with it’. Following this 
analysis, we might say that the adventurer lives ‘in the moment’ for his own 
finite ends. On the other hand, according to Ball, the dandy is an ‘inquisitive 
man’, who ‘is led from one experience to the another not by his mood, but by 
the consistency of ideas and the logic of intellectual facts. The adventures of 
the dandy are at the expense of the age he lives in … One could also say: 
the adventurer relies on an ideology of chance, the dandy on one of fate’944 . 
The dandy experiences the moment as meaningful to the fate of human 
being and to the epoch which he observes. 
  Ball likens himself to the biblical Daniel; Switzerland, he says ‘is a 
birdcage, surrounded by roaring lions’945. ‘It is a delusion of grandeur’ he 
admits ‘but sometimes I take the whole story as if it had been arranged for 
me’946 . Ball sees himself as providential, like Daniel an ‘interpreter of dreams 
who is thrown with his friends into fire and to the lions … but … ‘the fire had 
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no power upon their bodies’. ‘And I Daniel alone saw the vision: for the men 
that were with me saw not the vision; but a great quaking fell upon them, so 
that they fled to hide themselves.’’ 
  There is a danger of hubris in these venturing characters. Venturing 
beyond, Bloch warns, as an individualistic trait ‘could become simply anti-
social’947. As Huelsenbeck confirms, with this individual audacious striving 
forward the dadaist ‘programme’ involves ‘the adoration of  brute force from 
Rimbaud to Mickey Spillane, … Hitchcock - all that, horrible dictu.’948 The 
striving individual might become something of a bully and a dictator, 
enamoured of his own messianic mission; how one attains one’s objective 
might be at odds with the outcome. In the case of the artist they appear 
intolerably egotistical. Ball writes in Dada Diary: ‘notice that I am falling into 
slight madness that comes from my boundless desire to be different’949 .  
  This epoch is a moment for fantasies of the omnipotence of art and 
artists. Ball sees it as necessary that he should ‘drop all respect for tradition, 
opinion, and judgment. It is necessary for me to erase the rambling text that 
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others have written.’950 ‘Kandinsky also advanced a messianic claim for art’951, 
and posited  a spiritual élite ‘whose summit is an artist-prophet’. This 
‘corresponds to the belief expressed by Schoenberg in the Theory of 
Harmony, that the laws of the man of genius are the laws of the humanity of 
the future’, elsewhere asserting: ‘art is born of ‘I must’, not of ‘I can’’952. In 
echoes of Kierkegaard, Schoenberg states that he rates ‘the struggle for truth 
higher than the truth itself’953 . In 1909, he says that what he visualises he has 
not yet attained, ‘Perhaps this is not yet graspable. It will perhaps take a long 
time before I can write the music I feel urged to, of which I have had an 
inkling for several years, but which, for the time being, I cannot express’954 .  
  We remember our discussion regarding the difference between those 
who are obliviously submerged in the world of everyday concern, who live life 
only ‘for the moment’, and those authentically absorbed. To live ‘in the 
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moment’ for Kierkegaard is to live exclusively in some partial phase of a 
whole. ‘To live anarchically’ according to an ‘imperfect sensuality’ or 
engrossed in concern for the future are both ways of missing the significance 
of the ’moment’.  Kierkegaard’s figure of the ‘seducer’ in Either/Or, is a 
representative of the person who lives ‘in the moment’ in such a way. 
Kierkegaard and Bloch both use the figure of Don Juan to describe this 
character. Goethe’s Faust is a man venturing beyond the limit in his quest to 
‘access spiritual forces’955, as Bloch says, this is ‘a search for the complete 
fulfilment of what appears in the moment’956.  In Don Giovani or Don Juan, 
Bloch tells us, we find examples of the ‘radical love-drive’, in Faust ‘the 
radical drive for knowledge and experience’957.  
  In Thomas Mann’s novel Doctor Faustus, the character of Faust is 
represented in the figure of a composer, Adrian Leverkühn. Mann’s character 
is a composite of Schoenberg and Nietzsche. Leverkühn meets his 
Mephistopheles first in the shape of a pimp who leads him to a prostitute. 
From her ‘he contracted the syphilis that will eventually render him insane’958 .  
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Hence, Bloch tells us, ‘the demonic pact has already been inscribed in his 
own blood, granting him, in the years before his collapse into madness, 
‘great time, mad time, the most devilish time, in which to soar higher and 
higher still’959 . Mann alarmed Schoenberg with his seemingly mysterious 
ability to discern his objectives and put into literary language a clear 
description of his ideas. In fact Mann lifted sections of Adorno’s unpublished 
manuscript of Philosophy of Modern Music, whole into his fiction. The figure 
of Mephistopheles appears again in this work of Mann’s as ‘an intellectualist, 
who writes of art, of music, for vulgar newspapers, a theorist and critic, who 
is himself a composer’960. He is described in terms which unmistakably 
capture Adorno, and it seems, Adorno did not object. 
  The extraordinary knowledge and experience this Faustian Leverkühn 
seeks is given with two hands: carnal knowledge and the experience of the 
‘under-side’ of life on one and the knowledge he develops of a new music 
with the name it gains him amongst the ‘great’ creative artists on the other. 
Through one he contracts syphilis which leads to his death and through the 
other he composes radical new music which, in a sense, makes him 
‘immortal’. Adorno delares that ‘All those outside the sphere of management’ 
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in music ‘are path-finders, trail-blazers, and - above all - tragic figures’961, and 
Harrison confirms this, asserting that there is a ‘tragic experience of heroic 
suffering’ at root of dissonance in musical composition. This is what Bloch 
refers to as the Faustian ‘drive for fulfilment’. 
Beyond What and How. 
  What are the limits which our ‘heroes’ seek to venture beyond? In 
general terms the artist strives toward expression of some ‘inner’ feeling in 
an outward, objective representation. Kandinsky’s central concept is that of 
‘inner necessity’ (innerer Klang), the expression of the ‘soul of nature and 
humanity’962. The question is that of form and content, of how an objective 
form can convey truthfully or accurately the moment of a subjective 
experience. ‘What Kandinsky sought to investigate here was nothing less 
than the common denominator of all the arts, their correlations and … their 
‘translatability’ of one kind of art into another’. He believed in an 
‘overreaching law of all the arts, he pursued it all his life, and always hoped 
for the scientific evidence that would definitely confirm his surmises’963 .  
  Schoenberg considers there is something in the underlying laws of 
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musical composition, though not the laws themselves, which appears to be 
‘eternal or at least of such long duration that we may just as well say eternal’. 
It is perhaps, he ventures, ‘the circumstance that the work of art will always 
mirror our modes of thought, our perceptual and conceptual powers, and our 
feelings’964 . Schoenberg says, ‘At times, when working on something 
extraordinarily difficult, I had a sense of merely transcribing what already 
existed.’965 The ‘eternal’ is that which is abiding and enduring and appears to 
show itself as present in certain moments which come to our attention. We 
have spoken of the Augenblick as that inaccessible entity which has no 
actual content; Heidegger says ‘Nothing can happen in the moment of 
vision’. Boethius describes the nunc stans as a moment which ‘emulates the 
eternal present of eternity’, the nunc stans is not a possible condition of the 
world, only an appearance which attaches itself to the present. Gadamer 
asks of time ‘what is this which … can never at any moment be identical with 
itself as that which is present (da)?’966. The cipher-image Augenblick refers to 
its own emptiness. Jaspers’ concept of cipher as we have seen is of that 
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966 Jacques Derrida asks a similar question in relation to the self identity of a sign in ‘Signs 
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which is the language of transcendence but not transcendence itself. For 
Jaspers one of the boundary situations occurs in the antinomical structure of 
man and especially where it concerns the ‘subject/object dichotomy’. 
Regarding the photograph, we have had Sontag’s description of it as a 
‘pseudo presence’ which is a ‘token of absence’, and Sartre speaking of the 
‘present in the form of flight’. Following these examples, the indication is that 
the objective work cannot be identical with the subjective experience it 
expresses.  
  Art attempts to bring to our attention something eternal and 
transcendent, something of the ‘spirit’ in its many available renderings 
allowed by the German Geist. For Kandinsky ‘spirit’ refers to a part of finite 
being as it seems to do for Jaspers. The ‘nameless unconditioned’ which 
Jaspers posits as both source and goal of transcendence and value, is that 
which is experienced in a particular existential ‘situation’. We might also 
consider Gadamer’s ‘existential moment’ here, as events of ‘history’ and their 
individual experiencing - the zeitgeist, brought to expression. We are also 
reminded of Heidegger’s event as ereignis, with its quality of ‘en-owning’, 
events are taken to heart as belonging with their experiencing. In some 
cases art desires to bring an experience to such close attention as to 
emulate the original moment of experience; but the problem is of being too 
close to the moment to ‘see’ it. Yet, expressionism is an attempt to do just 
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this, it is in fact the central concern of Schoenberg. 
  Schoenberg’s technique of dissonance relates to the mood of society 
at the time and points to the fact that all things are as it were ‘up in the air’, 
we might call the very zeitgeist ‘dissonant’. The conditions of life are not ones 
we know and recognise, they are unidentifiable, not understandable, and 
beyond the power of the individual human being to resolve. Yet there is an 
as-yet unseen resolution; Schoenberg asserts that the expressions 
‘consonance’and ‘dissonance’are false when used to signify an antithesis. ‘It 
all simply depends on the growing ability of the analysing ear to familiarize 
itself with the remote overtones’’, he tells us. ‘What today is remote can 
tomorrow be close at hand; it is all a matter of whether one can get closer.’ 967 
Schoenberg defines consonances as being closer to and in ‘simpler relations 
to the fundamental tone’, while so-called dissonances are more ‘remote, 
more complicated’968 . 
  In our ‘decisive epoch’ both the world and the artists within it are in a 
process of continual striving; what is sought is the achieving of an impossible 
end or the end itself in a final resolution. Bloch, Hudson tells us, followed 
Plato in treating time as a discontinuous continuum of discrete ‘nows’ each of 
which constitutes itself anew in each moment and always takes the same 
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form: the form of a sudden pulse, which drives forward to the next and then 
sinks.969 Bloch interprets this process of the now as a section which reveals 
the structure and content of the world process. It begins again in each 
moment: ‘as a process to solve the question of its origin; and every moment 
contains both the datum of world completion and the data of its content970 . 
The world process, Bloch asserts, is ‘unsolved’, in it ‘the intensive That drives 
toward its missing What or essence, and the structure of the moment reflects 
the structure of the process’971 .  
Momentary Appearance. 
  The moment itself is represented in some of the works of art of this 
period in an attempt to access and represent the moment of the immediate, 
inner experience. The problems involved with this reveal the impossibility of 
seeing what one is fundamentally ‘in’. Schoenberg’s paintings are attempts in 
self-portraiture to ‘see oneself’, their titles pointing to the nature of his 
endeavours: ‘Green Self-portrait’ (1910); ‘Vision’ (1910); ‘Self-Portrait’ 
(1911); and perhaps the most famous and certainly the most angst-ridden 
‘Red Gaze’ (1910). Schoenberg, in a note from 1934 says Kandinsky called 
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his paintings ‘Visions’, ‘while I named them ‘Gazes’ (Blicke)’972. We might 
consider that a ‘vision’ is what one ‘sees’ or experiences, while a ‘gaze’ is a 
concentrated act of looking, of trying to ‘see’. In Schoenberg’s musical 
compositions we find this attempt to access the immediate experience in  A 
Survivor from  Warsaw . 
  Robert Hullot-Kentor describes a scene in A Survivor from Warsaw in 
which German soldiers raiding the hiding place of some Jews find them 
asleep, and oust them from their hiding place. The narrator provides a 
subjective report of the event, as one of the Jews, the subjective position 
prevents certain objective aspects being represented. The confusion of ‘even 
the first moments - the orders shouted, the searchlights - are hard to follow 
and describe’, Hullot-Kentor explains, because the narrator ‘does not know 
what is or is not dream’. As the crowd ‘is driven out of hiding and provoked 
into a stumbling fast march in the street’, the sergeant ‘orders their heads 
smashed’ and the narrator ‘is clubbed down’. ‘The chaos and shattering of 
his perceptions deprive the listener of objective recourse’.  ‘In the concussive 
instant that the rifle butt strikes the narrator’s head, however, we do not, and 
could not possibly, hear a scream. The subjective form of the report prohibits 
the event being registered externally. Instead, the sound that must have 
occurred is documented only by a muffled, suddenly slack and hollow 
                                            
972 Arnold Schoenberg and Wassily Kandinsky, Letters, Pictures and Documents, Editor: Jelena 
Hahl-Koch, Translator: John C. Crawford, Faber and Faber, London,1984, p. 166   
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peacefulness that suspends the recurrent heart-spasming alarm motif that 
knits the work together’. There is perhaps Hullot-Kentor posits, ‘no other 
artwork, in which fright and hope become comparably identical in the 
moment that they vanish. The power of the composition depends on this 
moment. The panicky inconsolableness of history ignites in this stifled, 
imploded instant, whereas any scream would have provided the 
rationalization that it might have been heard’973 .  
  Adorno finds ‘scars and blotches’, faults in the fabric of  Schoenberg’s 
compositions which result from these attempts at immediate expression. Yet, 
Hullot-Kentor asserts that in this piece as ‘an eye-witness report rendered 
into fiction’ what Schoenberg attempts is achieved, ‘the barrier between real 
and fictional is breached’974 . The reviewer, Hans Keller reports on the 
‘shattering’ effect of the composition: ‘What higher praise can the Survivor 
receive than a musician-survivor’s confession that never since his escape 
from the Nazi’s did he feel, at the same time, so terrifyingly near and so 
redeemingly far from the memory of his experiences?’975  Schoenberg, like 
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Kierkegaard never intended to make things easy for the reader, the 
audience. Dissonance caused a ‘scandal’ for Schoenberg, which Rosen tells 
us ‘never finished’. Perceived as ugly and an unpleasant aesthetic 
experience, yet for Kandinsky filled him with excitement at the obvious 
empathy between their respective artistic intentions.  
  This moment of negotiation between producing a work of art which 
expresses Geist in both its content and its form is identified by Bloch as ‘the 
deep content of the Faust wager’. Thomas Mann’s Dr. Faustus, presents an 
image of the composer as one whose artistic gifts are rather an affliction than 
a gift from God, and who is led into a daemonic relation where he must 
sacrifice what is seen as perhaps the usual reason for art -  to reflect the 
world in a pleasing fashion, for the ability of reveal the world at the expense 
of pleasing. In this way the Faustian figure becomes tragic in their suffering 
(in the sense of a passion or progress). Nietzsche considers why ‘… the 
enigma by which ‘that which is ugly and disharmonic’ is represented so often 
in music,  ‘Surely, a higher pleasure must be perceived in all this.’ The 
enigma can be explained by the tragic experience of heroic suffering, which 
makes us see ‘that even the ugly and disharmonic are part of an artistic 
game that the will in the eternal amplitude of its pleasure plays with itself … 
The joy aroused by the tragic myth has the same origin as the joyous 
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sensation of dissonance in music’976 .  
Resolution. 
  We see in Schoenberg’s work an attempt to hold on to the moment, to 
refuse it resolution, to say with Faust ‘Stay Awhile you are so fair’ which, 
Bloch tells us, ‘spoken to the moment, describes the utopia of being -There 
par excellence.’977 Dissonance refuses its ‘terminus’978. Wanting to hold on to 
the moment rather than letting it go to become one of Nietzsche’s ‘dear dead 
glances’, immediate experience allowed to wain, can remain with one less 
intensely and perhaps more ‘thoughtfully’ in reflection. Art might help us to 
accept loss as necessary. Kierkegaard says, ‘An expression of emotion has 
the ‘power to relieve the soul of a burdensome weight, precisely because the 
burden, when merely expressed, already begins to become something of the 
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past’979. To express the joy of such a ‘letting-go’, I  turn again to Thomas 
Mann. Mann’s novel  Buddenbrooks is the story of the decline of a bourgeois 
family attempting to maintain its status during a period of great social 
change. In Buddenbrooks, we find a discussion of the resistance to ‘new 
musical harmonies’980 and this dissonant episode in a harmonious evening at 
the Buddenbrooks’ in the year 1868. Young Hanno Buddenbrooks gives a 
recital of his own composition to whose ending he has given a strange turn. 
Hanno, faithful to Schoenberg’s stance against pathos, manages to make his 
piece ‘emotional rather than merely sentimental’, Hanno’s ‘beloved finale’ 
comes:  
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‘… It swelled, it broadened, it slowly, slowly rose: suddenly, in the forte, 
he introduced the discord C sharp, which led back to the original key … 
He dwelt on the dissonance until it became fortissimo. But he denied 
himself and his audience the resolution; he kept it back. What would it 
be, this resolution, this enchanting, satisfying absorption into the B major 
chord? A joy beyond compare, a gratification of overpowering 
sweetness! Peace! Bliss! The kingdom of Heaven: only not yet - not yet! 
A moment more of striving, hesitation, suspense, that must become 
well-nigh intolerable in order to heighten the ultimate moment of joy. - 
Once more - a last, a final tasting of this striving and yearning, this 
craving of the entire being, this last forcing of the will to deny oneself the 
fulfilment and the conclusion, in the knowledge that joy, when it comes, 
lasts only for the moment. … At last, at last, joy would no longer be 
denied. It came, it poured over him; he resisted no more. His muscles 
relaxed, his head sank weakly on his shoulder, his eyes closed, and a 
pathetic, almost an anguished smile of speechless rapture hovered 
about his mouth; while his tremolo,  … swelled up suddenly into forte, 
and after one brief, resounding burst, broke off’
981. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
981 Ibid, p. 392  
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Conclusion. 
  
The figurative expression ‘in the blink of an eye’ or ‘Moment’ 
(Augenblick) has its root in the instant of time. The concept can never escape 
this basic point, human being as it is inexorably within the temporal world. In 
its most basic interpretation Augenblick describes an experience of a fleeting 
but momentous event. Such an occurrence can be accompanied by an 
altered perception of time. Events can seem to happen in a condensed 
‘moment’ or ‘instant’ of intensity which passes swiftly.  At its extreme, we 
might experience something like an arresting of time itself. Correspondingly, 
time can drag due to boredom or inactivity; traumatic events might be 
accompanied by the sensation that they unfold in slow motion. In this way an 
experience can seem to stand out from time, though in actuality time moves 
on taking these moments with it. This itself is necessary to the moment: that 
it must pass. 
  The moment brings the experience of temporality to our attention. We 
find that objective, ‘outer’ time as a linear progression does not conform to 
our subjective, ‘inner’ experience of it. Circularity in time is discernible in the 
seasonal natural world, however, this investigation into the concept of a 
‘decisive moment’ reveals that our temporal experience is neither simply 
linear nor circular. Much of the significance of the concept lies in its promise 
of an experience which can elevate us from ordinary everyday temporality. 
Certain moments in our temporal experience stand out in significance; they  
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are occasional and disconnected. In reflection one can point to significant 
and decisive moments or events as marking out the span of one’s life or 
attribute to them epoch-making significance.  
  As a metaphor, the Augenblick describes the temporal experience and 
also gives us a neatly representative visual image, the swift opening and 
closing of the ‘blink’; and the ‘eye’ which allows an implication of ‘seeing’ in 
the sense of knowing or understanding. Highlighting the literal German 
meaning of Augenblick as ‘glance of the eye’ gives us Heidegger’s ‘moment 
of vision’, a term related to sight or insight (Einblick) and the more mysterious 
connotation of ‘vision’.  Augenblick is sometimes rendered as the ‘twinkling of 
an eye’ which, along with the connotation of a swift coming and going is also 
suggestive of brightness and light. Nietzsche plays on the word Augenblick 
and its related words: ‘glance’ (Blick), ‘wink’(Augenblinzeln) - as a cheeky 
mode of communication,
 
and ‘the lightning flash (Blitzen) of insight’. In its 
more rare rendition as ‘gaze of the eye’ the phrase has the connotation of a 
prolonged contemplation, perhaps even a dreamy unfocussed look. Jaspers 
refers to the ‘absolute solitude’ of contemplation as ‘the eye of an existence’, 
‘the first leap’
982
 toward existence transcending itself. 
  I have considered the Augenblick as a cipher, a tool for 
communicating certain intense experiences which cannot be grasped or 
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demonstrated. Certain artists and works of art and photography have been 
examined from the point of view of various aspects of the Augenblick. Having 
passed through various philosophers and their redeployments and 
expansions of the complex and interrelated aspects of the concept, it has 
come to be thought of as a ‘philosopheme’. As an inherited conceptual tool of 
metaphysical thought we can use it to consider various elements within 
historical or contemporary situations. It has also become clear that the 
Augenblick consists of variations which share what Wittgenstein terms ‘family 
resemblances’
983.  I reiterate these resemblances here together with 
examples of their manifestations in some of the works of art which have been 
discussed. 
  The ‘now’ is a discrete moment in a continuum or process yet it 
contains something of the past and of the future. Attempts to locate the ‘now’ 
of the present cannot find it in the continuum of time. Heidegger describes 
the nows' coming along and passing away, yet in their changing being also 
'self - same'. Though they pass, they retain a ‘constant presence' .They can 
be arrested for contemplation as the ‘standing now’ or nunc stans. Heidegger 
has asserted that in the ‘moment of vision’ ‘nothing can occur’, it is rather the 
site of ‘an authentic Present or waiting-towards’
984. The temporal moment 
reveals a connection to something eternal or transcendent. As an example of 
this the images of Henri Cartier-Bresson seem to isolate a moment of 
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individual or historical significance and hold it in a ‘still’ photograph. His work 
has been described as representing nothing less than the human condition. 
Certain of Schoenberg’s works are pieces of condensed time, as is evident in 
Erwartung. One second of action is drawn out to the eternity of four hundred 
bars. In Die glückliche Hand, the rapidly revolving images are moments too 
swiftly passing to access.  They become restricted to the ‘standing moment’. 
Cartier-Bresson’s images have been describes as ‘captured now’ moments. 
Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain as he himself tells us is a nunc stans, 
indeed both of these examples are this nunc stans in form as well as content. 
It would seem that we carry the 'now' along with us in some sense, and 
therefore, as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche made clear, every moment holds 
the possibility of an augenblicklich experience. In the process of perishing 
and becoming, Nietzsche’s ‘life force’, the Moment returns or recurs. The 
possibility of accessing it exists in ‘every moment’. In the case of Jaspers, the 
potential leap to an awareness of Existenz exists as possibility in every 
moment, awaiting fulfilment. This realisation lies at the heart of the doctrine 
of Eternal Return. Bloch asserts that the structure of the ‘world process’ is 
reflected in that of the Moment as ‘heliotropic’, beginning anew ‘in every 
moment’ and progressing toward the light of an ‘end’. This is another way in 
which the moment in everyday temporal existence connects itself to the 
‘eternal’. Heidegger and Nietzsche, through the concept of Eternal Return 
speak of an eternal quality of transcendent Being, out of which human beings 
come forth into presence in a momentary yet momentous way. Heidegger  
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describes Dasein’s being as augenblicklichkeit. We are able to come to the 
point of celebrating the momentariness of our existence (augenblicklichkeit), 
because we understand it relative to the notion that 'there is no perishing 
without a simultaneous becoming' .  
  Gadamer has said of the notion of perishing and becoming that it is 
where the 'truth of historical consciousness' reaches 'its fulfilment'. It is the 
endless coming and going of change which builds a continuity of history, 
rather than the flow of time. It comes to our attention as moments of 
disruption. (Even the subjective moment of ‘inspiration’ which occurs as if 
suddenly and from ‘out of the blue’ and initiates the artistic attempts to 
express the inexpressible, is revealed as a moment in a dialectical 
progression. It is Adorno asserts, inseparable from its objective rendering in 
form.)  Discontinuities and radical changes experienced relative to perishing 
and becoming for Gadamer constitute ‘historical consciousness’. For 
Kierkegaard, Christ’s Incarnation is such an event. It happens ‘once and for 
all’, it changes everything. As such we might consider it as ‘epoch making’; 
we have seen that Gadamer recognises it as 'an absolute epoch-experience', 
as significant to religious thinking as it is to the history of ideas. 
  Events which precipitate great change are boundary situations, an 
example in the contemporary world I point to is September 11
th as being a 
moment when the world as we know it changed. An historical event and its 
actual experiencing together form Gadamer’s ‘existential moment’. I have 
identified an epoch as decisive, that which centres on the year 1910. 
Discontinuities keep everything up in the air so to speak. Adorno asserts that  
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Schoenberg’s dissonant music with its dissolution of traditional tonality 
articulates the contemporary crisis, mirrors the condition of dissonant tension 
of the zeitgeist (intellectual and metphysical).  New art movements erupt into 
being from the destruction of old traditions, yet still occur within an on-going 
process. The Dada movement is born out of this zeitgeist, it aims to make the 
world anew by revolt. Destruction is necessary to creation, it is the result of 
accident, the unexpected thrown up by chance. Nietzsche followed by 
Jaspers and Heidegger has told us how to live and not be a prey to chance 
but to overcome it by willing. We find also at this time the dissolution of the 
representation of the object in art in favour of abstraction. There is a striving 
for a means of expression which goes beyond limits of form. 
Christ’s Incarnation as a ‘once and for all’ event provides a ‘prototype’ 
or initialising Moment which enables all experiences of subjective ‘truth’ that 
follow. It allows a thinking of the collapsing or condensing of time between an 
initial event which maintains its presence as it recurs.  It is not a question of 
distance in time rather, a connection of understanding. We established in the 
case of Cartier-Bresson that one image can distil the essence of a whole 
sequence of action and serve as an Ansatzpunkt or point of departure for 
further thinking. A discussion regarding the ability of an image to express and 
represent complex, simultaneously experienced emotions led us to extend 
this question to incorporate ‘images’ of art and music, in our final chapter. 
In terms of art, I have already mentioned Schoenberg’s Erwartung 
condensed to its limit by being devoid of anything superfluously ornamental.   
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The Moment of subjective experience, insight or ‘vision’ involves the 
communication of the type of ‘truth’ or knowledge unavailable to scientific 
thinking, that which requires ‘faith’ whether religious or philosophical. 
However, the connection to the eternal made in subjective moments must be 
constantly maintained, as Kierkegaard said, empirically existing beings are in 
existence as ‘inwardness’ ‘only momentarily’
985
. The inherent paradox of the 
Augenblick is that it is at the same time both fulfilled ‘because in it lies 
eternity’ and empty because the temporal moment vanishes and the actual 
experience of the Augenblick cannot be grasped. The knowledge involved in 
a ‘vision’, Kierkegaard has shown us, is not that which can be conveyed 
socratically. Jaspers also has indicated that this is a knowledge which 
belongs to eternity, 'athwart of time' . Jaspers’ ‘epochal consciousness’ 
attempts to see beyond the legacies of the past. Artists, as ‘epochal 
consciousness’, recognise and strive to express the zeitgeist. To make flesh 
something eternal or transcendent.  
We have seen throughout this thesis the necessity of the presence of 
the right ‘man’ of the moment. Those who are unafraid to risk themselves, to 
raise the question of their relation to the idea as Kierkegaard says. 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger assert that this only happens among the very 
few and it is only then that the ‘decisive moment’ has the power to compel 
                                            
985 Kierkegaard, CUP, op cit, p. 191 
  
407 
(genius), or it paralyses the individual with anxiety (irony)’986. Some perhaps 
over-wrought attempts at a breakthrough can result in a composition being 
flawed according to Adorno. However, for such individuals, the Augenblick 
can allow a direct experience a connection to something eternal.  
We have noted Jaspers’ appropriation of Kierkegaard’s concept of ‘the 
leap’, developing it from one of faith in relation to religious belief, to one of 
faith in philosophical thinking and decision within a finite temporal life. We 
have seen how Jaspers describes a penetrating glimpse of a vital, though 
incommunicable experience in ‘fleeting moments’ as ‘a pure eye’. If one does 
not retreat from this experience transcendence can ‘shine through’
987
. 
Perhaps the actions of our artists might constitute such a leap of faith. 
The Moment of chance has been considered especially in Nietzsche 
and Jaspers together with the role of fate and accident and its acceptance as 
amor fati. What is thrown up in the flux of life can be seized and used. Our 
artists seize the moment of change and respond to it in their works. We have 
seen the moment defined as a crisis point of judgement and decision, of an 
act of will carried out in existential freedom. How an individual acts in a 
moment of decision, can reveal their attitude to life itself. Jaspers, following 
Kierkegaard, has identified two modes of living ‘in the moment’. In one the 
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present is given no significance in itself, life is lived for the sake of future 
goals; in the contrasting view the present is all - one lives only ‘for the 
moment’.  Both concern finite temporal existence and miss the connection to 
the eternal, Jaspers has asserted. But one who is ‘like the Augenblick’, or ‘in 
the Augenblick’ (augenblicklich) as a state of being, yearns toward a fulfilled 
existence.  Nietzsche, with his symbol of the gateway named Augenblick, 
has presented us with the notion of the necessity of being’ in the gateway’ to 
fully realise the nature of the eternal. He has revealed this as a site of moral 
decision, and told us that one must summon the courage to confront 
acccepted values and realise that moral responsibility resides only within 
oneself. 
  Artists expose the symptoms of the problematic of the times. In 
artworks they attempt to express existentiality – that we are, were, and hope 
to be, they provide document and evidence of a zeitgeist. Being fully ‘in’ the 
existential moment they strive toward its expression. Kandinsky and 
Schoenberg both realise the limits of the possibilities of doing this in 
traditional forms. Adventurers both, they attempt new forms, Kandinsky 
moves toward abstraction as Schoenberg does toward dissonance. Having 
reached the limits of art the artists venture beyond them, but at great risk.  
  Bloch refers to those who heroically venture beyond. He uses the 
figure of Kierkegaard’s Don Juan as one who lives ‘for the moment’ in what 
Heidegger would call an ‘inauthentic’ attitude. Heroic yet hubristic, suffering 
delusions of grandeur which can turn to madness (Hugo Ball felt his need to  
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be different verged on madness). This is how Schoenberg is portrayed by 
Mann, as a Faust figure. The risk he takes is a wager and a demonic pact. 
The knowedge such figures seek can only lead to their downfall. Works of 
art, as we have heard Adorno assert, can be scarred and lose their 
autonomy as a work of art. Schoenberg’s Survivor from Warsaw can be seen 
as a represention of the impossibility of accessing the fleeting momentary 
experience, (especially that of death, which is, as we have heard Heidegger 
say ‘unavailable’). In this work fear and hope appear momentarily together, 
but the clash of the paradox, though necessary, cannot be maintained and 
the moment vanishes.  
  The moment in its most ‘replete sense’, Kierkegaard calls the ‘fulness 
of the time’. A conjunction of an historical and initial moment when something 
‘new’ appears and the subjective experience of it, it resembles Gadamers 
definition of the ‘existential moment’. It describes the notion of ‘historicity’ 
used by both Gadamer and Heidegger. We have encountered this idea in 
Heidegger’s apocalyptic’ moment of vision’, as related to kairos the right time 
for action. Aspects of kairos have been found throughout the investigation 
into Cartier-Bresson’s ‘decisive moment’. Finally it describes that period I 
have defined as the’ decisive epoch’ with its dissonant zeitgeist. In the 
fullness of time, when the time is right and the person necessary is present, 
change occurs. Conventional perceptions of art and music are challenged 
and they change. The ‘boundary situation’ that this epoch represents brings 
with it the opportunity of ‘venturing beyond’ its limits.  
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  Our investigations have concentrated on nineteenth and twentieth 
century conceptions of the 'moment'.  It culminates in a period poignant and 
fertile for considerations of the ‘moment’. We have described how human 
being is alienated from the world at large and from itself; and we have utilised 
Schoenberg’s ‘dissonance’ as an analogy for the state of unresolvedness of 
the world and of the individuals within it. We have posited that art provides a 
repository of the inner ‘feelings’ of individuals which reflect the outer ‘mood’ 
of the time and as such can provide us with examples of the ‘existential 
moment’.  We have looked into examples of these attempts to go beyond 
temporal and material constraints.    
  Jaspers has said that philosophising issues from an ‘inner drive’
988
 of 
individual human being toward the transcendent which it can accomplish in 
an ‘exalted moment’. The final form constantly seeks its essence. Yet we 
have established that this immediate moment of experiencing cannot be held 
onto. The dissonance seeks its consonance. Human being yearns toward 
fulfiment, yet perversely wants no end to the yearning, for a yearning 
satisfied is no longer a yearning. Though we drive toward ‘ends’, keeping 
things in the air puts off the final end. In this way we seek to keep the 
moment with us, pending and unresolved. And yet, its resolution when it 
comes might be a joyous ecstatic experience.  However, we soon begin 
                                            
988 Jaspers, Karl, Way to Wisdom, An Introduction to Philosophy, Yale University press, New 
Haven and London, 1954, p. 24  
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again yearning for the day of its return. Faust bids the moment stay, but 
Nietzsche, as Stambaugh astutely points out, bids the moment go - but 
return. This is Nietzsche’s way of holding on to the moment. It is not lost in 
this way and we can live in joyful expectation that the possibility of a decisive 
moment resides in ‘every moment’. 
The idea which began in this thesis with Kierkegaard’s collapsing of time is 
echoed in Jaspers’ notion that the moment of philosophical insight brings 
together the philosophers of the past and those who follow them, 
transcending their actual temporal existence to become ‘eternal 
contemporaries’
989.
. The existentialist philosophers we have considered, the 
‘philosophers of the moment’ are such contemporaries and we could not 
have had a developed concept of the Augenblick without them. It is our task 
to make these philosophers ‘mean’ for our contemporary situation, to 
collapse the time between their thought and ours, to have the courage to 
venture. The perennial philosophical questions, Jaspers tells us, are 
transformed for us in our situation, each age must come to its own 
understanding of them and make their own response. The Augenblick may 
continue to gather added meanings to itself, relevent to the contemporary 
situation. As Jaspers pointed out, the more ‘rational’ human being seemingly 
becomes, the more it has need of the Augenblick.  
                                                                                                                             
 
989  Jaspers, The Great Philosophers I, viii, Wallraff, op cit, p. 18  
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